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DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
A TRACKING STOCK EQUITY STRUCTURE:
THE NEED FOR A DUTY OF FAIRNESS
Jeffrey J. Hass*
INTRODUCrION
If some of Wall Street's financial engineers have their way, an
exotic corporate financing tool known as [track]ing stock will be coming
to a company near you.
When it does, some experts advise, run for the hills.'
Trouble is brewing in the seemingly sedate realm of corporate
directorial fiduciary duties. A number of prominent U.S. companies -
including, among others, U S West, Inc., General Motors Corp., USX
Corp., and Tele-Communications, Inc.2 - have been operating their
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. 1988, University of
Pennsylvania. - Ed. I would like to thank William Bratton and Lawrence Cunningham
for their valuable suggestions on an earlier draft of this article, Stephen Gillers, Harvey
Goldschmid, and Allan Vestal for their advice and encouragement, and Richard Kendall
of Global Financial Press for his friendship and generosity. Special thanks go out to
Laura Pentimone and D. Michael Roberts for their editorial assistance. Finally, no
words can express my appreciation for my life partner, Anita Hass, whose unwavering
support of my efforts means the world to me.
1. Stephanie Strom, It's Called Targeted Stock: Shun It, Some Experts Say, N.Y.
Tpm, July 12, 1994, at Dl.
2. See GENERAL MoroRs CORP., PROXY STATEMEN/PROSPEC rUs (Sept. 21, 1984)
[hereinafter GM-EDS PROXY STATEMENT] (used in connection with GM's acquisition of
Electronic Data Systems Corp., which GM recently split-off (see infra note 41));
GENERAL MoTORs CORP., SoLicrrATION STATEMENT (Nov. 13, 1985) [hereinafter GM-
HuGHEs SOLICrTATION STATEMENT] (used in connection with GM's acquisition of Hughes
Aircraft Co.); TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PROXY STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUs (June 29,
1995) [hereinafter TCI PRoxY STATEMENT]; U S WEST, INC, PROXY STATEMENT AND
PRospErus (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT]; USX CORP.,
PROXY STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS (Apr. 10, 1991) [hereinafter USX-MARATEON PROXY
STATEMENT]; USX CORP., PRoXY STATEMENT (Apr. 13, 1992) [hereinafter USX-DEn-n
PROXY STATEMENT]; see also GENzYME CoRP., PRosPEcTus AND JoINT PROXY STATEMENT
(Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter GENzYME PRoXY STATEMENT]; SEAGULL ENERGY CoRP.,
PROXY STATEMENT (May 2, 1994) [hereinafter SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT].
In addition to those companies discussed above, Ralston Purina Co. also adopted a
tracking stock equity structure. See RALSTON PURINA Co., PROXY STATEMENT AND
PRosPEcrus (June 9, 1993) [hereinafter RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT]. However, Ralston
Purina unwound its tracking stock equity structure in May 1995 by exchanging out-
standing shares of Ralston-Continental Baking Group Common Stock for shares of
Ralston-Ralston Purina Group Common Stock in anticipation of the sale of its Conti-
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businesses using an evolutionary corporate equity structure that employs
"tracking" stocks.3 Like conventional common stocks, these hybrid
forms of common stock legally represent an equity stake in a diversi-
fied parent corporation. Unlike their conventional counterparts, how-
ever, tracking stocks possess carefully tailored attributes that are de-
signed to provide investors with the economic equivalent of an equity
stake in a particular business segment or "group ' 4 operated by a diver-
sified parent corporation, rather than in the whole corporation.5
nental Baking subsidiary to Interstate Bakeries Corp. in July 1995. See Carl Quintanilla,
Interstate Bakeries Set to Buy Ralston's in $560 Million Agreement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,
1995, at B6.
Two other prominent U.S. companies attempted to implement a tracking stock eq-
uity structure and failed. Kmart Corp.'s proposed structure - detailed in its annual re-
port and proxy statement dated April 28, 1994 (see KMART CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT
AND 1993 ANNuAL REPORT (Apr. 28, 1994) [hereinafter KMART PRoxy STATEMENT]) -
was rejected by its stockholders on June 3, 1994. See Christina Hoff, K-Mart Weighs Its
Options After Defeat by Shareholders at Stock-Sale Proposal, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1994,
at A2. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp.'s proposed structure - detailed in its proxy state-
ment dated June 4, 1993 (see RJR NABisco HOLDING CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT (June 4
1993) [hereinafter RJR PRoxY STATEMENT]) - was rejected by its stockholders on June
23, 1993.
At least one foreign corporation - Fletcher Challenge Ltd., a New Zealand corpo-
ration - has adopted a tracking stock equity structure. See FLETcHER CHALLENGE LTD.,
SOLICITATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECrUS (Oct. 21, 1993) [hereinafter FLrcHR Souca.
TATION STATEMENT]. Fletcher Challenge, which recently split one of its two tracking
stocks into three separate tracking stocks, now has four classes of tracking stock. See
Karen Chan, Fletcher Challenge's New Shares Draw Mixed Views From Analysts,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1996, at 15.
3. Tracking stocks also are referred to as alphabet stocks, lettered stocks, or
targeted stocks. The terms alphabet and lettered stock arose originally when General
Motors Corp. issued two classes of common stock known as GM class "E" common
stock (representing an economic interest in GM's former Electronic Data Systems sub-
sidiary) and GM class "H" common stock (representing an economic interest in GM's
current Hughes Aircraft subsidiary). The term targeted stock was coined by Lehman
Brothers in the early 1990s in an attempt to create a proprietary distinction in services it
was rendering to corporations interested in implementing a tracking stock equity struc-
ture. See generally Targeted Stock Picking Up As Restructuring Choice, TREASURY
MANAGER'S REP., Aug. 2, 1996, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Restructuring Choice] (noting that
"targeted stock" was created by Lehman Brothers in 1991 for Pittsburgh-based USX
Corp.).
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") typically requires cor-
porations adopting tracking stock equity structures to use the term group to identify the
distinct business segments of the corporation to which a particular class of tracking
stock will be linked economically. For example, in 1991 USX Corp. artificially bifur-
cated itself into the Steel Group and the Marathon Group and, in 1992, further subdi-
vided the Marathon Group into the Marathon Group and the Delhi Group. USX's three
tracking stocks are named accordingly "USX-U.S. Steel Group Common Stock,"
"USX-Marathon Group Common Stock," and "USX-Delhi Group Common Stock."
5. See infra section I.B.2.
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The advent of such a novel equity structure, in turn, presents
unique and formidable challenges to directors that are not faced by di-
rectors of corporations with conventional equity structures. These chal-
lenges primarily stem from the extensive intergroup conflicts and direc-
torial loyalty concerns inherent in tracking stock equity structures.
These conflicts and concerns arise when a parent corporation imple-
menting a tracking stock equity structure artificially divides itself into
two or more distinct business groups. Although that corporation strives
to present its business groups to the financial community as separate
and distinct stand-alone corporations,6 it remains intact and governed by
a single board of directors and executive management team. Not sur-
prisingly, the traditional corporate fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,7
6. The SEC requires that corporations with tracking stock equity structures dis-
tribute two sets of financial statements to holders of shares of each class of tracking
stock. The first set contains details of the financial performance of the business group to
which shares of such class are linked economically. The second set contains details of
the financial performance of the entire tracking stock corporation on a consolidated ba-
sis. Tracking stock corporations typically send the two sets of financial statements to
stockholders in one disclosure document. See, e.g., U.S. STEEL GROUP, 1995 ANNuAL
REPORT (Feb. 13, 1996) (detailing the financial performance of both USX Corp.'s U.S.
Steel Group and USX Corp. as a whole during 1995).
7. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988) ("It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that directors
are subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness.");
Steinberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1124 (Del. 1988) ("It is a basic principle of
Delaware corporate law that directors of Delaware corporations are subject to fiduciary
duties."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (holding that corpo-
rate directors are fiduciaries and as such owe the corporation a duty of care to inform
themselves properly before making a business decision); Lmws SOLOMON & ALAN R.
PALMrrER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 314 (2d ed. 1994).
As Solomon and Palmiter have explained:
According to the traditional fiduciary analysis, corporate managers owe two du-
ties to the corporation: care and loyalty. The duty of care imposes minimal stan-
dards of attentiveness and prudence; it specifies standards for judging the ade-
quacy of corporate decisions when the fiduciary is charged with laziness,
although not with a conflict of interest. The duty of loyalty arises when a fiduci-
ary undertakes a transaction that may conflict with the corporation's interests. It
imposes stringent standards of fairness in cases of diversion and self-dealing.
Id.; see infra sections IV.A.1 and IV.B.1 (providing an overview of the duties of care
and loyalty under Delaware law).
Because many of the most prominent tracking stock corporations in existence to-
day are Delaware corporations (for example, Tele-Communications, Inc., General
Motors Corp., and USX Corp.), Delaware law will be used throughout this article ex-
clusively as the backdrop in evaluating traditional corporate fiduciary duties. In fact, as
part of its implementation of a tracking stock equity structure, U S West, Inc., a
Colorado corporation at the time, reincorporated in the State of Delaware. See U S
WEST Paoxy STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1, 41-42, 61-68. Another important reason to
focus on Delaware law is the fact that the large variety of permitted corporate transac-
tions under Delaware law has created an ample number of fiduciary duty questions for
2091June 1996]
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which were designed to promote due care in directorial decisionmaking
and prevent improper self-dealing by directors,' fail to address the
unique fairness issues raised by these intergroup conflicts and loyalty
concerns. The ambiguities caused by this failure are a disservice to both
the millions of stockholders holding shares of tracking stock9 and the
directors serving on tracking stock corporate boards.
On the one hand, directors of tracking stock corporations deserve
the legal guidance necessary to make corporate decisions and formulate
corporate policies giving rise to intergroup conflicts free from unwar-
ranted stockholder litigation. On the other hand, stockholders of track-
ing stock corporations need legal assurance that these directors, when
making business decisions and formulating corporate policies, are con-
sidering fully and fairly the needs of the business group to which their
shares are linked economically. In addition, these stockholders deserve
legal assurance that the individuals serving as directors are "disinter-
ested"10 from a financial point of view. The need for legal guidance in
this area is all the more acute today because several additional corpora-
tions have adopted recently, or have proposed adopting, tracking stock
equity structures."
Corporate fiduciary law, therefore, needs to evolve to accommo-
date this novel capital structure development. This author argues that di-
rectors of tracking stock corporations should comply with a newly cre-
ated "duty of fairness" when making decisions and formulating policies
that could have disparate impacts on the business groups operated by
those corporations. This new duty addresses head-on the intergroup
conflicts and directorial loyalty concerns that arise in a tracking stock
equity structure. The creation of this new duty is more appropriate than
the Delaware courts to resolve. See Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Foreword:
Delaware's Preeminence by Design, in 1 R. FRANKLiN BALOTI & JESSE A. FwNKELSTEIN,
THE DELAwARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BusINFss ORGANIZATIONS F-1, F-3 (2d ed.
Supp. 1991); U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42 (summarizing the
benefits of incorporating in Delaware). Importantly, this article neither has attempted
to, nor does it, analyze the issues raised herein under the substantive laws of any juris-
diction other than the laws of the State of Delaware.
8. See infra sections IV.A.1 (discussing the duty of care and the business judgment
rule) and IV.B.1 (discussing the duty of loyalty).
9. General Motors Corp. alone had over 1.1 million record holders of its lettered
stocks on December 31, 1995: 625,652 record holders of GM's $1213 par value Common
Stock, 272,096 record holders of GM's Class E Common Stock, and 267,052 holders of
GM's Class H Common Stock. See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1995 FORM 10-K, at 11-45
n.6.
10. "Disinterested" in a tracking stock context has a unique meaning because of
the substantial divergence of financial interest that exists among different classes of
tracking stock. See infra section II.C.
11. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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simply creating a judicial gloss on the traditional fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty because those duties as currently interpreted can play
the same vital role in the corporate governance of tracking stock corpo-
rations as they do in the corporate governance of conventional
corporations.
Part I of this article briefly describes the key distinctions between
a tracking stock corporation and a conventional corporation. It then
touches on the reasons why corporations have adopted tracking stock
equity structures. Part II articulates the unique legal challenges
presented by a tracking stock equity structure. Part Ill discusses the dis-
closure that tracking stock corporations have made with respect to these
challenges. Part IV briefly summarizes the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty and explores why these duties are ill-equipped to address these
challenges. Part V presents the duty of fairness and discusses the duty's
elements in detail. In addition, Part V sets forth practical advice as to
what tracking stock boards can do today to help minimize their expo-
sure to litigation that may be commenced by disgruntled tracking stock
stockholders in the future.
I. TRACKING STOCK EQUrrY STRuCrURE - A PRIMER
A. Key Distinctions Between a Conventional Corporation and a
Tracking Stock Corporation
A tracking stock corporation and a conventional corporation differ
in several material respects. These differences all arise from a tracking
stock corporation's attempt to link the performance of each class of its
common stock'2 to a particular business group operated by that corpora-
tion. The distinctions between a conventional corporation and a tracking
stock corporation are revealed by comparing the different classes of
common stock issued by a conventional corporation and a tracking
stock corporation, the respective voting, dividend and liquidation rights
of those classes of common stock, and the corporate governance struc-
ture of those corporations. 3
12. A class of common stock of a corporation with a tracking stock equity struc-
ture commonly is referred to as "tracking stock" in the financial marketplace and
throughout this article.
13. For a general overview of the attributes of tracking stock corporations, see
Erica H. Steinberger & Jeffrey J. Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, in ACQUISI-
TIONS, MERGERS, SPIN-OFFS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURINGS 523 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-825, 1993).
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1. Classes of Common Stock
An examination of the classes of common stock issued by a con-
ventional corporation and a tracking stock corporation reveals the most
pronounced difference between them. The equity structure of a conven-
tional corporation - even one with diversified operations 14 - typically
consists of a single class of common stock.15 The holders of the out-
standing shares of that class collectively own the entire equity or own-
ership interest in the corporation.' 6 To the extent the corporation as a
whole performs well, shares of that class should likewise perform well
regardless of how any particular division or subsidiary of that corpora-
tion performs.
By contrast, a corporation with a tracking stock equity structure
must have shares of at least two separate and distinct classes of com-
mon stock outstanding.17 Holders of the outstanding shares of those
14. "Diversified" in this context means a corporation with two or more substan-
tially unrelated business pursuits or lines of business. For example, a corporation that
solely manufactures shoes is specialized rather than diversified, whereas a corporation
that both manufactures shoes and operates a chain of restaurants is diversified rather
than specialized. A corporation often strives for diversification in order to soften the ef-
fects of a downturn in the business cycle associated with its primary line of business or
to guard against the obsolescence of that business. Diversification is also thought to
provide synergies. See Dennis C. Carey & Ralph S. Saul, Have Spinoffs Spun Out of
Control?, N.Y. TMs, July 14, 1996, § 3, at 11.
15. As discussed later in this article, see infra note 67, some corporations, of
course, do have more than one class of common stock. While the economic rights of
those classes mirror each other, the legal rights of those classes differ, especially with
respect to exchange and voting rights. A tracking stock corporation, by contrast, has
multiple classes of common stock, each of which has unique economic and legal rights.
Preferred stock of a conventional corporation is not discussed in this article mainly be-
cause the holders of such stock "usually realize their gain from fixed dividends, not
from capital appreciation or increased [corporate] profits, and so are analogous to
debtholders who receive their return from interest.... In short, preferred stockholders,
like debtholders, receive little benefit from improved corporate performance."
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and Why We Should
Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 451 (1996). This work also contains an excellent dis-
cussion and analysis of corporate fiduciary duties in a preferred stock context.
16. See BALomr & FIasTN, supra note 7, § 5.1, at 5-4 (Supp. 1996). The term
common stock generally refers to an "equity security that has voting rights and is enti-
tled to share in the residual assets of the corporation on liquidation after the claims of
creditors and other classes of stock are satisfied." Id. § 5.2, at 5-10. Importantly, com-
mon stock also has a "maximization right - that is, the right to require that manage-
ment run the corporation in a way intended to maximize benefits accruing to [common
stock]holders." Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Finan-
cial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273, 1288
(1991).
17. General Motors Corp., U S West, Inc., and Genzyme Corp. have, and Ralston
Purina Co. had at one time, two classes of tracking stock. USX Corp. has three classes
of tracking stock. Fletcher Challenge Ltd., a New Zealand corporation that initially had
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classes own, in the aggregate, the entire equity interest in the tracking
stock corporation. Yet, unlike a class of common stock of a conven-
tional corporation, each class of common stock of a tracking stock cor-
poration "tracks" or "targets" the financial performance of a distinct
business segment or "group" 18 operated by that corporation. Such
tracking is achieved by inserting specific provisions into a corporation's
certificate or articles of incorporation that define the particular rights of
each class of tracking stock. In addition, the board of directors adopts
certain managerial and accounting policies that foster tracking.' 9
As discussed below,20 the goal in implementing a tracking stock
equity structure is, in essence, to create a fiction in the investment com-
munity. This fiction maintains that a particular class of tracking stock is
really common stock of a stand-alone corporation that operates the
two classes of tracking stock, recently split one class into three separate classes; conse-
quently, Fletcher Challenge now has four classes of tracking stock. See supra note 2.
Kmart Corp., had it successfully adopted its Specialty Retail Stock Proposal in 1994,
would have had the ability to issue up to five classes of tracking stock. See supra note
2.
Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI") has, perhaps, the most confusing equity struc-
ture of any tracking stock corporation. Immediately prior to adopting its tracking stock
proposal, TCI had two classes of common stock (Class A and Class B). Upon adopting
its proposal, TCI redesignated its two existing classes of common stock into two series
of tracking stock: Series A TCI Group Common Stock and Series B TCI Group Com-
mon Stock. Shares of these two series are designed to track TCI's newly created TCI
business group. Simultaneously with the redesignation of its existing classes of common
stock, TCI distributed shares of two new series of tracking stock designated as Series A
Liberty Media Group Common Stock and Series B Liberty Media Group Common
Stock. Shares of these two new series are designed to track TCI's newly created Liberty
Media business group. See generally TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2 (detailing, in
a 479-page fine-print document, TCI's tracking stock proposal and financial information
for its two business groups).
With regard to the complexity of TCI's tracking stock equity structure, Robert
Wood commented that:
[T]he biggest current flap over target stock involves [TCI]. TCI has achieved sig-
nificant publicity for its four-pronged approach to tracking stock. Reduced to
simplicity (if anything can be simple here), the TCI plan calls for four issuances
based on TCI components.... [l]t is understandable that investors may be cir-
cumspect [of TCI's plan] upon receiving the 600 page preliminary proxy materi-
als plopped on their desks.
Robert W. Wood, Current Trends and Transactions, in 8 TAX STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATE AcQuisMONs, DisPosmoNs, SPIN-OFFs, JoiNT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REOR-
GANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCrURINGS 1995, at 585, 624 (PLI Tax Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. J-378, 1995).
18. See supra note 4.
19. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 30-32; SEAGULL PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 45-47; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 49-53; U S
WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 42-45; USX-DELn PROXY STATEMENT, supra
note 2, at 18.
20. See infra section I.B.2.
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same type of business as the tracked business group. Tracking stock
corporations bolster this fiction by publishing and distributing to the fi-
nancial community separate audited financial statements of their various
business groups. 21 Tracking stock corporations hope that shares of each
class will trade in the financial marketplace based directly on how the
tracked business group performs and only indirectly (if at all) on the
performance of the corporation as a whole. Tracking stocks, however,
do not provide stockholders with an outright equity interest in the
tracked business group."
2. Dividend, Voting, and Liquidation Rights
Holders of common stock of a conventional corporation ordinarily
receive one vote for each share on all matters upon which common
stockholders are entitled to vote. This right usually is set forth explicitly
in the certificate or articles of incorporation of the corporation or, in the
absence of such a provision, is granted by the corporate law of the state
in which the corporation was organized.23 Dividends on shares of com-
mon stock are payable at the discretion of the corporation's board of di-
rectors and then solely out of the funds of the corporation legally avail-
able for the payment of dividends, as determined by state corporate
law.24 Upon the liquidation or winding-up of the corporation, holders of
common stock share ratably, based on the number of shares held, in any
assets of the corporation remaining once creditors and preferred stock-
holders have received all amounts owed to them.25
The voting and liquidation rights of holders of tracking stock differ
significantly from those of holders of conventional common stock. With
respect to voting rights, the holders of shares of different classes of
tracking stock of the same corporation often have an unequal number of
21. See supra note 6.
22. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 21; SEAGULL PROXY
STATEmENT, supra note 2, at 38; TCI PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 30; U S WEST
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 29.
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(g), 212, 215(a)-(b) (1991).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 170(a) (1991).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. it. 8, §§ 280, 281 (1991 & Supp. 1994); Garrett v.
Edge Moor Iron Co., 194 A. 15 (Del. Ch. 1937), affd. sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for
Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Cox, 199 A. 671 (Del. 1938) (noting that in cor-
porate dissolution, unpaid cumulative dividends on preferred stock must be paid out of
funds in receiver's hands before anything is paid on common stock); Gaskill v. Gladys
Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 339 (Del. Ch. 1929) (holding that in distribution of corporate




votes per share. 26 Typically, the number of votes per share for one class
is fixed at one while the number of votes per share of the other class or
classes is adjusted periodically based on either the relative per share
values or relative market capitalizations of the various classes of track-
ing stock and fixed until the next periodic adjustment.27 Similarly, the
liquidation rights of the various classes of tracking stock typically are
based on the relative market capitalizations of the various classes of
tracking stock at the time of liquidation. 28 Most importantly, holders of
a particular class of tracking stock have no direct claim against the as-
sets of the business group to which their class is linked economically.2 9
Instead, based on their respective liquidation rights, such holders share
26. State corporate law generally provides that the right to vote shares of a partic-
ular class or series within that class may be denied outright or may be limited to spe-
cific matters only. In addition, more than or less than one vote per share may be granted
to the shares of any class or series, and the separate vote of a class or series may be re-
quired before specific corporate actions may be taken. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 102(a)(4), 102(b)(1), 102(b)(4), 151(a), 212(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994). As a general
rule, however, the voting rights of the shares of stock of a particular class or a particu-
lar series within a class cannot be varied. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker,
378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
27. If, for example, voting rights are determined based on per share values, then
the voting rights of Group A common stock will be fixed at one vote per share, while
those of Group B common stock will be adjusted periodically to equal the quotient of
the weighted average trading price of one share of Group B common stock divided by
the weighted average trading price of one share of Group A common stock. See, e.g.,
U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 56-58 (voting rights of each outstanding
share of Communications Stock fixed at one vote; voting rights of each outstanding
share of Media Stock adjusted before each shareholder vote to equal the quotient of the
weighted average market value of one share of Media Stock (based on values available
on trading days prior to the record date) divided by the weighted average market value
of one share of Communications Stock). Thus, at any given time each share of Group B
common stock may have more than, less than, or exactly one vote per share. TCI and
GM, however, break from this mold by fixing the voting rights of shares of each class
of their tracking stocks. See TCI PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 54-55 (voting
rights of each outstanding share of Series A TCI Group Common Stock and Series A
Liberty Media Group Common Stock fixed at one vote; voting rights of each outstand-
ing share of Series B TCI Group Common Stock and Series B Liberty Media Group
Common Stock fixed at ten votes); GM-HuGHrs SOLcITATION STATEMENT, supra note 2,
at 36-37 (voting rights of each outstanding share of GM-$1 2/3 Stock, GM-E Stock, and
GM-H Stock fixed at one vote, one-quarter of one vote, and one-half of one vote,
respectively).
28. See, e.g., KMART PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 7; RALSTON PROXY STATE-
MENT, supra note 2, at 41; SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 59; TCI PRoXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 71; USX-DELm PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 14.
U S West breaks from this mold by providing for fixed liquidation rights for its classes
of tracking stock. See U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 58-59.
29. See, e.g., GEmzYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 46; SEAGULL PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 38; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 30; U S WEST
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 29.
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in any assets of the entire corporation remaining once creditors and pre-
ferred stockholders have received all amounts owed to them.
As with conventional corporate dividends, dividends paid on
shares of tracking stock are paid at the discretion of the board of direc-
tors and then only out of funds legally available for the payment of div-
idends, as determined by state corporate law.30 A tracking stock corpo-
ration's certificate or articles of incorporation, however, also will
provide that dividends on one or more of its classes of tracking stock
will be limited further to an "available dividend amount." This amount
typically equals the maximum amount that would be legally available
for the payment of dividends if the business group to which such class
is linked were a stand-alone corporation.3' In addition, a tracking stock
board usually adopts a policy initially establishing the expected divi-
dend rates of the various classes of tracking stock at the time a tracking
stock equity structure is implemented.32
30. See, e.g., SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 48-50; TCI PRoxY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 55; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 47;
USX-Dam PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 15.
31. For example, in addition to being restricted to legally available funds of Tele-
Communications, Inc. as determined in accordance with Delaware law, dividends on
TCI Group Common Stock (which consists of both Series A and Series B TCI Group
Common Stock) are limited further to an amount not in excess of the "TCI Group
Available Dividend Amount." This amount is intended to equate substantially to the
amount that would be legally available for the payment of dividends on the TCI Group
Common Stock under Delaware law if the TCI Group were a separate, stand-alone Del-
aware corporation. See TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 55-57.
See also GEmZYME PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 43-44; RALSTON PROxY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33-35; SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 48-50;
U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 47-48; USX-DELH PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 15-16; USX-MARATHoN PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 23-24.
32. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 29-30; U S WEST
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 45-46. The establishment and announcement of a
dividend policy help to ensure that the shares of the different classes of tracking stock
eventually come to rest in the hands of investors with investment objectives (growth, in-
come, and so on) that correspond to the attributes of each such class. For example, U S
West disclosed its intention to establish a dividend policy applicable to its Communica-
tions Stock that was comparable to the dividend policy applicable to its conventional
common stock. Thus, U S West anticipated that it would pay quarterly dividends on its
Communications Stock of $0.535 per share (the amount paid on its conventional com-
mon stock). See U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT., supra note 2, at 45. By contrast, U S
West noted that it anticipated paying no quarterly dividend on its Media Stock once its
proposed tracking stock equity structure was implemented. Id. U S West's anticipated
dividend policy thus supported its attempt to market its Communications Stock as an
"income-oriented" stock and its Media Stock as a "growth-oriented" stock. See id. at
40; see also infra note 58.
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3. Governance by a Single Board of Directors
A conventional corporation is governed by a single board of direc-
tors. This board is responsible for formulating corporate policies and
making major corporate decisions. 33 A tracking stock corporation simi-
larly has a single board of directors. Ultimately, the board of either a
conventional corporation or a tracking stock corporation is accountable
to the owners of the corporation, namely the stockholders.
A tracking stock corporation has at any given time at least two
groups of stockholders with economic interests linked to the perform-
ance of different business groups operated by that corporation. Because
of this, the board of directors of a tracking stock corporation must look
out for the interests of multiple groups of stockholders that often have
competing financial interests.34 In other words, the board must answer
to at least two and perhaps even more masters, depending on how many
classes of tracking stock the corporation has. Each distinct group of
stockholders, therefore, is disadvantaged by having no "truly indepen-
dent agency" 35 looking out for its interests and those of the business
group to which its shares are linked.
B. Reasons for Implementing a Tracking Stock Equity Structure
Corporations have implemented a tracking stock equity structure
primarily for one of two reasons. The first is to provide a unique type
of consideration that can be used in connection with corporate acquisi-
tions. The second is as a means to enhance - or attempt to enhance -
stockholder value. Each of these uses for tracking stock is explored
briefly below.
1. Use of Tracking Stocks as Acquisition Consideration
Stockholders who are considering a sale of their shares in a corpo-
ration as part of the acquisition of that corporation by another corpora-
tion have a common fear. They fear that the agreed upon acquisition
price for the corporation does not reflect the true value of that corpora-
tion. Indeed, those stockholders are loath to give away the "upside" po-
33. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTMS AND LiABI ris § 2:02 (1984).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
35. In re FLS Holdings, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.12623, 1993 WL
104562, at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993) (noting that in determining whether the allo-
cation of merger consideration between preferred and common stockholders was fair, no
"truly independent agency" existed on behalf of the preferred stockholders, because all
the directors were elected by the common stockholders).
June 1996] 2099
Michigan Law Review
tential of their corporation at a bargain price. A corporation seeking to
acquire another corporation, however, typically desires to purchase
100% of the equity interest in that corporation in order to eliminate the
problems that arise when a minority equity interest in an acquired cor-
poration remains outstanding.
Using shares of the acquiring corporation's common stock for all
or part of the consideration paid to the selling stockholders often can
solve this dilemma. Selling stockholders who receive those shares are
able to continue their participation in the growth and success of the ac-
quired corporation through a rise in value of the acquiring corporation's
stock. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that the acquiring corpora-
tion successfully will purchase the entire equity interest in the acquired
corporation. Thus, the use of stock consideration 6 helps quell selling
stockholders' fears about price while simultaneously allowing the ac-
quiring corporation to operate its newly acquired business as it sees fit.
A problem arises, however, when the acquiring corporation is such
a large conglomerate that the performance of the acquired corporation
will become "lost" within the performance of the conglomerate. In this
case, selling stockholders naturally are concerned that the value of the
common stock of the acquiring corporation that they receive will be af-
fected only marginally if at all by the performance of the acquired cor-
poration. As a result, their fear of giving away the "upside" potential of
their corporation is not assuaged.
One solution to this dilemma would be for the acquiring corpora-
tion to create a separate class of tracking stock designed to track the ec-
onomic performance of the acquired corporation. 37 In this way, selling
stockholders can continue to participate in the future success - and
failure - of the acquired corporation more directly than if they owned
conventional common stock of the acquiring corporation.38 The acquir-
36. Frequently the consideration received by selling stockholders consists of both
cash and stock of an acquiring corporation. The use of cash, of course, placates to a cer-
tain degree those selling stockholders who desire to have no interest in the acquiring
corporation going forward.
37. The acquiring corporation's outstanding common stock would be modified si-
multaneously to track all of that corporation's businesses with the exception of the
newly acquired business. See, e.g., GENZYME PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 38;
GM-EDS PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 19-21.
38. See, e.g., GM-EDS PROXY STATEMENT. supra note 2, at 10 (stating that shares
of GM-E Stock allow the former shareholders of Electronic Data Systems Corp. to par-




ing corporation, meanwhile, would meet its goal of purchasing the en-
tire equity interest in the acquired corporation.39
Certain acquisitions made by General Motors Corp. ("GM") and
Genzyme Corp. ("Genzyme") provide vivid examples of the use of
tracking stock as acquisition consideration. In 1984, GM acquired all
the outstanding common stock of Electronic Data Systems Corporation
("EDS"). Part of the consideration paid by GM to EDS's stockholders
(the most famous of whom was Ross Perot) consisted of newly created
GM class "E" common stock ("GM-E Stock"). 40 GM-E Stock was de-
39. Most tracking stock corporations have noted that one of the reasons for adopt-
ing a tracking stock equity structure is to provide them with a choice of stock consider-
ation for use in connection with acquisitions. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 29; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 49; U S WEST PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40. However, the utility of tracking stocks as acquisition
consideration in practice remains questionable due to the negative response of selling
stockholders towards it. This response arises for three reasons. First, most selling stock-
holders of an acquired corporation simply do not understand what tracking stock is and
the purposes it serves. A good deal of educating, therefore, must be accomplished by
the acquiring corporation before selling stockholders of an acquired corporation will
embrace the concept of tracking stock. Second, because selling stockholders retain no
direct voting rights with respect to the acquired corporation, they no longer are entitled
to elect directors to the board of the acquired corporation after its sale. Thus, they lose
all control over the acquired corporation, which is subsumed within a new or existing
business group of a tracking stock corporation. Finally, use of tracking stocks as acqui-
sition consideration also may pose problems from an accounting and tax perspective.
See U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that tracking stocks could
limit the ability of a company to use the "pooling" method of accounting in structuring
an acquisition).
Nevertheless, tracking stock is used from time to time as acquisition consideration.
For example, U S West, Inc. recently announced that its Media Group would acquire
Continental Cablevision Inc. for $5.3 billion in cash and stock, plus the assumption of
$5.5 billion in debt. The stock to be issued was reported to consist of $2.8 to $3.3 bil-
lion in Media Group common stock and $1.0 billion in U S West preferred stock con-
vertible into shares of Media Group common stock. See Leslie Cauley & Mark
Robichaux, U S West Media To Pay $5.3 Billion To Buy Continental Cablevision, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 28, 1996, at A3. By using Media Group common stock as acquisition con-
sideration, U S West will avoid issuing shares of stock with a hefty dividend attached.
As Jim Anderson, the Chief Financial Officer of U S West, has stated, "We did not
want to use our combined stock to make large acquisitions like Continental because is-
suing all those shares with the dividend attached would be very expensive." Gautam
Naik, PacTel To Reduce Dividend 42 Percent, MORNING NEWS TaiB. (Tacoma, Wash.)
Apr. 4, 1996, at C9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. GM allowed each EDS selling shareholder the option of selecting one of two
consideration packages, or a combination of both packages. Option I consisted of re-
ceiving $44 in cash for each EDS share - that is to say, an all-cash deal with no inter-
est in EDS's future performance. Option H consisted of a combination of cash ($35.20
for each EDS share), two-tenths of a share of GM-E Stock for each EDS share, and a
contingent value note. Shareholders who did not indicate which option they desired re-
ceived Option I only. See GM-EDS PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 7-8. Sharehold-
ers who objected to the sale of EDS were entitled to dissenters' rights under Texas law.
June 1996] 2101
Michigan Law Review
signed through its carefully tailored attributes to track the performance
of EDS upon the acquisition of EDS by GM. GM's existing common
stock ("GM-$1 2/ Stock") continued to track the performance of the old
GM.41
Their ownership of GM-E Stock allowed Mr. Perot and the other
selling stockholders of EDS to participate in the upside potential of
EDS after its sale to GM. More importantly to Mr. Perot, however, was
the fact that EDS's management team, which continued to include Mr.
Perot even after the sale of EDS, would be motivated to perform after
the acquisition through the use of stock options tied to GM-E Stock
rather than GM-$12/3 Stock.42 GM, in turn, was able to ensure that it
alone would control EDS.43
Genzyme similarly used tracking stock to effect its acquisition of
BioSurface Technology, Inc. ("BioSurface") in 1994.44 As part of the
transaction, Genzyme stockholders approved the creation of a new class
of Genzyme common stock called Tissue Repair Division Common
Stock ("TR Stock") and the simultaneous redesignation of Genzyme's
See id. at 44-45. Ross Perot and certain other significant shareholders of EDS had nego-
tiated in advance for, and agreed to accept, Option II consideration as part of the overall
transaction. See id. at 8-9.
41. GM announced in August 1995 that it was "splitting-off" EDS by exchanging
shares representing an actual equity interest in EDS itself for outstanding shares of
GM-E Stock. GM received a favorable tax ruling on December 28, 1995, which would
allow the split-off to occur tax free to both the holders of GM-E Stock and to GM itself.
See Allen R. Myerson, Government to Permit Tax-Free Split of G.M. and E.D.S., N.Y.
Tmms, Dec. 30, 1995, at 43. GM effected the split-off on June 7, 1996. See Dow Jones
Equity Market Index, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at C7. Details of the split-off can be
found in the joint Solicitation of Written Consent of General Motors Corporation Com-
mon Stockholders and Prospectus of Electronic Data Systems Holding Corporation,
GENERAL MoToRs CORP., SoucrrATiON STATEMET/PROSPEcrs (Apr. 23, 1996) [herein-
after GM SoLIcrrAnON STATEMENT/PROSPECTUS].
42. See Jennifer Reingold, Heartburn (Targeted Stock), FIN. WORLD, Sept. 26,
1995, at 32.
43. While GM was able to control EDS, upon completion of the transaction Mr.
Perot became GM's largest stockholder, joined GM's board of directors, and continued
on as EDS's chairman. Soon thereafter, he also became GM's biggest gadfly, as he in-
creasingly became openly critical of GM's operations, business, and management. See
generally Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
GM used lettered stock again in 1985 in connection with its acquisition of Hughes
Aircraft Co. ("Hughes") from Howard Hughes Medical Institute. In connection with
this acquisition, GM created GM class "H" common stock ("GM-H Stock"). In addi-
tion to certain other cash and noncash consideration, GM issued 50 million shares of
GM-H Stock to the Institute in payment for Hughes. GM-H Stock was designed to track
the performance of Hughes upon its acquisition by GM. See generally GM-HUGHES SO-
ucrrATION STATEMENT, supra note 2 (detailing GM's acquisition of Hughes through its
use of lettered stock).
44. See generally GENzY E PROxY STATEMENT, supra note 2 (detailing Genzyme's
acquisition of BioSurface through its use of tracking stock).
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existing common stock as General Division Common Stock ("General
Stock"). TR Stock was designed to relect the performance of a newly
established division within Genzyme called the Tissue Repair Division,
while General Stock was designed to reflect the performance of the rest
of Genzyme's businesses. The Tissue Repair Division was created by
combining certain Genzyme programs and licenses relating to tissue re-
pair with the newly acquired business of BioSurface. 45 Upon consum-
mation of the acquisition, Genzyme issued five million shares of TR
Stock (representing 50% of the initial equity interest in the Tissue
Repair Division) to BioSurface stockholders and shortly thereafter dis-
tributed 3.3 million shares of TR Stock (representing 33% of the initial
equity interest in the Tissue Repair Division) to Genzyme's existing
stockholders.
Corporations that implement tracking stock equity structures in
connection with an acquisition have an additional hurdle to overcome
that is not confronted by those seeking to employ those structures for
value enhancement purposes. That hurdle is an arm's-length negotiation
with the management of the acquired corporation 6 This negotiation not
only addresses such traditional matters as the number of shares of track-
ing stock to be received by the acquired corporation's stockholders, but
also covers the specific terms of, and management policies to be
adopted with respect to, that tracking stock. In addition, the manage-
ment for the acquired corporation can negotiate for specific prophylac-
tic measures designed to ensure that the acquiring corporation's board
respects the integrity of the business group to which that tracking stock
relates.47
45. Genzyme's use of tracking stock was unique in that it was linked to a newly
formed division whose products were in development and that had never generated op-
erating income or paid dividends. Consequently, the valuation of the tracking stock is-
sued to BioSurface's stockholders proved difficult. See id. at 31.
46. See id. at 39.
47. For example, BioSurface bargained for a number of provisions that restrict the
flexibility of Genzyme's board to manage Genzyme's Tissue Repair Division. These
provisions included the following:
1. The number of "TR Designated Shares" was fixed and cannot be increased
unless at least one of several circumstances occurs, including possibly a class
vote of the holders of TR Stock. "TR Designated Shares" are shares of TR Stock
that Genzyme could issue without allocating any of the proceeds to the Tissue
Repair Division.
2. Significant restrictions were placed on the board's ability to transfer assets -
especially "key" assets - from the Tissue Repair Division to Genzyme's
General Division. Such restrictions cannot be modified or repealed by the board
without a class vote of the holders of TR Stock.
3. Genzyme was prohibited from making a de facto redemption of TR Stock
through open market purchases without paying the requisite 30% exchange pre-
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2. Use of Tracking Stocks in an Attempt
To Enhance Stockholder Value
Tracking stocks are used today chiefly in an attempt to unlock
stockholder value. Operating on the assumption that the financial mar-
ketplace was not completely efficient in valuing their businesses, certain
diversified corporations have adopted tracking stock equity structures in
an attempt to unlock the hidden, or unrecognized, value in those busi-
nesses. For example, U S West, Inc. ("U S West"), USX Corp.
("USX"), Ralston Purina Co. ("Ralston"), and Tele-Communications,
Inc. ("TCI") all have implemented tracking stock equity structures dur-
ing the 1990s for this purpose, among others. 4 Two other prominent
U.S. companies - Kmart Corp. ("Kmart") and RJR Nabisco Holding
Corp. ("RJR") - attempted to implement such structures for this pur-
pose, but failed.49 MCI Communications Corp. entertained the idea of
mium to holders of TR Stock. (This 30% exchange premium is one of the highest
exchange premiums found in any tracking stock corporate charter.)
4. Genzyme was prohibited from developing products outside the Tissue Repair
Division that compete or would compete in the market with products being de-
veloped or sold by the Tissue Repair Division.
5. Holders of TR Stock were given the power to veto a merger or business com-
bination of Genzyme if, as a result thereof, the holders of all classes of Genzyme
common stock (a) no longer owned, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of the
voting power of the surviving corporation and (b) did not receive the same form
of consideration, distributed among such holders in proportion to the Market
Capitalization (as defined) of each class of Genzyme common stock as of the
date of the first public announcement of such merger or business combination.
See id. at 40-43, 45-46.
48. See RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 28-29; TCI PROXY STATE-
MENT, supra note 2, at 49; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40; USX-
DELHI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 11; see also Unlocking Stock Value, INVESTOR
REL, June 1, 1995; cf. FLETCHER SoLIcrrATION STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 23 (example
of foreign corporation adopting tracking stock equity structure to enhance stockholder
value).
49. See KMART PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2; RJR PROxY STATEMENT, supra
note 2. Kmart's proposal was defeated soundly by its shareholders on June 3, 1994, and
a few months later Kmart sold 51% of each of its Officemax, Sports Authority, and
Borders-Walden Books subsidiaries. Each of the three companies has an independent
executive management team and a separate board of directors. See HoovER's HANDBOOK
DATABASE, KMART CORPORA'TION 1 (1995). According to one commentator, Kmart share-
holders defeated the tracking stock proposal because they viewed it "as a Band-Aid
when major surgery was required." Reingold, supra note 42, at 32. Many believe that
the concept of tracking stock "took a beating" due to the Kmart debacle. See U S West
To Begin Promotional Tour for Stock Plan, STAR-TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Oct. 10,
1995, at 3D [hereinafter Promotional Tour]; Restructuring Choice, supra note 3, at 5.
RJR's unsuccessful attempt to implement a tracking stock equity structure did not fur-
ther the cause of tracking stock either, with at least one commentator labeling it a "no-
torious targeted-stock-issue flop." Lyn Perlmuth, Wriggling Out of Preferred, INsTrr.LI
TiONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1995, at 35, 36.
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tracking stock, but ultimately decided against it in favor of providing
investors and stock analysts with more detailed financial information
about its various businesses.50 Other prominent companies are believed
to be considering currently the implementation of tracking stock equity
structures primarily for value-enhancement purposes.51
Use of tracking stocks in an attempt to unlock stockholder value is
thought to be particularly expedient with respect to a diversified parent
corporation that is operating simultaneously one or more growth busi-
nesses and one or more declining, out-of-favor, or even stable yet fiman-
cially uninspiring businesses.52 The belief of such a corporation
50. See Promotional Tour, supra note 49, at 3D.
51. See COMCAST CORP., PROXY STATEMENT AND 1995 FORM 10-K, at 28-30 (May
17, 1996) (pursuant to which Comcast shareholders approved a charter amendment pro-
viding for, among other things, the future issuance of tracking stock); Westinghouse
Says It Weighs Separate Broadcasting Stock, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 20, 1996, at 34 (discuss-
ing Westinghouse Electric Corp.); Laura Landro, Sony May Sell Stake in U.S. Opera-
tions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A3 (discussing Sony Corp. of America); Public
Service Enterprise May Spin Off Exploration Unit, Dow JONES INTL NEws SERV., Dec.
7, 1995, available in WL, DJNS Database (discussing Public Service Enterprise Group
Inc.); Jill Goldsmith, 7ime Warner's 4Q Buoyed by Film Unit; No News on U S West,
Dow JONES INTL NEws SERv., Feb. 6, 1996, available in WL, DJNS Database (discuss-
ing Time Warner, Inc.); see also Restructuring Choice, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting
that a source at Lehman Brothers stated that several companies are in advanced discus-
sions with Lehman Brothers regarding the issuance of targeted stock, and that interest in
targeted stock is clearly growing). On the international front, the utility industry in the
United Kingdom is considering the use of tracking stocks in an effort to avoid addi-
tional governmental regulation being considered in connection with the current merger
activity within the industry. See The Lex Column: Utilities on Track, FIN. TMEs
(London), Jan. 15, 1996, at 20; U.K. Utility Mergers May Cause 71ghter Rules: Confer-
ence, Dow JONEs INTL NEws SEav., Jan. 24, 1996, available in WL, DJNS Database.
52. John Oslund of the Star-Tribune cleverly described U S West's businesses as
consisting of "two basic types of vessels: a powerful but slow battleship (the telephone
company) and a squadron of flashy speed boats, represented by the cable TV, wireless
and entertainment ventures." He added that, before tracking stock, investors "won-
der[ed] whether they [were] buying battleships or speed boats when they acquire[d] U S
West shares." John J. Oslund, U S West Twosome - Chairman and CEO of Baby Bell
Tries To Sell Shareholders on 'Targeted' Plan, STAR-TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct.
16, 1995, at ID. Stephen Keating of the Denver Post commented, with respect to U S
West, that "[t]he cooks in the U S West Communications kitchen are making a racket
splitting up the POTS and PANS." Stephen Keating, U S West Makes Pitch for New
Class of Stock Reflecting Media Potential, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at E3.
USX Corp., Ralston Purina Co., U S West, Inc., and Tele-Communications, Inc.,
all of which have implemented tracking stock equity structures at one time, impliedly
categorized their respective businesses as follows:
Declining or
Name of Corporation Growth Business(es) Out-of-Favor Business(es)




often sparked, fueled, and fanned by its investment bankers53 - is that
the marketplace simply is failing to understand and fully appreciate, and
thus value, all the businesses operated by that diversified corporation.54
In other words, the corporation believes that the financial community,
when determining the trading value of that corporation's conventional
common stock, is placing too much weight on its declining businesses
and not enough on its growth businesses. 55 The net effect of the finan-
Declining or
Name of Corporation Growth Business(es) Out-of-Favor Business(es)
Ralston food business baking
U S West nonregulated cable TV, regulated local telephone
multimedia and wireless business
businesses
TCI media products and cable and telephone
electronic retailing businesses
Of course, what is considered a growth business and what is considered a declining
or out-of-favor business changes over time. For example, when USX adopted its initial
tracking stock equity structure in 1991, it created two classes of tracking stock: one
linked to its steel business - both a declining and out-of-favor business at that time -
and the other linked to its oil and gas business. In 1992, USX redesignated its tracking
stock linked to the oil and gas business into two new tracking stocks, one of which was
linked to the oil business and the other of which was linked to the gas pipeline business.
USX then sold shares linked to the gas pipeline business to the public in an effort to
raise money for its stalled oil business. See Dana Milbank, USX Weighs Plan to Offer
Shares of Delhi Gas Pipe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at C15. More recently, USX's
steel business once again has become a viable business.
53. At least one commentator has taken an extremely cynical view in this regard.
Jennifer Reingold of Financial World has stated that "[iun the end, targeted stock just
complicates everyone's life a bit and adds a couple of million dollars per transaction to
the coffers of the investment bankers." Reingold, supra note 42, at 33.
54. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 28-29; TCI PRoxY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 48-49; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 39-
40. Some support for this theory does exist, as a recent study indicated Wall Street's
preference for "pure plays" - one-business companies - rather than companies en-
gaging in multiple businesses. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Why the Market Likes Johnny-
One-Notes... and Is Skeptical of One-Man Bands, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1995, at F4;
Strom, supra note 1, at D5.
Spin-offs - the traditional alternative to tracking stock equity structures - are
thought to enhance stockholder value for this same reason. See infra section I.B.3.
"Spinoffs merely make it easier for Wall Street to recognize value," according to Roger
Lowenstein of the Wall Street Journal. He adds that "[p]ortfolio managers, even those
with working calculators, dislike having to add the values of multiple businesses; one-
trick ponies make a better 'story.' " Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value - Confessions
of a Corporate-Spinoff Junkie, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1996, at Cl.
55. In financial terms, the conventional common stock of the particular corpora-
tion was trading at a price-earnings ratio ("P/E ratio") more associated with the P/E ra-
tio of a stand-alone corporation primarily operating in the declining businesses, rather
than at a P/E ratio of a stand-alone corporation primarily operating in the growth busi-
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cial community's naivet6 is its undervaluation of the corporation as a
whole.
Tracking stocks are thought to help unlock stockholder value by, in
essence, "uncoupling" the growth businesses from the other businesses
operated by a diversified parent corporation. 56 The belief and hope of a
corporation implementing a tracking stock equity structure is that the fi-
nancial marketplace, through more increased and focused equity re-
search, will value shares of each class of tracking stock as if they were
shares of a stand-alone corporation primarily engaging in the business
of the particular business group to which they are linked.5 7 Once these
stocks begin trading like stocks of separate, stand-alone corporations, it
is anticipated that the combined trading value of the two tracking stocks
will be greater than that of the former conventional common stock.58 Or
so the theory goes.s9
nesses. The price-earnings ratio is calculated by dividing the price per share of stock by
the corporation's earnings per share. See THE PORTABLE MBA IN INVESTMENT 196 (Peter
L. Bernstein ed., 1995). A stock with a high P/E ratio indicates that the financial mar-
ketplace views that stock's growth prospects more favorably than those of a stock with
a lower P/E ratio. See THE PORTABLE MBA IN FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING 26 (John
Leslie Livingstone ed., 1992) [hereinafter MBA N FINANCE].
56. Because the businesses of a diversified parent corporation are artificially "un-
coupled" when a tracking stock equity structure is implemented, a tracking stock propo-
sal is sometimes referred to as an "internal spin-off."
57. See, e.g., GENZYME PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40; KMART PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, cover letter of former Chairman Joseph E. Antonini; RALSTON
PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 28-29; RJR PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 27;
SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 62; TCI PROxY STATEMENT, supra note 2,
at 48. U S West's tracking stock proposal has been labeled "an acknowledgment that
U S West's investors, among others, are confused by the Colorado-based company's di-
versification strategy and as a result aren't accurately valuing the company's stock."
Oslund, supra note 52, at ID. In order to facilitate increased equity research, U S West
appointed a director of investor relations for each of its two business groups. See Split
Positions, INVESTOR REL, Oct. 1, 1995.
58. Having two different classes of tracking stock also can be appealing to distinct
types of investors. Using U S West as an example, more conservative investors, such as
pension funds, should tend to favor U S West's Communications Stock, a conservative
stock linked to the company's traditional local telephone business paying a quarterly
dividend. More risk-taking investors should favor U S West's Media Stock, a more
risky stock reflecting the performance of the company's growth businesses initially pay-
ing no dividend. See Keating, supra note 52, at E3; Restructuring Choice, supra note 3,
at 4. By appealing to distinct types of investors, tracking stocks are thought to lure new
investors into holding a tracking stock corporation's stock. Richard McCormick, Chair-
man of U S West, stated his belief that the creation of a U S West "growth" stock - U
S West's Media Stock - would attract "100 new institutional investors." Stock Split
Gets Resounding OK - Communications, Media Shares To Trade Separately Today,
DENVER PoST, Nov. 1, 1995, at Cl (quoting Richard McCormick) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
59. Although not the focus of this article, scholars need to answer the question of
whether tracking stocks actually increase stockholder value. If they do, then the logical
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follow-up question is how. If, in fact, value is created, where does it come from? Does a
tracking stock equity structure, for example, reduce information asymmetry through the
publication of additional financial information about a corporation that was previously
available only to management? If so, and if this is the reason for any increased stock-
holder value, then should not corporations follow the lead of MCI Communications
Corp., which merely publishes more detailed financial information about its various
businesses, rather than USX Corp. and the other tracking stock converts?
It should be noted that many commentators have criticized whether the implemen-
tation of a tracking stock equity structure alone can enhance stockholder value. For ex-
ample, Edmund Andrews of the New York Times likened such implementation to the ap-
plication of "cheap makeup on the same old face." Edmund L. Andrews, U S West To
Stake Out Some New Turf N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at D1, D4; see also Reingold,
supra note 42, at 33 (quoting Professor Bruce Greenwald of the Columbia Business
School who labeled a tracking stock equity structure "a sleight-of-hand transaction" de-
signed to solve management's fundamental problem, "which is their nonperformance").
With respect to corporate restructurings in general and U S West's tracking stock
proposal in particular, Roger Lowenstein of the Wall Street Journal has stated that
"[rlearranging the financial furniture merely to look attractive to Wall Street.. ." is a
bad idea. He added that " 'getting the stock up' is probably the worst motivation there
is" for a company, and that "[w]hen a company pays attention to business, the stock
will take care of itself." Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value - When Are Corporate
Overhauls Worthwhile?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at Cl.
Not surprisingly, corporations implementing a tracking stock equity structure set
forth explicit disclaimers in their disclosure documents noting that such implementation
may or may not serve its intended purpose of enhancing stockholder value. See, e.g.,
KMART PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 14; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at
36; RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 23; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 35-36.
BioSurface Technology, Inc. retained PaineWebber Inc. to render a fairness opinion
to it with respect to the consideration to be received by BioSurface's stockholders from
its acquiror - Genzyme Corp. That consideration consisted of shares of a newly cre-
ated class of Genzyme tracking stock (TR Stock). The Prospectus and Joint Proxy
Statement of Genzyme and BioSurface (Annex XI of which sets forth PaineWebber's
fairness opinion) had this to say about PaineWebber's findings with respect to tracking
stock:
Additionally, PaineWebber noted that "tracking stocks" generally trade at a mul-
tiple of earnings per share that is not discounted when compared to the multiples
at which stock of other companies in the same industry trades, indicating that in-
vestors are valuing the business of the tracking stock in the same way that they
value stocks of other companies in the same industry. PaineWebber compared the
ratio (the "P/E Multiple") of the stock price to 1993 actual earnings per share
and 1994 and 1995 projected earnings per share of the eight widely recognized
tracking stocks to the P/E Multiple of selected companies considered by
PaineWebber to be comparable. In each case, PaineWebber examined the average
premium or discount for the three annual periods of the P/E Multiple for the
tracking stocks to the average P/E Multiple of the stocks of the selected compara-
ble companies. Of the eight stocks that PaineWebber considered, six traded on
average at a premium to the selected comparable companies and two at a dis-
count to the selected comparable companies.
GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 59-60 (emphasis added).
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3. Comparison with Spin-Off Strategy
Any corporation willing to consider the implementation of a track-
ing stock equity structure usually has considered a more traditional cor-
porate strategy - the "spin-off" - for enhancing stockholder value. A
corporate spin-off entails an actual distribution (or "spin-off") by a cor-
poration to its stockholders of actual shares of one of its subsidiaries.
Each stockholder of the corporation immediately prior to the spin-off
thus winds up holding two types of common stock as a result of the
spin-off: one representing a direct equity interest in the parent corpora-
tion minus the spun-off subsidiary; and the other representing a direct
equity interest in the spun-off subsidiary. Each type of common stock
then will trade separately in the marketplace and presumably reflect the
value inherent in the corporation to which it relates. A tracking stock
equity structure also places shares of different classes of stock into the
hands of stockholders, but those shares all represent equity interests in
the parent corporation itself, and not in the business groups to which
they are linked economically. Thus, a tracking stock equity structure is
sometimes referred to as an "internal spin-off."
A tracking stock equity structure has several advantages over a
traditional corporate spin-off strategy. First, by remaining one large di-
versified corporation, all businesses operated by a tracking stock corpo-
ration potentially benefit from the lower cost of capital available to a
large, diversified parent corporation.60 This benefit stems from the avail-
ability of all the tracking stock corporation's assets to service the debt
of that corporation. 61 A spun-off subsidiary, by contrast, must secure its
own financing, and the cost of this financing likely will reflect its new
status as a smaller, and more risky, stand-alone corporation.
Second, tracking stock corporations can spread corporate overhead
costs, such as payroll, employee benefits, legal, and accounting, over a
larger corporate entity. A spun-off subsidiary needs to implement these
functions for itself, as well as to fund its own corporate management
structure. 62 Third, if properly structured, a tracking stock proposal can
60. See GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40.
61. See DCR Adds U S West, Inc. and U S West Capital Funding to Rating Watch
- Down; U S West Communication, Inc.'s Ratings Reaffirmed, PR Newswire, Feb. 27,
1996, available in WL, PRNEWS Database; DCR Rates U S West, Inc. $130 Million
Exchangeable Issue 'A+,' PR Newswire, Dec. 11, 1995, available in WL, PRNEWS
Database, at *2 (stating that, with respect to U S West, that "[c]reditors of parent and
parent-related debt continue to have legal claims on the assets of the consolidated
enterprise").
62. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. speculated that the costs of operating two sepa-
rate entities would be 30% to 50% higher than operating RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp.
alone. See RJR PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 26.
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be effected on a tax-free basis to both the stockholders of the corpora-
tion and the corporation itself.6 A tax free spin-off ruling from the
Internal Revenue Service (a 355 Ruling, which, in the view of corpora-
63. In October 1987, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") added tracking stock
to the list of areas under extensive study with respect to which it would not rule until
the issue was resolved. See Rev. Proc. 87-59, 1987-2 C.B. 764. Recently, the IRS de-
cided that tracking stock involved an area of tax law upon which the IRS would not is-
sue any rulings or determination letters. See Rev. Proc. 95-3, 1995-1 C.B. 385.
The important tax issue relating to tracking stock has to do with determining
whether tracking stock is stock of the issuing company or of an actual or constructive
subsidiary owning the tracked business group. All tracking stock corporations have
taken the position that tracking stock is stock of the issuing company - the parent cor-
poration. If this position proves to be the correct one, then the following tax conse-
quences will follow:
1. A distribution of tracking stock to stockholders of the parent corporation will
qualify as a nontaxable stock dividend under § 305(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code").
2. Such a distribution also will be tax-free to the parent corporation itself under
§ 311 of the Code.
3. A public offering of tracking stock by the parent corporation will be nontax-
able under § 1032 of the Code.
4. The conversion of tracking stock into conventional common stock by the par-
ent corporation under either § 1036 or § 368(a)(1)(E) of the Code will result in
the recognition of no gain or loss.
5. The tracked assets will remain part of a consolidated tax group.
If, however, the IRS determines that tracking stock is really the stock of an actual
or constructive subsidiary of the parent corporation, then the following negative tax
consequences may follow:
1. Assuming that a tracking stock transaction does not qualify as a § 355 spin-
off, tracking stock distributed to the parent corporation's stockholders would be
taxable as dividends under § 301 of the Code.
2. Also assuming that a tracking stock transaction does not qualify as a § 355
spin-off, the difference between the fair market value and the basis of the track-
ing stock distributed would be recognized as gain to the parent corporation under
§ 311 of the Code.
3. A public offering of tracking stock would not qualify under § 1032 of the
Code and the parent corporation would recognize gain.
4. The conversion of tracking stock into conventional common stock by the par-
ent corporation would not qualify under either § 1036 or § 368(a)(1)(E) of the
Code and could be taxable, unless such conversion qualified under § 368(a)(1)(B)
of the Code.
5. If the tracking stock distributed constituted more than 20% of the equity of the
subsidiary in question, then deconsolidation would result for federal tax purposes.
See Harold R. Handler & Dickson G. Brown, Tracking Stock, in 6 TAx STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 1993, at 369
(PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Course No. J-346, 1993). This uncertainty relating to
the proper tax treatment of tracking stock "has had a chilling effect on the use of track-
ing stock, particularly with respect to closely held corporations, since practitioners can-
not give complete assurance that the form of the transaction will be respected." James
C. Diana, Recent Transactions Involving Tracking Stock, 37 Tax Mgmt. Mem. (BNA)
No. 6, at S-44, S-44 (Mar. 18, 1996).
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tions considering a spin-off, is normally a sine qua non to its implemen-
tation64) is not always obtainable due to the stringent requirements that
a corporation must satisfy in order to obtain that ruling.65
Finally, by remaining part of a larger corporate entity, the busi-
nesses operated by a tracking stock corporation receive additional pro-
tection from unsolicited takeover bids. A spun-off subsidiary, by con-
trast, must defend itself." This defense is difficult to accomplish given
the smaller size of the spun-off subsidiary. In addition, that subsidiary
must incur the additional costs and expenses associated with installing
its own takeover defenses.
If. SPECIAL CONCERNS ARISING IN A TRACKING
STOCK EQUITY STRUCTURE
The special concerns that arise in a tracking stock equity structure
and confound the traditional corporate fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty stem from the achievement of the major goal of that structure: the
creation of a substantial divergence of financial interest between differ-
ent classes of tracking stock. That goal is achieved by artificially divid-
ing a conventional corporation into two or more distinct business
groups and then economically linking each particular class of tracking
stock to the performance of one of those business groups. By contrast,
as discussed below, the holders of different classes of conventional
64. Dunn & Bradstreet, for example, has proposed splitting itself into three pub-
licly traded companies. The spin-off plan, even if approved by the stockholders of
D&B, remains "contingent on a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that [D&B]
can proceed on a tax-free basis." Kenneth N. Gilpin, Dunn & Bradstreet To Split Into 3
Companies, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 10, 1996, at DI. GM, which recently split-off EDS, also
made the receipt of a tax-free ruling from the IRS a precondition of consummating that
transaction. See supra note 41.
65. See generally Jeffrey Bagner & Warren de Wied, Spin-Off Transactions: Cor-
porate Considerations, in AcQuIsmoNs, MERGERS, SPIN-OFFS, AND OTHER
RESTRUCTURINGS, supra note 13, at 481, 517-20 (discussing the "myriad of require-
ments" under § 355 of the Code that must be met to obtain a 355 ruling).
66. See, e.g., KMART PROXY STATEmENT, supra note 2, at 14; RALSTON PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 21; RJR PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 7, 25; TCI
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40, 135; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2,
at 76-77; see also Reingold, supra note 42, at 33 ("But the big drawback to targeted
stock, from the shareholders' point of view, is that it can actually impede a takeover.");
Carey & Saul, supra note 14, § 3, at 11 (citing a study by J. Randall Woolridge and
James A. Miles, professors at Penn State University, and Patrick Cusatis of Lehman
Brothers, that found that spin-offs were about five times more likely to be taken over
than were other companies). Prior to the split-off of EDS from GM, EDS's board of di-
rectors approved the adoption of a "poison pill" shareholder rights plan. See Neil
Templin & Rebecca Blumenstein, Pathway Clears for GM Spinoff of EDS Unit, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 1996, at A4.
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common stock of a corporation have a substantial unity of financial
interest.
To illustrate this crucial point, the juxtaposition of C Corp. and TS
Corp. will be used from time to time in the remainder of this article.
C Corp. is a diversified conventional corporation that operates two busi-
nesses (Business 1 and Business 2). It also has two classes of common
stock (Class A and Class B). 67 TS Corp., by contrast, is a tracking stock
corporation with two designated business groups (Group X and Group
Y) and two classes of tracking stock (Group X Common Stock and
Group Y Common Stock). The economic performance of Group X
Common Stock and Group Y Common Stock is linked to Group X and
Group Y, respectively.
A. Relationship Between Different Classes of Common Stock
The overall relationship between different classes of common stock
of a corporation, whether conventional or tracking stock in nature, can
be broken down into two distinct sub-relationships. The first of these is
the legal relationship between the different classes. This relationship is
set forth generally in the specific provisions of the certificate or articles
of incorporation of the corporation in question.68 These provisions con-
tain the distinct dividend, voting, liquidation, and other rights of each
67. As previously stated, conventional corporations typically have only one class
of common stock that represents the entire equity interest in the corporation. See supra
text accompanying notes 14-16. On occasion, some corporations do issue more than one
class of common stock. Corporations that issue shares of a second class of common
stock typically have a large percentage of shares of their first class of common stock in
the hands of a single stockholder or a group of stockholders (often a family). The issu-
ance of shares of a second class of common stock allows these corporations to raise eq-
uity financing while ensuring that the controlling stockholder or group of stockholders
retains control. This often is accomplished by altering the voting rights of the second
class of common stock and providing for its convertibility into shares of the first class
of common stock. See, e.g., EvERGR N MEDIA CORP., PaosPEcrus 1, 32 (July 20, 1995)
(stating that economic rights of Class A and Class B Common Stock are identical, that
no dividend may be paid on shares of Class A Common Stock unless simultaneously
the same dividend is paid on Class B Common Stock (and vice versa), and that the only
differences between Class A and Class B Common Stock relate to voting and conver-
sion rights); see also BALorn & FDWNELSTFN, supra note 7, § 6.59 (Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing use of multiple classes of conventional common stock); E.S. Browning, As Hot
New Issues Increase So Does Supervoting Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1996, at Cl.
68. See, e.g., Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 147 A. 312, 315-16 (Del. Ch.
1929), affd., 152 A. 723 (Del. 1930). The certificate or articles of incorporation are
viewed, in fact, as a "contract" between the corporation and its security holders that de-
lineates the relationship between them. See Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253
A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969). The corporate law of the state in which a corporation was in-
corporated also contains specific provisions governing the legal relationship between
different classes or series of stock. Provisions exist, for example, that specify when a
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class of common stock.69 By comparing these provisions, one can ascer-
tain the rights of the holders of one class of common stock vis-A-vis
those of the holders of another class.
The second sub-relationship is the economic or financial relation-
ship that exists between the different classes of common stock. The cor-
relation between the trading values of various classes of common stock
as they fluctuate in response to both external factors, such as interest
rate changes and the release of economic data, and internal factors, such
as corporate earnings and new product developments, determines this
relationship. While a corporation has no control over external factors,
the strategic business decisions and policies of its board of directors di-
rectly influence internal factors.
1. Relationship Between Different Classes of Common Stock of a
Conventional Corporation
Different classes of common stock of a conventional corporation
differ with respect to the legal rights that define those classes.70 For ex-
ample, each share of one class of common stock may have one vote
while a share of another class may have more than or less than one
vote, or even no votes.71 Shares of one class of common stock also may
be convertible into shares of another class of common stock while
shares of that other class may not be convertible at all.72 The certificate
or articles of incorporation of the corporation that issued the particular
classes of common stock in question describe these legal rights in
detail.
separate vote of one class of stockholders is required at the exclusion of other classes of
stockholders. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (1991).
69. In situations where the certificate or articles of incorporation are silent as to a
particular legal right (for example, voting rights), state corporate law fills in the gap.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212, 215 (a)-(b) (1991); BALOTrn & FINKELSTEIN,
supra note 7, § 5.4 (Supp. 1996).
70. This, of course, must be the case. If a corporation desired to issue additional
shares of common stock with the exact same legal rights as those of another class, then
the corporation simply would issue additional shares of that existing class, rather than
create a new class. See supra note 67.
71. See supra note 67.
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (1991). Under Delaware law, such con-
vertibility may be at the option of either the stockholders, the corporation, or both. The
specific provisions detailing the convertibility features of a class of stock must be set
forth in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 102(a)(4), 151(a), (e) (1991); see also supra note 67 (providing an example of a
company that allows shares of one of its two classes of common stock to be converted
into shares of its other class of common stock).
June 1996] 2113
Michigan Law Review
With respect to the economic or financial relationship between two
classes of conventional common stock, each such class shares a sub-
stantial unity of financial interest with the other class. This substantial
unity exists because the trading value of shares of each class is linked
to the financial performance of the corporation as a whole. Since the
performance of the corporation as a whole already reflects the individ-
ual performances of distinct businesses or divisions operated by that
corporation, business decisions or policies of the board of directors that
have disparate impacts on such businesses or divisions will not affect
the trading value of shares of the various classes in a materially differ-
ent way. Hence, there is no "sibling rivalry" between different classes
of conventional common stock from an economic or financial point of
view, as holders of shares of all classes of conventional common stock
desire the corporation as a whole to perform well.73
This notion of a substantial unity of financial interest can be illus-
trated using the example above. Suppose that, on the one hand, a given
board decision of C Corp. - for example, to allocate $100 million of
capital to Business 1 rather than Business 2 - has a positive impact on
Business 1 and no impact on Business 2. In this event, and assuming
that all other external and internal variables are held constant, the trad-
ing value of both Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock
should rise because the overall effect on C Corp. as a whole will be
favorable. If, on the other hand, this same decision ultimately has no
impact on Business 1 and a negative impact on Business 2, then the
trading value of both Class A Common Stock and Class B Common
Stock should decline because the overall effect on C Corp. as a whole
will be unfavorable. Thus, even though different business decisions or
policies of the board may have disparate impacts on the businesses or
divisions operated by a diversified conventional corporation, the trading
values of the different classes of common stock should react substan-
tially in unison due to their link to the financial performance of the cor-
poration as a whole.
73. Shares of different classes of common stock, of course, do not trade in perfect
unison. The trading value of shares of a particular class reflects not only the overall per-
formance of the corporation but also the value of any additional legal rights - such as
enhanced voting rights - associated with that class. In addition, other factors, such as
the "float" or liquidity of the secondary trading market for the shares of a particular
class and the board's dividend policy with respect to such class, can influence the trad-
ing value of those shares.
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2. Relationship Between Different Classes of Tracking Stock of a
Tracking Stock Corporation
Like different classes of conventional common stock, different
classes of tracking stock also differ with respect to their legal rights.
Dividend, voting, exchange, and liquidation rights frequently vary be-
tween different classes of tracking stock of the same corporation,74 and
such rights also vary as between classes of tracking stock of different
tracking stock corporations. 75 For example, each share of U S West's
Communications Group Common Stock has one vote while each share
of its Media Group Common Stock initially has eight-tenths of one
vote, subject to certain subsequent adjustments. 76 With respect to ex-
change or redemption rights, only shares of one of Genzyme's two clas-
ses of tracking stock are subject to exchange or redemption under cer-
tain circumstances,77 while shares of all three classes of USX's tracking
stock are subject to exchange or redemption under certain
circumstances. 78
Unlike classes of conventional common stock, however, different
classes of tracking stock as a general matter have a substantial diver-
gence of financial interest.79 This divergence stems from the fact that
each class is linked economically to the financial performance of one
business group operated by a diversified parent corporation. As a result,
the trading value of shares of one class of tracking stock can rise and
fall substantially independently of the trading value of shares of the
other class or classes. Of course, establishing this divergence of f'nan-
cial interest is the primary goal of corporations implementing a tracking
stock equity structure today, as they attempt to create the fiction that a
class of tracking stock is really a class of common stock of a stand-
alone corporation. 0
This notion of a substantial divergence of financial interest can be
illustrated using the example above. Suppose that, on the one hand, a
given board decision of TS Corp. - for example, to allocate $100 mil-
lion of capital to Group X rather than Group Y - has a positive impact
on Group X and no impact on Group Y. In that event, and assuming
74. See supra section I.A.2.
75. See id.
76. See U S WEsT PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 56-58.
77. See GENzYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 44.
78. See USX-Dumn PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at II-I to 11-6.
79. See GENzYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 31 (referring to classes of
tracking stock as "multiple classes of common stock with divergent interests"); KMART
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 10 (same).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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that all other external and internal variables are held constant, the trad-
ing value of Group X Common Stock should rise while the trading
value of Group Y Common Stock should remain largely unchanged. If,
on the other hand, that decision has a positive impact on Group X and a
negative impact on Group Y, for example, because Group Y is now un-
able to fund fully its own capital expansion plan, then the trading value
of Group X Common Stock should rise while the trading value of
Group Y Common Stock should decline. Thus, to the extent that busi-
ness decisions and policies of the board of a tracking stock corporation
affect the business groups operated by that corporation differently, the
trading values of shares of the various classes of tracking stock should
react differently.
While the trading values of shares of different classes of tracking
stock can diverge, this divergence nonetheless does not reflect a com-
plete separation. Indeed, shares of each class of tracking stock are, for
better or for worse, still legally an equity investment in the diversified
parent corporation and not a given business group. Rather, these shares
are only economically linked to distinct business groups operated by
that corporation. These business groups, in turn, are the corporate
equivalent of "Siamese Twins" - distinct businesses attached at the
hip through their common ownership and control by the same parent
corporation. Because of this, shares of each class of tracking stock re-
main subject to the risks associated with all the businesses, assets, and
liabilities of that parent corporation, and not solely to those of the busi-
ness group to which they are linked.8' Unfortunately, this fundamental
81. See, e.g., TCI PRoxy STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 30. A vivid example of this
link is found by looking at Genzyme Corp.'s recent announcement of its proposed
purchase of Deknatel Snowden Pencer Inc. ("DSP") for $250 million in cash. Both the
business of DSP and the cost to acquire it would be attributed to Genzyme's General
Division. Reflecting the concerns of analysts that Genzyme was overpaying for DSP,
Genzyme's General Division Stock dropped approximately 4.5% after the announce-
ment. Genzyme's TR Stock, which is linked to its Tissue Repair Division, also fell ap-
proximately 2% even though the Tissue Repair Division was not directly involved in
the proposed acquisition of DSP and no other negative information concerning the
Tissue Repair Division was given. See William M. Bulkeley, Genzyme Will Buy
Deknatel Snowden for $250 Million, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1996, at B8.
RJR Nabisco's tracking stock proposal was apparently defeated by its shareholders
because of the link that the shares of its different classes of tracking stock would con-
tinue to have with RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. as a whole. RJR Nabisco had attempted
to uncouple its food businesses from its tobacco business through the use of tracking
stocks. As explained by Jennifer Reingold, shareholders quickly realized that this at-
tempted "uncoupling" was not enough to pacify shareholder concerns with respect to
the liabilities - or potential liabilities - of RJR Nabisco's tobacco business:
Another potential pitfall [to tracking stock] is corporate liability, which the
new entity continues to share with other parts of the parent company. That seems
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point is likely to be overlooked by the unsophisticated investor.82
This indirect link to the financial health of the entire corporation
tends to decrease the variance in the trading values of shares of differ-
ent classes of tracking stock. In fact, corporations adopting tracking
stock equity structures are quick to point out in their disclosure docu-
ments that financial effects arising from any particular business group
that affect the corporation's overall operations or financial condition
could, if significant, affect the results of operations or financial condi-
tion of the other business group or the trading value of shares of the
class of tracking stock linked to that group. 3 Thus, the financial per-
formance of, or financial outlook for, a particular business group could
enhance, diminish, or have no effect on the trading value of shares of a
class of tracking stock economically linked to another business group.
Due to this indirect link to the corporation as a whole, tracking stocks
theoretically should never trade completely like stocks of stand-alone
corporations.8 4
to be why RJR Nabisco's shareholders rejected the idea of a target stock separat-
ing the food and tobacco businesses. If tobacco companies were ever found liable
in any of the big class-action cigarette suits and didn't have enough cash to cover
the damages, the food stockholders could end up holding the ashes. Shareholders
felt RJR was trying to create the illusion of legal separation without actually do-
ing so. RJR ended up doing a partial IPO of 19% of its food business [subsidi-
ary] in January [1995].
Reingold, supra note 42, at 33.
82. Despite the earnest attempts of tracking stock corporations to explain the com-
plicated nature of a tracking stock equity structure, many stockholders never fully un-
derstand it. As one U S West spokesperson stated, "You'd be surprised how may people
think it's a stock split or a spinoff, rather than what it is." Bill Menezes, U S West Puts
a Spin on 2 Classes of Stock: Investors Will Have Choice of Core Phone Business or
Ventures into New Technology, RocKY MTN. NEWs, Oct. 10, 1995, at 37A (quoting Lois
Leach) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hu, supra note 16, at 1296 (noting
that the popular Value Line Investment Survey analyzes GM as if it were three different
corporations, with separate one-page analyses of GM-$1 2/3 Stock, GM-E Stock, and
GM-H Stock). Investors' misconceptions are perfectly understandable given the exceed-
ingly thick disclosure documents typically distributed to stockholders by companies
seeking to implement tracking stock equity structures. The hyper-complexity of the TCI
Proxy Statement has already been noted. See supra note 17. TCI, however, is in good
company in this regard.
83. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 31; KMART PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 10; RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 21; RJR
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 23; SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 38;
TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 30; U S WEST PROXY STATEMENr, supra note 2,
at 29.
84. Evidence of this can be found by looking at the price of GM-E Stock after
GM announced that it intended to split-off EDS officially from GM. See supra note 41.
Despite the fact that GM-E Stock had appreciated sevenfold since its issuance in 1984,
it jumped 6% on the news of the split-off. See Reingold, supra note 42, at 32. As part
of the split-off, GM, in fact, required EDS to pay GM a special dividend of $500 mil-
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The substantial divergence of financial interest that exists between
different classes of tracking stock sets the stage for a potentially explo-
sive sibling rivalry. This rivalry creates an unprecedented dilemma from
both the perspective of the holders of different classes of tracking stock
of a tracking stock corporation and that corporation's directors. Holders
of each class of tracking stock, unlike common stockholders of a stand-
alone corporation, do not have an independent executive management
team and a separate board of directors looking out for and promoting
their interests alone. 5 Rather, the interests of those holders are at the
mercy of a single executive management team and a single board of di-
rectors that also must consider the interests and needs of the holders of
shares of one or more other classes of tracking stock. Adding fuel to the
fire is the fact that the holders of shares of at least one class of tracking
stock of any particular tracking stock corporation are arguably minority
stockholders of that corporation. 6 Thus, it is more appropriate to view
the sibling rivalry created by a tracking stock equity structure as a
struggle between a big sister and a little sister rather than as a struggle
between identical twins.87
lion, which amount was intended to reflect the increased value of EDS as a stand-alone
business. See GM SoLIcrrATON STATMmENT/PRosPEcruS. supra note 41, at 3; Templin &
Blumenstein, supra note 66. An additional reason why tracking stocks trade only near,
but not at, multiples of stocks of stand-alone corporations is their lack of "takeout" pre-
mium - the additional premium necessary to gain control of a corporation. See
Reingold, supra note 42, at 33.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. It should be noted, however, that
tracking stock corporations frequently create holding company structures as a matter of
convenience in maintaining accounting records. Thus, a parent corporation with tracking
stocks will place the assets and operations of each of its business groups in a separate,
wholly owned subsidiary. Because each such subsidiary is a separate corporation, it will
have its own board of directors. Under Delaware law, however, that board solely is ac-
countable to the parent corporation and its stockholders. See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550
A.2d 1105, 1123 (Del. 1988) (quoting Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E.
Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988)).
86. Ralston Purina actually sets forth its discussion of this point under a risk factor
heading entitled "Minority Voting Power." See RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note
2, at 23; see also U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT. supra note 2, at 57 ("The Company an-
ticipates that the Communications Stock would initially represent a majority of the vot-
ing power of all classes and series entitled to vote in the election of directors."); Susan
Pullam & Steven Lipin, Target Stock Is Under Fire from Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1995, at Cl (quoting Leon Cooperman of Omega Advisors, who stated, with respect to
targeted stock, "I don't like buying something that amounts to a minority interest").
87. Genzyme Corp. provides an extreme example of this proposition. Upon
Genzyme's implementation of a tracking stock equity structure, the holders of its
General Stock and holders of its TR Stock had approximately 91% and 9%, respec-
tively, of the total voting power of Genzyme. As a result of this imbalance, according to
Genzyme, "on matters which are submitted to a vote of the holders of all classes of
common stock, the preferences of the holders of the General Stock are likely to domi-
nate and determine the outcome of such vote unless and until the relative number of
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Directors of a tracking stock corporation have to satisfy two or
more different groups of stockholders with substantially divergent fi-
nancial interests." Each such group of stockholders, together with its
team of litigators, potentially can second-guess any board decision that
does not favor, or that neglects or does a disservice to, the business
group to which its stock is linked economically.s9 Complicating this
problem is the fact that many tracking stock directors apparently have
made corporate decisions while owning disproportionate equity posi-
tions in their corporations." Such disproportionate equity positions give
rise, at a minimum, to an appearance of impropriety that could bolster a
stockholder claim of blatant favoritism or purposeful or benign neglect.
B. Intergroup Conflicts Arising in a Tracking Stock Context
Corporations adopting tracking stock equity structures today are
not coy about the "slew of potential conflicts of interest" 9' that can
arise between different stockholder groups. Early on, however, corpora-
tions were not so frank. GM, for example, failed to mention the possi-
bility that intergroup conflicts could arise among the holders of its three
classes of lettered stock.92 By contrast, one of the most recent tracking
shares outstanding and/or the market value of the General Stock and TR Stock materi-
ally changes." GENZYME PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32.
88. Directors are faced with a host of difficult issues in this regard. What, for ex-
ample, does the financial mantra of "maximizing stockholder wealth" mean in the con-
text of an equity structure with two or more competing groups of common stockhold-
ers? Should "stockholder wealth" be viewed on a multiple class basis? Or should it be
viewed on an individual class basis? If the former, does not this mean that directors
should promote the business group with the best growth prospects even if this proves
detrimental to the declining business group? If the latter, can the maximization of stock-
holder wealth for one class of stockholders be achieved simultaneously with the max-
imization of stockholder wealth for the other class or classes of stockholders? See gen-
erally Hu, supra note 16, at 1294-97 (discussing multiple maximization problems in the
context of GM).
89. See Reingold, supra note 42. As Jennifer Reingold has stated:
This is not as easy as it looks, however. Keeping two sets of shareholders
happy means that every internal decision, whether it's which products the sales
force should focus on or whether one unit should borrow money at a rate that
might affect the parent's debt rating, needs to be done in a way that will keep the
other shareholders' lawyers from getting involved.
Id. at 33.
90. See infra section ll.C.
91. Keating, supra note 52, at E3.
92. See GM-EDS PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2; GM-HuGHEs SoucrrroN
STATEmENT, supra note 2. A participant in GM's issuance of GM-E Stock, however, in-
dicated to the author that GM was well aware of potential intergroup conflicts but de-
cided not to disclose them in an effort to bolster its tax position that its lettered stocks
were stocks of GM and not separate companies. Indeed, as Henry T.C. Hu has pointed
out, "[t]he fiduciary complications [in GM's structure] are immense even when com-
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stock converts - U S West 93 - prominently featured the following
statement in its public disclosure documentation:
The Board could, in its sole discretion, from time to time, make opera-
tional and financial decisions or implement policies that affect dispropor-
tionately the businesses of the Communications Group and the Media
Group .... Any such decision may favor one Group at the expense of
the other. For example, the decision to obtain funds for one Group may
adversely affect the ability of the other Group to obtain funds sufficient
to implement its growth strategies.94
This type of disclosure, however, does not do justice to the reali-
ties of the intergroup "sibling rivalry" inherent in every tracking stock
corporation. Indeed, intergroup conflicts underlie virtually every sub-
stantive business decision and policy made by a tracking stock board of
directors.95 Yet the holders of stock linked to each business group are
neither entitled to vote on those decisions and policies as a separate
class nor entitled to elect their own representative to the board of
directors.
Although the specific business decisions or policies of tracking
stock boards that can give rise to intergroup conflicts vary, the majority
fall into one or more of the following categories:
(1) decisions involving the allocation of scarce corporate resources, cor-
porate opportunities, corporate expenses, or merger or acquisition
consideration;
(2) decisions on whether to promote or discourage particular public poli-
cies or laws;
(3) dividend policies relating to the various classes of tracking stock;
(4) decisions or policies involving intergroup transactions and dealings;
pletely ignoring fiduciary duties owed to holders of GM's preferred stock." Hu, supra
note 16, at 1296.
93. Stockholders of U S West approved a tracking stock equity structure on
October 31, 1995.
94. U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasis added). See also
KMART PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 10 (referring to the board making "opera-
tional and financial decisions with respect to one Group that could be considered to be
detrimental to another Group").
95. Although discussing the tension between common and preferred stockholders,
Lawrence E. Mitchell has labeled conflicts between two classes of participants in a
corporate capital structure "horizontal" in nature, because they center on the competing
legitimate interests of those participants in the corporate pie. By contrast, Professor
Mitchell has labeled conflicts arising between corporate directors and officers and the
corporation itself and other corporate constituent groups "vertical" in nature. See
Mitchell, supra note 15, at 449-50, 463-70. The conflicts arising among competing
groups of tracking stock stockholders are quintessential "horizontal" conflicts, although
they can take on "vertical" overtones whenever tracking stock directors hold dispropor-
tionate equity positions in their corporations. See infra section II.C.
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(5) decisions to exchange outstanding shares of one class of tracking
stock for shares of another class of tracking stock; and
(6) decisions relating to capital-raising activities and the use of proceeds
stemming therefrom.
What follows is a brief discussion of the manner in which each of these
categories of business decisions or policies foments sibling rivalry be-
tween the holders of different classes of tracking stock.
1. Allocable Decisions
Intergroup conflicts arise each time directors make corporate deci-
sions involving allocations between or among business groups. Alloca-
ble decisions may involve, among other things, the distribution or allo-
cation between or among business groups of corporate resources,
opportunities, and expenses. In addition, if the tracking stock corpora-
tion as a whole is merged with or acquired by a third party, the board
must allocate merger or acquisition consideration among the various
classes of stockholders.96 Because of the substantial divergence of fi-
nancial interest existing among different classes of tracking stock, allo-
cable decisions that have disparate impacts on the business groups like-
wise will have disparate impacts on the trading value of shares linked to
those groups. This, in turn, could give rise to dissatisfied stockholder
groups and eventually lead to litigation.97
Corporate resources, whether financial or human in nature, are lim-
ited. The board of directors is charged with the duty of allocating these
resources among the different business groups. For example, a tracking
stock board must allocate its corporation's limited supply of capital
among the various capital projects of the different business groups. If
the amount of capital is insufficient to fund all of these capital projects,
then some projects simply will not be undertaken due to capital ration-
96. For one of the more thoughtful discussions concerning allocable decisions and
their potentially disparate impacts on different business groups, see the TCI PRoxY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
97. Many of the allocable decisions discussed in this section also confront direc-
tors of diversified conventional corporations. For example, if a corporation has $50 mil-
lion of capital available, how should it allocate it? Using the example from above,
C Corp. could allocate it all to Business 1, all to Business 2, or could allocate some to
Business 1 and the rest to Business 2. Of course, how this allocation ultimately is made
is of no particular consequence to holders of Class A Common Stock and Class B Com-
mon Stock because they share a substantial unity of financial interest in the corporation
as a whole. If the allocation decided upon proves to be beneficial to the corporation as a
whole, the trading values of those stocks should react favorably. If, however, such allo-
cation proves to be detrimental to the corporation as a whole, the trading values of
those stocks should decline accordingly.
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ing.98 Similarly, tracking stock corporations typically have one or more
credit facilities with financial institutions in place at the parent corpora-
tion level.99 The board of directors must somehow allocate the credit
available under those facilities among the various business groups.
Human resources, too, must be allocated among the groups.10 While
each business group will likely have its own operational management
team that runs the day-to-day affairs of the group, each member of the
parent corporation's executive management team must determine how
much of her time to devote to each business group.
The board of directors must also make decisions allocating corpo-
rate opportunities among the business groups. While the various busi-
ness groups of most tracking stock corporations conduct vastly different
operations,101 others do not. Occasionally, a business opportunity may
arise that could be undertaken by two or more business groups because
their businesses overlap to some extent.'02 This exact situation exists,
for example, between U S West's Communications Group and its Media
Group.103 If a viable new communications-related corporate opportunity
arose and was available to U S West, its board would have to allocate it
98. According to the TCI Proxy Statement:
The Board of Directors could from time to time allocate resources and fi-
nancial support to ... one Group instead of the other Group. The decision to al-
locate resources and financial support to one Group may adversely affect the
ability of the other Group to obtain funds sufficient to implement its business
strategies.
TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
99. The lower costs obtained through the ability to continue to borrow funds at the
parent corporation level is one of the major benefits that a tracking stock equity struc-
ture has over other stockholder value enhancement strategies, such as a spin-off. See
supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
100. See generally TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34 ("The Board of Di-
rectors could from time to time make operational and financial decisions that affect the
Groups disproportionately, such as ... the allocation of resources and personnel that
may be suitable for more than one Group.").
101. For example, USX's U.S. Steel Group conducts a steel and domestic iron ore
business; USX's Marathon Group conducts an oil exploration and production business;
and USX's Delhi Group conducts a natural gas gathering, processing, and pipeline
business.
102. According to the TCI Proxy Statement:
Because both the Liberty Media Group and the TCI Group... have significant
interests in entities which provide programming services to markets outside the
United States, and also have business strategies which anticipate expansion into
international markets, it is likely that the Board of Directors of the Company will
be presented with opportunities which could be pursued through either the TCI
Group... or the Liberty Group, or jointly through both Groups.
TCI PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
103. See U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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to one business group or the other.104 The board's ultimate decision
could send out a not-so-subtle message to the financial community
about both the business group that received the opportunity and the bus-
iness group that lost out on it. The potentially adverse impact on the
trading value of shares of the tracking stock class linked to the losing
business group is self-evident and could lead holders of those shares to
cry foul.105
Tracking stock directors also must decide how to allocate corporate
overhead costs and expenses among the various business groups. These
costs and expenses include, among others, the salaries of the directors,
the executive management team, and the other unassigned employees,106
as well as the expenses associated with running the corporate headquar-
ters. Because all of the business groups of a tracking stock corporation
theoretically benefit by having a board of directors, an executive man-
agement team, and a corporate headquarters, the associated expenses
must be allocated on some consistent, rational basis to the various busi-
ness groups.1' 7
104. See id. at 33 ("The Board could... make operational and financial decisions
... such as. . . the allocation of business opportunities ... that may be suitable for
both Groups. Any such decision may favor one Group at the expense of the other."); cf.
GENZYME PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 43 (discussing noncompete provision be-
tween Genzyme's two business divisions). U S West has indicated that, in allocating
any such corporate opportunity, the board would consider a number of factors, includ-
ing "whether the business opportunity is principally within the scope of a Group's busi-
ness, whether the business opportunity is principally within the geographic area served
by a Group and whether a Group, because of its managerial or operational expertise,
would be better positioned to undertake the business opportunity." U S WEsT PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 43. Presumably, overlapping business groups could, in the-
ory at least, "joint venture" any business opportunity suitable to both business groups
in an attempt to allay stockholder concerns.
105. On this exact point, Tim Horan, a securities analyst at Smith Barney, stated
that the " 'target stock structure that [U S West is] putting forward creates a lot of inef-
ficiencies .... There will be conflicts of interest between the two companies.' They
could end up competing against one another in wireless markets." Oslund, supra note
52, at 1D, (quoting Tim Horan). Apparently, the existence of conflicts between EDS
and the rest of GM is a primary reason GM decided to split-off EDS. See GM
SoucrrATION STATEMENT/PRosPECtUS, supra note 41, at 27-30. In fact, one notable con-
flict stemmed from the reluctance of certain competitors of GM to do business with
EDS because of its affiliation with GM. See id. at 28-29.
106. USX Corp., for example, stated that 276 of its active USX Headquarters em-
ployees in 1995 had not been assigned to any specific USX business group. See USX
CORP., 1995 FoRm 10-K, at 3.
107. See GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 41 (stating management
policy to allocate corporate and general and administrative expenses to each Genzyme
division "in a reasonable and consistent manner based on utilization by [each]
[d]ivision of the services to which such costs relate").
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Also involving allocations are board decisions concerning the dis-
tribution of consideration to be received by holders of shares of differ-
ent classes of tracking stock in the event the corporation as a whole is
merged with, or acquired by, a third party in a negotiated transaction. 08
The board of directors of each tracking stock corporation is charged
with the responsibility of determining the percentage of the considera-
tion to be allocated to holders of different classes of tracking stock.109
Because various methods of allocation are available, a particular group
of disgruntled stockholders could argue that the allocation method cho-
sen by the board was unfair."0
2. Promotion or Discouragement of Particular
Public Policies or Laws
A tracking stock board of directors must determine which public
policies or laws its corporation will promote or discourage through lob-
bying efforts, corporate contributions, and related political activities. To
the extent that the various business groups have conflicting business
purposes, the board may find itself in the unenviable position of decid-
ing whether or not to promote a particular governmental policy or law
that would facilitate the operations of one business group but hurt those
of another business group."' If, on the one hand, the board decides to
108. Such decisions are not implicated in a hostile acquisition context, in that the
bidder alone will determine what consideration it is willing to give in return for shares
of each class of tracking stock of the target corporation. If, however, a hostile bidder ul-
timately convinces management of a target corporation to participate in a negotiated ac-
quisition, then the board of the target corporation must, as part of the negotiation pro-
cess, decide how the merger or acquisition consideration will be allocated among
stockholders of the various classes of tracking stock.
109. See TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33; Cf. SEAGULL PROXY STATE-
MENr, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing pre-established board policy of distributing merger
or consolidation consideration to holders of Seagull's two classes of tracking stock
based on relative Market Capitalizations (as defined) of those classes). But see
GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 46 (placing restrictions on board's ability
to effect certain mergers and business combinations that would disadvantage holders of
Genzyme's TR Stock without first obtaining the affirmative vote of such holders).
110. See U S WEsT PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 31-32; cf. In re FLS Hold-
ings, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.12623, 1993 WL 104562 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2,
1993); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 596-97 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(evaluating the allocation of merger consideration between common stockholders and
preferred stockholders, where court required the allocations to be fair but not necessa-
rily equal).
111. U S West provided the following example of this conflict: "[T]he Communi-
cations Group's interests may be advanced by regulation requiring all common carriers,
including new entrants, to comply with the same tariff filing and approval requirements,
while the Media Group's interests may be advanced by regulation permitting non-
dominant, new entrants to comply with a relaxed set of requirements." U S WEST
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promote that policy, the board opens itself up to the legitimate com-
plaints of the holders of shares linked to the injured business group. If,
on the other hand, the board decides not to promote that policy, com-
plaints from the stockholders of the business group that would have
benefited likely will follow.
3. Decisions and Policies in Respect of Dividends
The payment of any cash dividend on any particular class of track-
ing stock involves an outflow of corporate funds. As a result, any such
payment reduces the pool of funds legally available to pay dividends on
all classes of tracking stock. 112 Therefore, a decision by a tracking stock
board of directors to declare and pay a dividend on shares of one class
of tracking stock is susceptible to charges of unfairness by holders of
shares of other classes of tracking stock. This is particularly true when
the board makes a decision to pay a dividend on shares of a class of
tracking stock linked to a business group that is not generating any in-
come at that time. In such a case, the board must also decide how to
fund that dividend."' This additional decision, in turn, also can be sub-
ject to claims of unfairness if, for example, funds from another business
group are borrowed to pay that dividend.
4. Intergroup Transactions and Dealings
Transactions and other dealings between or among business groups
of a tracking stock corporation offer fertile ground for claims of unfair-
ness brought by different groups of tracking stock stockholders. Exam-
ples of these types of transactions and dealings include the extension of
credit from one business group to another; the sale of assets of one bus-
iness group to another; and the furnishing of goods, services, or techni-
PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33. U S West added that the "increasing overlap be-
tween the business of the two Groups resulting from regulatory changes and technologi-
cal advancements may increase such conflicts." Id.
112. See, e.g., id. at 31; TCI PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33-34. Dividend
payments, of course, are not the only events that can reduce "legally available funds."
As TCI states:
Any net losses of the Company (without regard to whether such losses arose
from any specific Group), and any dividends or distributions on, or repurchases
of, the TCI Group Common Stock or the Liberty Media Group Common Stock,
and dividends on, and certain repurchases of, preferred stock, will reduce the
funds of the Company legally available for payment of dividends on both the
TCI Group Common Stock and the Liberty Media Group Common Stock.
Id.
113. Presumably, the necessary funds could be borrowed from a profitable busi-
ness group or from an outside lender. In either case, the net effect on a profitable busi-
ness group could be adverse.
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cal know-how by one business group to another.1 4 To the extent one
business group receives a better bargain - or is perceived to receive a
better bargain - than another business group, holders of shares linked
to the disadvantaged business group could challenge the validity of the
transaction. A stockholder claim in this regard could focus on the
board's decision to effect a transaction in the first place, the actual
terms of any such transaction, and/or the actions taken by a board to en-
force those terms.'1 5
In order to forestall these claims, many tracking stock corporations
have established a board policy that requires intergroup transactions to
be conducted only on an "arm's-length" basis.1 6 Intergroup loans, for
example, will be made only if the borrowing business group pays inter-
114. See, e.g., TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 35; U S WEST PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34, 42-43.
A potential intergroup conflict never disclosed by any tracking stock corporation
relates to the allocation of synergies between an acquired corporation and an acquiring
tracking stock corporation. Assuming that the acquiring tracking stock corporation is-
sues a new class of tracking stock in connection with such acquisition, the acquired cor-
poration would be deemed a new business group of that tracking stock corporation. The
shares of the new class of tracking stock would be linked economically to that new bus-
iness group. The intergroup conflict arises with respect to the allocation of synergies
that exist between the new business group and the existing business groups. For exam-
ple, should the new business group be forced to share proprietary technology with the
existing business groups? If so, at what cost, if any? See GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 41-42 (stating policy of giving each Genzyme division "free access" to
all the technology and know-how of the other Genzyme division, except with respect to
research specifically conducted by one division at the request of the other division). Be-
cause technology is a valuable asset, forcing the new business group to share its tech-
nology with existing business groups without compensation would result in substantial
benefits flowing to the stockholders of those existing business groups at the expense of
the stockholders of the new business group. This concern does not exist in a conven-
tional corporate context. Indeed, a conventional corporation typically makes strategic
acquisitions only if they can provide synergistic benefits to the entire corporation and its
stockholders. There are no allocation issues as long as the acquiring corporation ac-
quires the entire equity interest in the acquired corporation.
115. An interesting aspect of these intergroup transactions and dealings is how
closely they parallel "common director" transactions addressed by the duty of loyalty.
In such a common director transaction, a conventional corporation enters into a transac-
tion with another corporation, and both corporations have one or more common direc-
tors on their boards of directors. In an intergroup transaction, by contrast, two business
groups of a tracking stock corporation enter into a transaction approved by the single
board of directors of that corporation. Conceptually, all the tracking stock directors are
on both sides of the intergroup transaction since they make the decisions for both busi-
ness groups.
116. See, e.g., RAiSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32; U S WEST PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 42; USX-DELn PROxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 18; cf
GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42 (prohibiting transfer of Key TR
Programs (as defined) from Genzyme's Tissue Repair Division to its General Division
without a class vote of holders of TR Stock unless certain conditions are met).
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est on that loan to the lending business group at a rate representative of
the actual borrowing rate of the corporation as a whole.117 While this
policy seems fair on its face, it suffers in two significant respects.
First, an "arm's-length" policy does not address the issue of
whether a particular business group, if viewed as a stand-alone corpora-
tion, would elect to enter into the transaction in the first place. With re-
spect to an intergroup loan, for example, would the lending business
group choose to be in the "lending business" at all if it were a stand-
alone corporation with a wholly independent board of directors? Simi-
larly, if the lending business group chose to lend money, is the borrow-
ing business group the type of borrower to which the lending business
group would lend - that is to say, is the borrowing business group a
good credit risk? Unlike a stand-alone corporation with a wholly inde-
pendent board, a particular business group of a tracking stock corpora-
tion lacks an independent decisionmaker with the all-important power
to say "no" either to entering into certain types of transactions or to
dealing with particular parties. 18
To understand the second problem with an "arm's-length" policy,
assume that a particular business group, when viewed as a stand-alone
corporation, would choose to enter into an intergroup transaction with
another business group. In such a case, an "arm's-length" policy could
result in one of the business groups accepting unfavorable transactional
terms if such a policy focuses on what would be acceptable to the par-
ent corporation rather than the business group. Again, using an inter-
group loan as an example, the rate charged to a borrowing business
group could be viewed as either too low or too high, if it is based on
the rate paid by the entire corporation on its debt rather than on the rate
that the borrowing business group would pay as a stand-alone corpora-
tion. Because of this, stockholders interested in the lending business
group or the borrowing business group could allege, depending on the
117. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMET, supra note 2, at 41 (interdivision bor-
rowing bears interest at Genzyme's short-term borrowing rate); U S WEsT PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 42-43 (referring to short-term ordinary course advances of
funds between business groups to be made at market rates associated with U S West's
centralized cash management).
118. This stems from the fact that the same board of directors is, in essence, on
both sides of an intergroup transaction. As Warren Buffet has stated in a different con-
text: "Negotiating with one's self seldom produces a barroom brawl." Warren E.
Buffett, Lessons for Corporate Lawyers, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 25 (Lawrence A.
Cunningham ed., forthcoming 1997).
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particular facts, that the other business group was gaining a benefit at
their group's expense. 19
A related issue arising in the intergroup transaction context con-
cerns the action, if any, a board would take if one business group
breached the terms of an agreement with another business group. Using
the intergroup loan example once more, would the board take any ac-
tion against a defaulting business group? 120 Conceivably, the board
could liquidate assets of the borrowing business group to ensure that a
default does not occur; however, the board also could restructure the
terms of the loan unilaterally to allow the borrowing business group
more time to meet its obligations. The board's action, if any, in this sit-
uation likely will be scrutinized closely by the holders of shares linked
to the lending business group.
5. Optional Exchange of Shares of One Class of Tracking Stock for
Shares of Another Class of Tracking Stock
The certificates or articles of incorporation of most tracking stock
corporations provide for an optional exchange or conversion of out-
standing shares of one class of tracking stock for, or into, shares of an-
other class of tracking stock.121 This optional exchange feature provides
a tracking stock corporation with the ability to "unwind" its tracking
stock equity structure by collapsing one business group into another and
119. In the RJR Proxy Statement, a different type of problem is highlighted. That
proxy statement points out that RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. ("Holdings") would have
managed most financial activities on a centralized, consolidated basis had Holdings'
tracking stock proposal been approved by its stockholders. In such event, each business
group would have been allocated a portion of Holdings' debt (pooled debt), and interest
expense would have been charged to each business group based on the weighted aver-
age rate of the interest expense applicable to such pooled debt. The proxy statement
then points out that:
[i]n addition, in obtaining its financing through increases of its allocated pooled
debt balance, a Group will receive a "benefit" or "detriment" to the extent such
weighted average rate is lower or higher, respectively, than the market rate for a
hypothetical borrowing by such Group if such Group were a stand-alone
corporation.
RJR PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 25.
120. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971) (holding that
where majority owned subsidiary entered into contract with wholly owned subsidiary of
common parent corporation and such wholly owned subsidiary thereafter breached such
contract, under intrinsic fairness standard parent corporation must prove that its failure
to cause majority owned subsidiary to enforce the contract was intrinsically fair to mi-
nority shareholders of majority owned subsidiary).
121. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT. supra note 2, at 35-38; RJR PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33; TCI PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 59-61; U S




thus returning to the status quo ante. 22 The ability of a tracking stock
board to effect such an exchange is particularly susceptible to charges
of unfairness by the holders of outstanding shares linked to the col-
lapsed business group who must forfeit their shares in exchange for
shares linked to another business group. 12 Indeed, this stems from the
board's unilateral ability to decide whether and, if so, when to effect an
exchange. 124
Often, but not always, optional exchange provisions provide for a
fixed "premium" to compensate the exchanging stockholders for giving
up their shares.125 This premium is, in essence, an acknowledgment that
those stockholders are being forced to give up their interest in the "up-
side" potential of the collapsed business group.
26
A question arises, however, as to whether the fixed premium is the
correct premium to be paying. The premium logically should be deter-
mined at or near the time the exchange is announced and should be
based on the circumstances existing at that time, including elements of
the collapsed business group's future value known or susceptible of
122. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 40, 44; RALSTON
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 35; RJR PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
123. An optional exchange occurs when one business group is collapsed into an-
other. It results in the receipt by the collapsed business group's stockholders of shares
linked to the other business group, in exchange for their old shares linked to the col-
lapsed business group. The effects of such an exchange can be likened to those of a
stock merger transaction between two unrelated conventional corporations. In such a
merger, the acquiring corporation issues shares of its common stock in exchange for the
outstanding shares of the target corporation. The target corporation then is merged typi-
cally with a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. Yet, because a track-
ing stock board can force an exchange at a predetermined exchange rate by virtue of
provisions in its certificate or articles of incorporation, a tracking stock corporation does
not need to conduct a valuation of the disappearing business group. By contrast, before
a board of a conventional corporation can accept an offer to merge, its board of direc-
tors must make an assessment of the corporation's value, either through internal means,
such as by a valuation by its chief financial officer, or external means, such as by ob-
taining a fairness opinion from an investment banking firm. See Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
124. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 44; RJR PRoxY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32; U S WEST
PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32; USX-DELm PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at
14.
125. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 44; RALSTON PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 35-36; RJR PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33; USX-
DEL-I PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 17.
126. In discussing its provision allowing for an optional exchange of outstanding
shares of TR Stock for shares of General Stock, Genzyme Corp. stated "[a]ny such op-
tional exchange.., would preclude holders of TR Stock from retaining their investment
in a security that is intended to reflect separately the performance of the Tissue Repair
Division." GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33; see also RALSTON PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 22.
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proof.127 Instead, most tracking stock corporations fix their premiums in
stone at the time they implement a tracking stock equity structure. If the
fixed premium is, for example, 10% and the premium that otherwise
would be payable based on factors existing at the time the exchange is
announced is 16%, then the group of stockholders forced to give up
their shares could argue that it is being shortchanged, while the other
group of stockholders arguably is receiving a benefit. Similarly, if the
premium that otherwise would be payable based on factors existing at
the time the exchange is announced is only 5%, then the group of
stockholders giving up their shares arguably is being given a benefit at
the expense of the other group of stockholders. 12
6. Capital Formation and Use of Proceeds
Various stockholder groups could view an additional issuance of
shares of a class of tracking stock, depending on the particular facts sur-
rounding that issuance, as unfair from either a voting-power or use-of-
proceeds perspective. This potential unfairness stems from the fact that,
as a general matter, a tracking stock board of directors has the power to
authorize an additional issuance unilaterally. 129 In such a case, unless
otherwise required by applicable state corporate law or stock exchange
rules, no authorizing vote of either the existing stockholders of the class
of tracking stock being issued, voting as a separate class, or the stock-
127. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (holding that
Delaware appraisal statute requires that dissenter not only be paid the current value of
her shares but also that such value be determined by considering elements of the corpo-
ration's future value "known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger").
128. In discussing the fixed 30% premium to be received by holders of its TR
Stock upon an optional or mandatory exchange of TR Stock for General Stock,
Genzyme noted the following:
[H]olders of the TR Stock may receive a greater or lesser premium for their
shares than any premium paid by a third party buyer of all or substantially all the
assets of the Tissue Repair Division. In addition, any such exchange for shares of
General Stock could be made at a time when the General Stock may be consid-
ered to be overvalued or undervalued and would dilute the interests of the hold-
ers of General Stock.
GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
129. This assumes that the tracking stock corporation has authorized but unissued
shares of a class of tracking stock available for issuance. To ensure that shares are
available for issuance in the future, at the time a conventional corporation adopts a
tracking stock equity structure its stockholders typically approve a charter amendment
that increases the number of shares of common stock available for issuance. Thus, most
tracking stock corporations have a significant number of authorized but unissued shares
of their various classes of tracking stock available for future use in connection with ac-
quisitions or capital raising.
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holders of all classes of tracking stock, voting together as a single vot-
ing group, is required.
Any additional issuance of shares of one class of tracking stock
potentially can increase the voting power of the holders of that class of
tracking stock vis-a-vis the holders of the other class or classes of track-
ing stock. Thus, from a voting power perspective, a stock issuance
could alter the voting balance between the holders of various classes of
tracking stock. 30 In turn, the board's decision on how to allocate the
proceeds garnered from such an issuance could exacerbate this
alteration.
With respect to the proceeds raised from a stock issuance, tracking
stock boards usually adopt a general policy that requires those proceeds
to be attributed to the business group to which the issued stock is
linked.' 3' As logical as this arrangement is, some notable exceptions ex-
ist. Indeed, some tracking stock corporations have provided in their
charters that one of their business groups - usually the larger or more
dominant or established one - will have a "retained interest" in an-
other of their business groups.132 If so, this can lead to the attribution of
proceeds from a stock offering to a business group other than the busi-
ness group to which the newly issued shares are linked.
To illustrate this "retained interest" concept, the example of TS
Corp. from above will be used. Assume that at the time TS Corp.
adopted its tracking stock equity structure, the authorized number of
shares of Group Y Common Stock was set at 1.5 million. Further as-
sume that TS Corp.'s board made a determination at that time that a
100% equity interest in Group Y equaled only 1 million shares of
Group Y Common Stock. If TS Corp. issues or distributes a number of
shares less than 1 million (for example, 600,000 shares) in connection
130. See, e.g., U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT. supra note 2, at 30 (noting that share
issuances and repurchases, among other things, could impact the relative voting power
of shares of Communications Stock and Media Stock).
131. See, e.g., GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 42; RALSTON PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 31-32; USX-DELHi PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 18;
USX-MARATHON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 28.
132. See, e.g., U S WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 59-60 (Communica-
tions Group having retained interest in Media Group); RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 10, annex 1I (RPG Group having retained interest in CBG Group);
SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 59-61, I-1 to Hl-8 (possibility of Seagull
Energy having retained interest in ENSTAR Alaska Group in event less than 100% of
equity attributable to ENSTAR Alaska Group was sold to public as part of ENSTAR
Alaska Stock Offering); TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 72-74 (no immediate
retained interest, but TCI Group could have retained interest in Liberty Media Group in
future upon occurrence of certain events); USX-DELHI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2,
at 12-13, annex IV (Marathon Group having retained interest in Delhi Group).
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with its implementation of a tracking stock equity structure, then the
ownership of the number of shares not issued (400,000 shares in the ex-
ample) is attributed to Group X. Thus, the net effect is that Group X is
deemed to have the tracking stock equivalent of an equity interest in
Group Y (in this case, a 40% interest). 33
By implementing this "retained interest" concept, TS Corp.'s
board gains the flexibility of being able to issue shares of Group Y
Common Stock in the future from one of two sources. 34 The first
source is from the authorized but unissued shares of Group Y Common
Stock (500,000 in this example). Proceeds raised from the sale of these
shares would be attributed to Group Y. The second source is from
Group X's retained interest in Group Y. Proceeds raised from the sale of
these shares would be attributed not to Group Y, but to Group X. While
any such issuance would reduce Group X's retained interest in Group
Y, the holders of existing Group Y Common Stock nevertheless would
be diluted while the proceeds were attributed to Group X.135 Thus, an
issuance of tracking stock in general may raise many questions of fair-
ness depending on the circumstances surrounding that issuance.
C. Directorial Loyalty Concerns
The intergroup conflicts discussed above become even more worri-
some when viewed in light of the unique loyalty concerns inherent
within a tracking stock equity structure. These concerns arise whenever
a tracking stock director makes decisions at a time when her share own-
ership ratio of her corporation's different classes of tracking stock, mea-
sured on a fully diluted basis, is out of line with the outstanding share
ratio of those different classes. 136 This method of comparison is called
the Ratio Method.
133. A retained interest is not represented by actual shares linked to a business
group of the tracking stock corporation, and thus the business group deemed to own a
retained interest in another business group has no voting rights with respect to that re-
tained interest. Nonetheless, the business group holding the retained interest is entitled
to its proportional share of dividends paid by that other business group. See, e.g.,
RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 41-42; SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra
note 2, at 59-60; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 72-74; USX-Dmu PRoXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at annex V.
134. This assumes that no shares of Group Y Common Stock are held in treasury.
135. See RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 22 ("If the Company issues
shares of CBG Stock for the account of the RPG Group [rather than the CBG Group],
the voting power of holders of shares of CBG Stock immediately prior to such issuance
would be diluted even though any consideration received for such shares would not be
attributed to the CBG Group.").
136. Similar concerns arise whenever a director who owns a significant amount of
common stock makes a distributional decision favoring common stockholders over pre-
2132 [Vol. 94:2089
Duty of Fairness
An example will clarify how the Ratio Method of comparison
works. Suppose that TS Corp. has 3 million outstanding shares of
Group X Common Stock and 1 million outstanding shares of Group Y
Common Stock. The ratio of outstanding shares of each class of track-
ing stock would therefore be 3 to 1 (always using the class of tracking
stock with the fewest shares outstanding as the common denominator).
If Director A beneficially owns 50,000 shares of Group X Common
Stock and 1000 shares of Group Y Common Stock, Director A's owner-
ship ratio would be 50 to 1.
Because Director A's ownership ratio of 50 to 1 is out of line with
the ratio of outstanding shares, which is 3 to 1, Director A would be
considered to have a "Disproportionate Equity Position" or "DEP" in
Group X. By favoring the business group in which she has the Dispro-
portionate Equity Position - in this case, Group X - Director A can
benefit financially through an increase in the value of her shares of
Group X Common Stock. Similarly, Director A would have little per-
sonal financial motivation to bestow favors on Group Y, because such
favoritism would not benefit her significantly through an increase in the
value of her shares of Group Y Common Stock. Instead, favoring
Group Y actually could backfire if such favoritism negatively affects
Group X, and thus the value of her Group X Common Stock.137
ferred stockholders. See Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056-
57 (Del. Ch. 1987); Mitchell, supra note 15, at 464.
137. Of course, other ways of viewing disproportionate equity positions could be
adopted. For example, the number of shares of each class of tracking stock owned by a
director could be the measuring stick - the "Number of Shares Method." Thus; if a
director held more shares of Group X Common Stock than shares of Group Y Common
Stock, she would be deemed to have a disproportionate equity position in Group X.
Similarly, the aggregate dollar amount of the shares of each class of tracking stock
owned by a director could be used - the "Aggregate Dollar Method." Thus, if a direc-
tor held shares of Group X Common Stock that were worth more than her shares of
Group Y Common Stock, she would be deemed to have a disproportionate equity posi-
tion in Group X.
This article, however, rejects these other methods of determining disproportionate
ownership. Instead, it embraces the Ratio Method for four primary reasons.
First, the Ratio Method recognizes how directors generally come to own shares of
various classes of tracking stock in the first place. For instance, each of TCI, USX, and
Ralston distributed shares of a new class of tracking stock to the current owners of its
conventional common stock - and simultaneously redesignated its conventional com-
mon stock as another class of tracking stock - based on a predetermined distribution
ratio. (U S West accomplished the same result through a "conversion" of each out-
standing share of its conventional common stock into one share of Communications
Stock and one share of Media Stock.) For example, when Ralston Purina originally
adopted a tracking stock equity structure in 1993, it distributed to its stockholders one
share of CBG Stock for every five shares of conventional common stock held by its
stockholders at that time. See RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1. As a re-
sult, immediately after the distribution the ratio of outstanding shares of RPG Stock (the
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Whether a director winds up holding a Disproportionate Equity
Position intentionally or by happenstance is not the issue. The issue is
simply that a director who finds herself with a DEP has an inherent loy-
alty concern that must be addressed. 138 Even if that director is not im-
properly influenced by her DEP, its mere existence gives the appear-
ance of impropriety to the financial marketplace. 139
Any decision by a director holding a Disproportionate Equity
Position that favors the business group in which she has the DEP over
redesignated conventional common stock of Ralston Purina) to shares of CBG Stock
(the newly distributed stock of Ralston Purina) was 5 to 1. Accordingly, a Ralston
Purina director who held 500 shares of conventional common stock before the distribu-
tion wound up holding 500 shares of RPG Stock and 100 shares of CBG Stock after the
distribution. In theory, assuming no additional shares of either RPG Stock or CBG
Stock are issued and no outstanding shares of either RPG Stock or CBG Stock are re-
purchased by Ralston Purina, any stockholder, including a director, who maintains this
5 to 1 ownership ratio holds an equity position that reflects the status quo ante. Thus,
requiring that a director maintain her ownership ratio in line with the ratio of outstand-
ing shares of each class of tracking stock, as such outstanding share ratio changes from
time to time, ensures that board decisions will impact that director's tracking stock port-
folio in the same manner as they would have impacted her conventional stock portfolio
had a tracking stock equity structure never been implemented in the first place.
Second, the Ratio Method is easy to administer. Since this method is based on di-
rectors' fully diluted stock ownership, their exercise of stock options and related deriva-
tives will not affect their ownership ratio. In addition, any changes to the outstanding
share ratio, such as through an additional stock issuance or through a repurchase, ex-
change, or redemption of stock, will have to be approved by the directors themselves.
Because of this, the directors control when the outstanding share ratio will change and
thus are in a position to modify their portfolios accordingly.
Third, the Number of Shares Method fails to consider the value of those shares.
Thus, 1000 shares of Group X Common Stock, at any given time, could be more than,
less than, or exactly equal to the value of 1000 shares of Group Y Common Stock. If,
for example, 1000 shares of Group X Common Stock was worth $100,000 and 1000
shares of Group Y Common Stock was worth only $1000, then a director still would
feel pressure to favor Group X because her financial interest in Group X is significantly
greater than her financial interest in Group Y. While the Ratio Method also suffers from
this problem, as indicated above it reflects the status quo ante, while the Number of
Shares Method does not.
Finally, the Aggregate Dollar Method would prove unworkable. Directors continu-
ally would have to measure the value of their portfolios and make correcting trades on a
frequent, if not daily, basis. Making corrective trades, however, would be impossible at
those times when directors are prohibited from buying and selling shares by applicable
securities laws and regulations.
138. See TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34-35 (stating that disproportion-
ate ownership interests by board members could create or appear to create potential
conflicts of interest when directors are faced with decisions that could impact different
series of tracking stock differently).
139. As one federal court stated: "For this country's economic system to work in
the area of corporate investment, the investor must be assured that the corporation's of-
ficers and directors will put the interests of the corporation first and that their decisions
will not be clouded in any way by competing personal interests." Enstar Group, Inc. v.
Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
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another business group could give rise to a claim that her judgment has
been clouded by her own pecuniary interests. This stems from the fact
that the decision likely will affect the stock prices of shares linked to
the various business groups differently, due to the substantial diver-
gence of financial interest that exists among different classes of tracking
stock. Of course, whether a particular director actually will be swayed
by her DEP will depend on many factors, including her moral fiber, the
magnitude of her disproportionate ownership, and the amount of her po-
tential financial gain. 140
The election of an executive officer of a tracking stock corporation
to that corporation's board heightens loyalty concerns of this order.141
Unlike an outside director who may meet only periodically to discuss
company matters, an inside director, through her role as an executive
officer of the corporation, is in a position to influence directly how the
corporation implements particular board policies and decisions. An in-
side director, therefore, could make decisions daily that favor, or dimin-
ish the impact on, the business group in which she has a
Disproportionate Equity Position.
140. The purpose of this disproportionate ownership point is not in any way to im-
pugn the character or reputation of any current or former director or officer of any
tracking stock corporation. Indeed, the author has no direct or indirect information sug-
gesting that any such director or officer has in any way failed to perform his or her du-
ties in a loyal and faithful manner. However, it would be naive to ignore the fact that at
some point in time there may be tracking stock directors who might be influenced in
their directorial decisionmaking because of their disproportionate ownership, especially
when the magnitude of the disparity is significant. Indeed, one of the reasons the law is
suspicious of self-dealing transactions in general is that "[h]uman nature tells us the di-
rector will advance her own interests in the transaction, to the detriment of the corpora-
tion." SOLOMON & PALMrrER, supra note 7, at 343; cf Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee
Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1061 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that potential conflict of interest
necessitates disclosure even when there is no evidence that directors were influenced by
conflict).
The mere existence of a director with a DEP creates an appearance of impropriety
that tracking stock corporations should acknowledge and address to the satisfaction of
their stockholders. As tracking stock equity structures increasingly become embraced by
companies less august than the General Motors of the world, this problem only will be-
come more acute.
141. It is common for the chief executive officer of a corporation, whether con-
ventional or tracking stock in nature, to be a member, and often the chairperson, of the
corporation's board of directors. For example, Louis Gerstner is the Chief Executive
Officer and Chairman of the Board of International Business Machines Corp., a conven-
tional corporation. Thomas J. Usher is the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
Board of USX Corp., a tracking stock corporation. Many corporations have more than
one executive officer on their boards. USX Corp., for example, has four executive of-
ficers on its board of directors. See generally USX CORP., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 8,
1996) [hereinafter 1996 USX PROXY STATEMENT].
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Particularly troubling is the situation where an executive officer
who has responsibilities running primarily to one business group rather
than to the tracking stock corporation as a whole is elected to the
board.1 42 Not only will that officer be faced with the conflicts noted in
the preceding paragraph, but because her compensation package likely
will be aligned closely to the performance of the business group that
she runs, she will have a strong personal financial interest in that
group's performance irrespective of any Disproportionate Equity Posi-
tion she may have in that group. In such a case, the board likely will
find itself with a vocal advocate of the interests of that group.
Particular examples highlight that many directors of tracking stock
corporations, indeed, have held Disproportionate Equity Positions in
their corporations, although in many cases the magnitude of those DEPs
rendered them inconsequential. In USX's 1996 Proxy Statement, 43 USX
disclosed that on March 1, 1996 there were outstanding approximately
287.4 million shares of Marathon Stock, 83.2 million shares of Steel
Stock, and 9.4 million shares of Delhi Stock. Using Delhi Stock as the
common denominator, this yields approximately a 30 to 9 to 1 ratio."44
None of USX's fifteen directors, however, had an ownership ratio of the
three classes of tracking stock that came remotely close to matching
that 30 to 9 to 1 ratio. 45 All of USX's ten outside directors'4 had ratios
142. For example, while Victor G. Beghini and Paul J. Wilhelm were both mem-
bers of USX Corp.'s board of directors, Mr. Beghini was also Vice Chairman of USX's
Marathon Group while Mr. Wilhelm was President of USX's U.S. Steel Group. See id.
at 9-10. Curiously, no executive officer of USX's Delhi Group (USX's only other busi-
ness group) was on USX's board to balance things off.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 4. Outstanding stock options and related derivatives of USX were
excluded from the calculation of the outstanding share ratio. Of course, as such options
and derivatives are exercised or converted, as the case may be, from time to time in the
future, the outstanding share ratio would be modified correspondingly. Because the
stock options and related derivatives held by each USX director can provide significant
financial incentives to those directors, the ownership ratio of each such director was cal-
culated on a fully diluted basis to reflect his or her ownership of such options and
derivatives.
145. See id. at 12. USX provided ownership figures for directors as of January 31,
1996. Beneficial ownership figures of the directors used in calculating their ownership
ratios included shares deemed to be owned beneficially by them through the USX
Saving Fund Plan, the Marathon Thrift Plan, the Delhi Thrift Plan, the USX Dividend
Reinvestment Plans, the 1990 Stock Plan, and through stock options. See id. at 12 nn.1-
2 to tbl. entitled "Security Ownership of Directors and Executive Officers."
146. An "outside director" of a corporation is a director who is not also an officer
or other employee of, or a consultant to, that corporation. Because of Charles A.
Corry's former role as USX's Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Mr.
Corry is considered an "inside director" of USX for purposes of this discussion.
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at or close to a 1 to 1 to 1 ratio. 147 At first glance this would indicate
that each such outside director's personal portfolio was underweighted
in both Marathon Stock and Steel Stock. As a result, each outside direc-
tor would be benefited financially the most by taking steps to ensure the
successful performance of the Delhi Group. However, in this particular
case this is highly unlikely because each outside director owned only a
token number of shares of each class of USX tracking stock.' 48
The same cannot be said with respect to the five inside directors 149
of USX. While each inside director had ownership of a significant num-
ber of shares of each class of USX tracking stock, 50 none had an own-
ership ratio even close to the 30 to 9 to 1 ratio.' 5' One of the five inside
directors was overweighted substantially in Marathon Stock, while an-
other was overweighted substantially in Steel Stock. Of the three- re-
maining inside directors, one was overweighted substantially in Dehli
Stock, a second was overweighted in Marathon Stock and substantially
underweighted in Steel Stock, and the third was overweighted substan-
tially in Steel Stock and underweighted in Marathon Stock. Particularly
troubling was the fact that two of the inside directors were officers
whose duties ran primarily to only one of the three business groups op-
erated by USX. 52 Not surprisingly, each such director's portfolio was
overweighted, one quite substantially, with shares linked to the business
group to which his duties ran. 53
147. Five of the ten outside directors had approximately 1 to 1 to 1 ratios. The ra-
tios of the five remaining outside directors were approximately: 1.6 to .3 to 1; 1.5 to .3
to 1; 2 to .4 to 1; 1.7 to .3 to 1; and 2 to 1.2 to 1. See 1996 USX PROXY STATEMENT,
supra note 141, at 12.
148. No outside director owned more than 2,000 shares of any class of USX track-
ing stock. See id.
149. An "inside director" of a corporation is a director who is also an officer or
other employee of, or a consultant to, that corporation. Because of Charles A. Corry's
former role as USX's Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Corry is
considered an inside director of USX for purposes of this discussion.
150. The sole exception to this is Paul J. Wilhelm. Mr. Wilhelm owned 32,769
shares and 75,508 shares of Marathon Stock and Steel Stock, respectively, but only
1000 shares of Delhi Stock. See 1996 USX PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 141, at 12.
151. The ownership ratios of these five inside directors were approximately: 61.3
to 7.3 to 1; 11.7 to 2.3 to 1; 38 to 4 to 1; 24.1 to 19.9 to 1; and 32.8 to 75.5 to 1. See
id. at 12.
152. Perhaps these directors should be labeled more appropriately as "one-sided
directors" rather than "inside directors."
153. The two directors were Victor G. Beghini, the Vice Chairman of USX's
Marathon Group, and Paul J. Wilhelm, the President of USX's U.S. Steel Group. Mr.
Beghini's ownership ratio was approximately 38 to 4 to 1, while Mr. Wilhelm's owner-
ship ratio was approximately 32.8 to 75.5 to 1. See 1996 USX PRoxY STATEMENT, supra
note 141, at 12.
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GM's 1996 Proxy Statement'54 discloses similar results for GM di-
rectors. On March 25, 1996 there were outstanding approximately 756.1
million shares of GM-$12/3 Stock (the car company stock), 485.7 mil-
lion shares of GM-E Stock, and 97.9 million shares of GM-H Stock.
Using GM-H Stock as the common denominator, this yields approxi-
mately an 8 to 5 to 1 ratio. 55 None of GM's fourteen directors, how-
ever, had ownership ratios of the three classes of common stock that
mirrored that 8 to 5 to 1 ratio. 56 Of GM's eleven outside directors, 57
three owned shares of GM-$1 2/3 Stock but no shares of either GM-E or
GM-H Stock. GM's eight other outside directors had ownership ratios
ranging from as high as approximately 29 to 12 to 1 to as low as ap-
proximately 1 to 1 to 1.58 Unlike the case of USX's outside directors,
each of whom only owned a token number of shares of USX common
stock, four of GM's eleven outside directors individually owned, either
directly or through deferred stock units, the equivalent of over 20,000
shares of GM common stock.5 9
154. GENERAL MOT~oRs CORP., PRoxy STATEMENT (Apr. 9, 1996) [hereinafter 1996
GM PROXY STATEMENT]. The discussion of the stock holdings of GM's directors is
based on facts existing prior to GM's split-off of EDS, and thus reflects the ownership
by certain of those directors of shares of GM-E Stock. See supra note 41.
155. See 1996 GM PROXY STATEmEw, supra note 154, at 2. Once again, stock op-
tions and related derivatives of GM were excluded from the calculation of the outstand-
ing share ratio, but those held by a particular GM director were included when calculat-
ing that director's ownership ratio. See supra note 144.
156. See id. at 7-10. GM provided ownership figures for directors as of February
29, 1996. Beneficial ownership figures of the directors used in calculating their owner-
ship ratios included shares deemed to be owned beneficially by them through the
General Motors Deferred Compensation Plan for Non-Employee Directors, the Hughes
Electronics Deferred Compensation Plan for Non-Employee Directors, the General
Motors Savings-Stock Purchase Program, the General Motors Benefit Equalization
Plan-Savings, and through certain stock options. See id. at 9-10 nn.a, b, d, f to tbl. enti-
tied "Security Ownership of Directors, Named Executive Officers and Certain Others."
For purposes of this discussion, Eckhard Pfeiffer, a director-nominee at that time, is
treated as an actual director of GM since he was running unopposed. Share ownership
figures for Paul H. O'Neill, the GM director replaced by Mr. Pfeiffer, were not broken
out separately in the 1996 GM Proxy Statement and thus have been ignored.
157. For purposes of this discussion, John Smale is considered an inside director
of GM because of his position as Chairman of the Board of GM from November 2,
1992 through December 31, 1995.
158. The ownership ratios of these eight outside directors were approximately: 9.2
to 2.4 to 1; 5.5 to 3.6 to 1; 9.9 to I to 1; 9.1 to .4 to 1; 1.5 to 1.3 to 1; 15 to .9 to 1;
29.4 to 12 to 1; and 5.7 to .9 to 1. See 1996 GM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 154, at
7-10.
159. The aggregate number of shares of GM common stock beneficially owned
and deferred stock units held by Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Charles T. Fisher, HI, Dennis




Similar to the inside directors of USX, the inside directors of GM
had significant Disproportionate Equity Positions. The ownership ratios
of GM's three inside directors were approximately 103 to 1 to 1, 20 to
1 to 1, and 2 to 1 to 1.160 The first two ratios reflect an extraordinary
overweighting of shares of GM-$113 Stock, while the third ratio reflects
a substantial underweighting of both GM-$12/3 Stock and GM-E Stock.
Unlike the two inside directors of USX noted above, however, all of
GM's inside directors were officers with company-wide responsibilities,
rather than responsibilities running primarily to one of GM's three busi-
ness groups.
m10. DIsCLOSURE BY TRACKING STOCK CORPORATIONS
The greatest challenges presented to traditional corporate fiduciary
duties by a tracking stock equity structure are the ever-present inter-
group conflicts and the disturbingly real directorial loyalty concerns
arising from the existence of Disproportionate Equity Positions.
Delaware corporations that have adopted tracking stock equity struc-
tures generally have presented discussions of potential intergroup con-
flicts in their disclosure documents discussing such structures. Only one
of those corporations, however, has made any mention of the directorial
loyalty concerns that arise from Disproportionate Equity Positions.1 61
What those Delaware corporations have said provides an interesting in-
sight into the inability of the duties of care and loyalty, as currently in-
terpreted under Delaware law, to address the concerns raised by track-
ing stock equity structures.
A. Intergroup Conflict Discussions in Disclosure Documents
With respect to intergroup conflicts, the Delaware tracking stock
corporations discussed in this article have taken a particularly troubling
"don't worry, be happy" position. -One can observe this position by
closely examining what has become a fairly standard pattern of disclo-
sure on this issue. An indicative example is the following statement
from U S West:
Although the Company is not aware of any legal precedent involving the
fiduciary duties of directors of corporations having two classes of com-
mon stock, or separate classes or series of capital stock, the rights of
which are defined by reference to specified operations of the corporation,
principles of Delaware law established in cases involving differing treat-
ment of two classes of capital stock or two groups of holders of the same
160. See supra note 157.
161. See infra section IL.B.
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class of capital stock provide that a board of directors owes an equal
duty to all stockholders regardless of class or series. Under these princi-
ples of Delaware law and the related principles known as the "business
judgment rule," absent abuse of discretion, a good faith business deci-
sion made by a disinterested and adequately informed Board, or a com-
mittee thereof, with respect to any matter having disparate impacts upon
holders of Communications Stock and holders of Media Stock would be
a defense to any challenge to such determination made by or on behalf of
holders of either class of Common Stock. Nevertheless, a Delaware court
hearing a case involving such a challenge may decide to apply principles
of Delaware law other than those discussed above, or may develop new
principles of Delaware law, in order to decide such a case, which would
be a case of first impression.162
With respect to the quote above, several important points need to
be made. First, Delaware tracking stock corporations are falling all over
themselves to stress the current state of the law as it applies in a con-
162. U S WEsT PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33-34 (emphasis added); see
also RJR PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 23 (making essentially the same statement
as U S West, but providing no disclosure similar to the last sentence of the U S West
quote); TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34 (making essentially the same state-
ment); USX-DELHI PROXY STATEmEN, supra note 2, at 14-15 (making essentially the
same statement as U S West, but providing no disclosure similar to the last sentence of
the U S West quote); cf GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 31-32 (similar
statement made with respect to Massachusetts law); KMART PROXY STATEMfN, supra
note 2, at 10 (similar statement made with respect to Michigan law); RALsTON PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 22 (similar statement made with respect to Missouri law);
SEAGuLL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 39 (similar statement made with respect to
Texas law).
Although its statements relate to Massachusetts rather than Delaware law,
Genzyme Corp. actually implied at one point in time that its board of directors may be
legally required to act against the interests of the holders of its "minority" tracking
stock (TR Stock):
[Under Massachusetts law, the Board has a] fiduciary duty to act in good faith
and in a manner it reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. So long as the Tissue Repair Division continues to represent a dispropor-
tionately smaller portion of Genzyme's business, there is a likelihood that deci-
sions of the Board made in conformity with the foregoing duty when the interests
of the holders of the General Stock and the TR Stock diverge will favor the hold-
ers of the General Stock to the disadvantage of the holders of the TR Stock.
GENzYmE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32. Importantly, however, Genzyme con-
spicuously left this statement out of its two prospectuses relating to secondary offerings
of its General Stock and TR Stock. See GENZYME CORP., PROsPECrUs 6 (Oct. 12, 1995)
(covering the sale of 2,500,000 shares of Genzyme General Division Common Stock);
GENZYME CORP., PROsPEcTUs 5 (Sept. 22, 1995) (covering the sale of 3,000,000 shares
of Genzyme Tissue Repair Division Common Stock). Given the unlikelihood that
Palmer & Dodge, counsel for Genzyme, would have allowed such an important legal
statement to be omitted accidentally from two prospectuses of Genzyme, it is logical to
conclude that the omissions were intentional and, thus, that Genzyme and its counsel no
longer believed that the above-quoted statement was accurate.
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ventional corporate context. They point out that the legal principles that
make up the current state of the law "would be a defense" to chal-
lenges based on intergroup conflicts. 163 Clearly, in order to protect
themselves from disgruntled stockholders and their lawyers, these cor-
porations are taking the offensive by stating that their defense to inter-
group challenges would be based on conventional corporate law princi-
ples - in particular, the business judgment rule. Of course, these
principles, as discussed below, provide boards with tremendous leeway
in making corporate decisions.' 64
Second, in order to fulfill their duty to make full and fair disclo-
sure to stockholders, these corporations must expose their Achilles'
heel. They do so first by stating that they are not aware of any legal
precedent under Delaware law involving the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors of tracking stock corporations. This is entirely accurate, as there is
no guidance from the Delaware courts directly on point. 165 Next, their
duty requires them to undermine the implication that conventional prin-
ciples of Delaware law would apply in a tracking stock context by ex-
plaining that a Delaware court hearing a challenge based on intergroup
conflicts could choose to apply existing Delaware law principles other
than those presented, or may fashion totally new principles of Delaware
law, in order to decide such a challenge. Indeed, as these corporations
themselves clearly state, a case involving such a challenge "would be a
case of first impression."'166
In a bold move, U S West decided to take this disclosure a bit fur-
ther, but did so in an unhelpful way. In an attempt to ease stockholder
fears about intergroup conflicts in a tracking stock context and thus
163. Interestingly, this disclosure actually backtracks from a similar disclosure
made by USX Corp. which stated that "established rules of Delaware law would ap-
ply" to the resolution of intergroup conflicts, in addition to merely being "a defense"
to challenges based on intergroup conflicts. USX-DELM PROXY STATEMBNT, supra note
2, at 15; see also USX-MARATHON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 22 (discussion of
fiduciary duties of the board omits any discussion of Delaware law and its applicability
to intergroup conflicts).
164. See infra section IV.A.1.
165. See Bagner & de Wied, supra note 65, at 517 (stating that "[tiargeted stock
may raise complex questions under state law," and that "[it is unclear how the courts
will apply principles of fiduciary duty in [a targeted stock] context"). It should be
noted, however, that three lawsuits (two of which have been consolidated) brought
against GM by certain former holders of GM-E Stock currently are pending in the
Delaware Chancery Court. The complaints all essentially allege that GM's directors
breached their fiduciary duties by approving a plan to split-off EDS from GM that un-
fairly benefitted GM at the expense of EDS. See GM SOLICrrAION STATE-
MENT/PRosPECrus, supra note 41, at 69.
166. See TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34; U S WEST PROXY
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34.
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chill potential lawsuits, U S West reassuringly pointed out that these
conflicts were also present in its conventional equity structure days:
"Many of the... [intergroup] conflicts exist today with respect to deci-
sions that affect disproportionately U S West Communications and the
rest of [U S West's] businesses."' 167 This clearly is a true statement, as
board decisions and policies do have disparate impacts on the different
businesses operated by a diversified conventional parent corporation; 168
however, it is also a misleading statement. The existence of these con-
flicts is irrelevant to a corporation with a conventional equity structure
due to the substantial unity of financial interest shared by all common
stockholders of that corporation. These conflicts matter a great deal,
however, in the context of a tracking stock corporation due to the sub-
stantial divergence of financial interest that exists among holders of
shares of different classes of tracking stock. U S West conveniently left
this latter point out of its fiduciary duty discussion.
B. Discussion of Directorial Loyalty Concerns in
Disclosure Documents
Only one of the Delaware tracking stock corporations discussed in
this article made any mention in its disclosure document of the loyalty
concerns that arise from disproportionate share ownership by direc-
tors. 69 That corporation - TCI - took a remarkably cavalier approach
in this regard. TCI first underscored its awareness of the loyalty con-
cerns relating to disproportionate share ownership by directors:
Disproportionate ownership interests of members of the Board of
Directors in the TCI Group Common Stock and the Liberty Media Group
Common Stock or disparate values of the TCI Group Common Stock and
the Liberty Media Group Common Stock could create or appear to create
potential conflicts of interests when directors are faced with decisions
that could have different implications for different series [of tracking
stock]. 70
After such a serious statement, one would have expected TCI to discuss
its elaborate plans to deal with these very real concerns in order to calm
investors' fears. TCI, however, did nothing of the sort.
In perhaps the most perplexing disclosure of any Delaware track-
ing stock corporation, TCI instead followed its statement about dispro-
portionate share ownership by directors with a conclusory statement:
167. U S WEST PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 33.
168. See supra note 97.
169. See TCI PRoxy STATEmFNT, supra note 2, at 34-35. The disclosure documents
of GM, U S West, USX, and RJR Nabisco made no mention of these loyalty concerns.
170. TCI PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 34-35.
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"Nevertheless, [TCI] believes that a director would be able to discharge
his or her fiduciary responsibilities even if his or her interests in shares
of the TCI Group Common Stock and Liberty Media Group Common
Stock were disproportionate or had disparate values." 171 TCI, however,
offered absolutely nothing in support of its "belief" other than, per-
haps, the implicit message of "trust us. 1' 72
It is not clear why the other Delaware tracking stock corporations
discussed in this article did not make any disclosure in this regard. U S
West, the most recent tracking stock convert, certainly had access to
TCI's disclosure document. Perhaps U S West noticed the problems
with TCI's disclosure, was baffled as to how to improve upon it and
simply chose to ignore the issue altogether. This, however, is pure spec-
ulation. The more important point is that the disproportionate share
ownership concerns that arise in a tracking stock equity structure are at
best given lip service. Moreover, no tracking stock corporation dis-
cussed in this article - TCI included - has pointed out the heightened
loyalty concerns that arise when an officer of a tracking stock corpora-
tion (particularly an officer whose duties run primarily to a single busi-
ness group) serves on its board. 173
IV. THE DuTIEs OF CARE AND LOYALTY AND THE NEED
FOR A DUTY OF FAIRNESS
This Part provides an overview of the traditional fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty as they have been interpreted by the Delaware
courts.174 It also discusses whether those duties properly address the
171. Id. at 35; cf. GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 32 (similar state-
ment from Massachusetts corporation); RALSTON PROXY STATEMM, supra note 2, at 22
(similar statement from Missouri corporation); SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note
2, at 39 (similar statement from Texas corporation).
172. Although never explicitly stated by any tracking stock corporation, the disclo-
sure made in this regard as to the possibility of opportunistic conduct by directors ap-
pears designed to ward off stockholder lawsuits through the advanced conditioning of
stockholder expectations. Fiduciary obligations, however, should not be disavowed so
easily. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 465 & n.113.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
174. As stated earlier, this article addresses the issues raised herein solely under
Delaware law. See supra note 7. In this regard, only an overview of corporate fiduciary
duties under Delaware law is provided due to the extensive commentary that already
exists on the subject. For a more detailed discussion of corporate fiduciary duties under
Delaware law, the cases on point and the contexts in which these duties have been dis-
cussed, see, for example, BALOTrI & FNKEL'TEI, supra note 7; DENNIS J. BLOCK Er AL,
THE BusINEsS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY Dtnrs OF CORPORATE DmEcroRS (4th ed.
1993); BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 33; HARvEY GELB, PERSONAL CORPORATE
LIABLrrY - A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, LmGATORS, AND CREDrrORS' COUNsEL (1991); SOL-
OMON & PALMITR, supra note 7.
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unique concerns arising in a tracking stock equity structure. As shown
below, those duties were neither designed to nor do they address these
concerns. Nevertheless, they can continue to play an important role in
the corporate governance of tracking stock corporations. This conclu-
sion stems from the simple fact that, despite the artificial bifurcation of
a tracking stock corporation into two or more distinct business groups,
that corporation remains governed by a single board of directors. Like
the board of a conventional corporation, a tracking stock board must
deal with the exact same pressures that originally gave rise to the need
for the duties of care and loyalty in a conventional corporate context.
A. The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
1. Current Interpretation Under Delaware Law
The duty of care deals with the responsibility of corporate directors
to oversee the affairs of their corporations by, among other things, at-
tending directors' meetings, reviewing adequate information before
making corporate decisions, and monitoring the activities of corporate
officers to whom responsibilities have been delegated properly.' 75 Under
Delaware law, in performing their duties corporate directors are re-
quired to exercise the same degree of skill, diligence, and care in man-
aging the affairs of a corporation that a reasonably prudent business
person would exercise in similar circumstances. 176 Case law in
Delaware clearly has established that this standard is predicated on
"concepts of gross negligence,"'' 77 rather than ordinary negligence.
Cases holding directors liable for a breach of a duty of care, un-
complicated by self-dealing or conflict of interest, are exceedingly
rare.178 The paucity of such cases is directly attributable to the important
175. See BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 33, §§ 2:01, :02.
176. Unlike most states, Delaware does not have a statutory provision setting forth
its duty of care. However, in dictum in the 1963 case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "directors ...
in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily
careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." 188 A.2d at 130; see
also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
177. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984).
178. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1147 (Del. Ch. 1994)
(noting that a leading authority had identified only ten modem cases finding actionable
director negligence without a concurrent breach of loyalty or conflict of interest); In re
Beatrice Cos. Litig., No. CIV. 86-8248, 1986 WL 4749, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1986),
affd., 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987) ("[H]istory has shown it to be a vary rare case in
which the judgment of disinterested directors who follow a deliberate process in reach-
ing a business decision will be found to have breached that duty."); BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 174, at 72-75. Of course, it is not clear how many challenges to corporate action
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policy consideration of limiting the ability of the courts to second-guess
the business decisions and policies of corporate directors. 179 The law
embodies the belief that directors, rather than judges, are the best deci-
sionmakers in the corporate arena. 80
This deferential policy towards directorial decisionmaking is ef-
fected through a tool of judicial review known as the business judgment
rule.'8' This rule acts as both a procedural guide for stockholder liti-
gants as well as a substantive rule of law.18 2 From a procedural stand-
point, it creates "a presumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."' 83 From a substantive standpoint, unless a challenger rebuts
this presumption the business judgment rule attaches to protect the di-
rectors themselves and their decisions.8 4
Under Delaware law, overcoming the presumption of the business
judgment rule is "a heavy burden for a plaintiff to meet."18 5 Neverthe-
based on alleged breaches of the duty of care were filed with the courts but settled
before decisions were rendered.
179. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
180. See Atwood Grain & Supply Co. v. Growmark, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1360, 1366
(N.D. I1. 1989) (discussing Delaware law); BRODSKY & ADAMSKi, supra note 33,
§ 2:02.
181. See Spegiel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 802, 812 (Del. 1984); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 490 A.2d
1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), affd., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); BALoTrI & FiNKELsTEiN, supra
note 7, § 4.7 (Supp. 1996).
The business judgment rule reflects corporate law's attempt to strike a careful bal-
ance between the need to have a sufficiently independent board of directors manage the
affairs of a corporation while ensuring that the interests of the stockholders of the cor-
poration are effected. See Atwood Grain, 712 F. Supp. at 1367 n.5. Indeed, the businessjudgment rule plays a major role in the judiciary's attempt to benefit stockholders
through the promotion of wealth creation through calculated corporate risk taking activ-
ities. See Steiner v. Meyerson, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
[ 98,857, at 93,146 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995).
182. See Citron, 569 A.2d at 64; Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. CIV.A.12784,
1993 WL 77186, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1993).
183. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see Citron, 569 A.2d at 64; Smith, 488 A.2d at
872; Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No.
CIV.A.9700, 1993 WL 545409 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993). In the context of an alleged
breach of a corporate fiduciary duty, determining which party has the burden of proof is
often outcome-determinative. See infra note 223.
184. See Citron, 569 A.2d at 64; Garza, 1993 WL 77186, at *6; In re J.P. Stevens
& Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp.
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
185. BALoarr & F .KEsEiN, supra note 7, § 4.6, at 4-51 (Supp. 1996); see also
BRODSKY & ADAMsru, supra note 33, § 2:01 (noting that the business judgment rule pro-
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less, a plaintiff can overcome it by pleading "particular facts"' 186 that, if
taken as true, establish "director self-interest, if not self-dealing, or that
the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise due care."'
' 8 7
Thus, plaintiff allegations in this regard can be broken down into two
general categories. 88 The first category, which is discussed in further
detail below,189 includes allegations of direct or indirect director disloy-
alty as evidenced by bad faith, self-interest, self-dealing, or miscon-
duct.' 90 The second category contains allegations of a lack of due care
in directorial decisionmaking.
When mounting a challenge based on a lack of due care, a chal-
lenger must allege particular facts that, "taken as true, support a reason-
able doubt that a challenged transaction was [in fact] the product of a
valid business judgment."' 19' A judicial due care examination focuses on
both procedural due care (a board's decisionmaking process) and sub-
vides directors with a wide range of discretion within which to act without fear of lia-
bility). An important exception exists with respect to the adoption of defensive mea-
sures in the corporate takeover context. In this regard, the initial burden is on the
directors to show that "they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed" and that any defensive action taken by them
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955, 958 (Del. 1985); see Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356 (Del. 1985).
186. See Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 403 (1lth Cir. 1994). Rebutting the pre-
sumption created by the business judgment rule requires much more than mere asser-
tions or accusations. See Grobow, 539 A.2d at 187. In Grobow, the Delaware Supreme
Court expanded on this point:
[Olnly well-pleaded allegations of fact must be accepted as true; conclusionary
allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact may not be
taken as true. A trial court need not blindly accept as true all allegations, nor
must it draw all inferences from them in plaintiff's favor unless they are reasona-
ble inferences.
539 A.2d at 187 (footnote omitted).
187. Citron, 569 A.2d at 64; see Stepak, 20 F.3d at 403; Grobow, 539 A.2d at 183.
188. See generally BALorn & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6 (Supp. 1996). (As
Balotti and Finkelstein point out:
In analyzing claims, the courts generally considered allegations of breaches of
loyalty (i.e., whether the directors were motivated by other than an honest desire
to benefit the corporation and its stockholders in approving the transaction) or
lack of due care (i.e., whether the directors failed to make a reasonable effort to
ascertain and consider all relevant information).
Id. at 4-51.
189. See infra section V.B.1.
190. Allegations of "bad faith" or "fraud" imply that directors have been moti-
vated by other than an honest desire to benefit the corporation and the stockholders, and
thus have loyalty implications.
191. Grobow, 539 A.2d at 187 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 802, 815
(Del. 1984)) (alteration in original).
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stantive due care (the decision itself).192 Under Delaware law, the courts
use different standards of review when conducting a procedural due
care review and a substantive due care review.193
In order to invoke the business judgment rule's protections, direc-
tors have "a duty to inform themselves of all material information rea-
sonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties. 1 94 Accordingly,
in a procedural due care challenge a plaintiff must present evidence that
the board did not act in a deliberate and informed manner when making
its decision.195 Establishing a prima facie case in this regard is ex-
tremely difficult because the Delaware courts apply concepts of gross
negligence in assessing whether directors exercised due care in their
decisionmaking process.1 96
If, however, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that directors
were grossly negligent in their decisionmaking, then the presumption
that directors were exercising proper business judgment is overcome. 197
As a result, the directors then take on the burden of establishing that the
decision or transaction in question was "entirely fair" to the stockhold-
ers or the corporation. 98 If they fail to demonstrate the entire fairness of
192. See Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189.
193. See BALoau & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6, at 4-44 to 4-45 (Supp.
1996).
194. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985); Kumar v. Racing Corp. of Am., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 95,896, at 99,422 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1991).
Delaware, of course, recognizes that much of the information reviewed by boards
comes from management or third-party sources. Directors explicitly are entitled to rely
on such information as long as such reliance is both reasonable and in good faith. See
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991).
195. See Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189-92; Smith, 488 A.2d at 873.
196. Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 404-05 (1 lth Cir. 1994); Aronson, 473 A.2d
at 812; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1148 (Del. Ch. 1994);
Kumar, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,423.
To be held grossly negligent, corporate directors must demonstrate "reckless indif-
ference to or a deliberate disregard of the stockholders" or take actions that are "with-
out the bounds of reason." Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970
(Del. Ch. 1985). A court's inquiry in this regard will be "directed to the material or ad-
vice the board had available to it and whether it had sufficient opportunity to acquire
knowledge concerning the problem before acting." Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch. 1977) (citing Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del.
Ch. 1977); Puma v. Marriot, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
197. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
198. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)
(quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993)); see also
Smith, 488 A.2d at 893 (after determining that defendant directors failed to make an in-
formed decision in accepting a per share merger price for their corporation of $55, the
Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case to Delaware Court of Chancery to conduct
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a decision or transaction, they can incur personal liability unless their
corporation has adopted a charter provision limiting their liability for
grossly negligent acts. 199 In addition, a court may enjoin an unconsum-
mated transaction.2°°
During a substantive due care review, a court will look to see if
the business decision 'in question had any "rational business pur-
pose."'20' In order for a decision to receive the business judgment rule's
protection under this rationality standard, it must not be so patently friv-
olous or capricious as to amount to an "abuse of discretion. ' ' 202 This
standard is so high, however, that to meet it a business decision would
have to be "so bizarre that no reasonable person would countenance
it." 20 3 The mere fact that the decision was "ill-advised, stupid or ques-
tionable" simply would not be enough.204
2. Failure To Address Tracking Stock Concerns
The overview presented above reveals that the duty of care and the
business judgment rule, as they currently are interpreted under
Delaware law, do not address the concerns uniquely arising in a track-
ing stock context. Indeed, the duty of care and, more importantly, the
business judgment rule were designed to ensure that directors comply
only with "minimal standards of attentiveness and prudence. ' 205 While
concerns about attentiveness and prudence continue to exist with re-
spect to boards of tracking stock corporations, they are not the concerns
caused by the intergroup conflicts that pervade a tracking stock equity
structure. Rather, those concerns relate to unfairness, favoritism, unrea-
sonableness and neglect. Accordingly, the duty of care and the business
judgment rule are simply the wrong tools to deal with these concerns,
and their blanket application to stockholder fairness challenges, as ad-
vocated by the Delaware tracking stock corporations discussed in this
article, will prevent these concerns from being addressed.
evidentiary hearing to determine fair value of plaintiffs' shares and, to the extent such
fair value was greater than $55 per share, to award damages to plaintiffs).
199. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1994) (adopted by the
Delaware legislature in response to the ruling of Smith).
200. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affd. per curiam, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
201. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
202. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
203. BALOTn & FiNKELSTEIN. supra note 7, § 4.6, at 4-61 (Supp. 1996).
204. Id.
205. SOLOMON & PALMITER, supra note 7, at 314.
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This conclusion rests squarely on the formidable presumptions of
the business judgment rule. A tracking stock stockholder interested in
challenging a particular board decision or transaction likely would base
her challenge on fairness grounds. Specifically, that stockholder would
allege that the business group to which her shares are economically
linked was treated unfairly or unreasonably or was neglected by the
board as a result of that decision or transaction. Yet, as seen above,
under the duty of care the fairness of a decision or transaction only re-
ceives judicial attention once a challenger overcomes the heavy pre-
sumptive burden of the business judgment rule.
Assuming for the moment that a tracking stock stockholder was
successful in overcoming that burden, the concept of "fairness" in a
tracking stock context would have to be given meaning by the courts.
As currently interpreted in a conventional corporate context, "fairness"
means "fairness to the corporation and its stockholders." Would "fair-
ness" be reinterpreted in a tracking stock context to mean fairness to
just one business group and its stockholders? Because each tracking
stock corporation remains a single corporate entity despite its artificial
bifurcation into two or more distinct business groups, it would be un-
likely that a court would embrace this expanded meaning of fairness.206
It would be even more unlikely, however, for a court ever to reach
the issue of fairness in the first place. The juxtaposition of two fact pat-
terns - one involving a conventional corporation and the other involv-
ing a tracking stock corporation - clarifies this point. Using the basic
facts from above,207 assume that the board of C Corp. (the conventional
corporation) is deciding how to allocate $100 million of available capi-
tal to the proposed capital projects of Business 1 and Business 2. As-
sume for this example that Business 1 is a growth business and that
Business 2 is a declining business.2 8 After reviewing materials in ad-
vance that describe the various capital projects, the board discovers that,
206. As discussed in Part V, this author argues that the courts should not reinter-
pret the duty of care or the business judgment rule to address intergroup conflicts aris-
ing in a tracking stock equity structure. The reason for this is that a tracking stock cor-
poration remains intact as a single corporate entity and, therefore, its board continues to
confront the same fiduciary concerns affecting boards of conventional corporations. Ac-
cordingly, the duty of care and the business judgment rule can play the same role in a
tracking stock corporate context as they do in a conventional corporate context. Indeed,
tracking stock corporations enter into contracts, acquire assets, enter into financing ar-
rangements, and hire employees at the parent company level as well as at the business
group level.
207. See supra text accompanying note 67.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
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not surprisingly, the expected internal rate of return2 9 on each of the
capital projects of Business 1 exceeds the expected internal rate of re-
turn on each of the capital projects of Business 2. This higher return is
one of the reasons why Business 1 is considered a "growth" business
in the first place. However, the internal rates of return on all the capital
projects of both Business 1 and Business 2 exceed C Corp.'s cost of
capital.210 Still, because C Corp. only has a limited supply of capital
available to it, the board cannot undertake every capital project even
though they all would be profitable from a cost of capital perspective.
After due deliberations, the board decides to fund several of the pro-
posed capital projects of Business 1 but none of the proposed capital
projects of Business 2.
Under current Delaware interpretations of the business judgment
rule, a stockholder challenge - assuming there even was a challenge2"
- to the decision of the C Corp. board should fail. The board displayed
the requisite procedural due care by reviewing materials prepared in ad-
vance of its meeting and by deliberating at the meeting in a careful and
meaningful way. The board's decision also is clearly rational from a
substantive due care point of view, since the board decided to fund cap-
ital projects with internal rates of return higher than C Corp.'s cost of
capital. Assuming, then, that the challenger has not alleged bad faith or
self-dealing on the part of the directors, a court's inquiry into the matter
should quickly come to an end.
Now assume substantially similar facts for TS Corp. (the tracking
stock corporation). Thus, the board of TS Corp. is deciding how to allo-
cate $100 million of available capital to the proposed capital projects of
209. The internal rate of return ("IRR") of a given project is equal to that rate of
discount at which the sum of the present values of a series of expected future cash
flows is equal to the amount - the capital investment - required to produce them. See
MBA 11 FINANCE, supra note 55, at 275-77. Generally, finance theory supports the un-
dertaking of all capital projects with IRRs that exceed a corporation's cost of capital, as-
suming the corporation has the available capital to undertake all such capital projects. If
the corporation is subject to capital rationing because it has only a limited supply of
capital, then those capital projects with the highest IRRs should be undertaken in de-
clining order until the supply of capital is exhausted.
210. See supra note 209.
211. A stockholder challenge in this regard would be unusual because each stock-
holder of C Corp. shares a substantial unity of financial interest with the other stock-
holders. Of course, a stockholder challenge might be brought if the board's funding de-
cision proved to be ill-advised in hindsight. In that case, all stockholders likely would
have suffered a decline in their share price. Importantly, however, a stockholder would
not bring a challenge claiming that it was unfair to fund projects of Business 1 but none
of Business 2. The allocation made was irrelevant since the economic interests of all
stockholders are linked to the performance of the entire corporation, and not a particular
business operated by C Corp. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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Group X and Group Y. Assume for this example that Group X is a
growth business and that Group Y is a declining business. After review-
ing materials in advance that describe the various capital projects, the
board discovers that the expected internal rate of return on each of the
capital projects of Group X exceeds the expected internal rate of return
on each of the capital projects of Group Y. All the internal rates of re-
turn on the capital projects of both Group X and Group Y exceed TS
Corp.'s cost of capital. After due deliberations, the board decides to
fund several of the proposed capital projects of Group X but none of
the proposed capital projects of Group Y.
A challenge to the board's decision by a tracking stock stockholder
whose shares are economically linked to Group Y should fail assuming
the court simply measures the board's decision against the business
judgment rule. After all, like the board of C Corp., the board of TS
Corp. also displayed the requisite procedural due care by reviewing
materials prepared in advance of its meeting and by deliberating at that
meeting in a careful and meaningful way. The board's decision also is
clearly rational from a substantive due care point of view for the same
reason that the decision of C Corp.'s board was rational. A court, there-
fore, should end its inquiry at that point and never reach the issue of
whether the decision was fair to Group Y and its stockholders. 212
As stated earlier, a judicial determination of whether, if at all, and
if so, how, the business judgment rule and its presumptions would ap-
ply to stockholder challenges based on tracking stock board decisions
involving intergroup conflicts has not yet occurred. 213 When the first of
these challenges is brought, however, the courts should cast aside their
business judgment blinders and refuse to allow tracking stock corpora-
tions to use a judicial rule designed to encourage business risk-taking as
a shield to protect unfair treatment. In this regard, the courts should rec-
ognize two important distinctions between tracking stock corporations
and conventional corporations. First, in a tracking stock context, a sin-
gle board of directors and executive management team must look out
for the needs of at least two competing stockholder groups. Thus, a
tracking stock stockholder, unlike a stockholder of a conventional cor-
poration, does not have the benefit of an independent agency promoting
the interests of the business group to which her shares are linked. Sec-
212. This outcome is, without question, the outcome hoped for by the tracking
stock corporations discussed in this article. Boards of tracking stock corporations will
be granted the most leeway in making decisions involving intergroup conflicts if the
courts decide that those decisions will be afforded the protections of the business judg-
ment rule. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
213. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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ond, because a substantial divergence of financial interest exists be-
tween different classes of tracking stock, board decisions can have dis-
parate impacts on the trading values of shares of those classes.
These distinctions demonstrate that a tracking stock stockholder
suffers from a type of vulnerability to which stockholders of conven-
tional corporations are immune. That vulnerability stems from the abil-
ity of directors to subjugate - purposefully or unintentionally - the
needs of a particular business group to those of another business group
while claiming the protections of the business judgment rule.21 4 At its
extreme, this ability could even extend to running a particular business
group "into the ground" through, among other means, a sustained pat-
tern of purposeful or benign neglect. While this conduct is perfectly ac-
ceptable in a conventional corporate context where stockholder interests
are linked to the performance of the entire corporation, it should not be
tolerated in a tracking stock context where a specific group of stock-
holders will suffer while another group will not.215
In the example above, the board of TS Corp. could perpetually de-
cide to forgo funding Group Y's capital projects and thus stunt its in-
dustrial development.2 6 If this were to occur, holders of Group Y
Common Stock would have little, if any, recourse against the board
under current Delaware interpretations of the duty of care and the busi-
ness judgment rule. The board's course of action would help make win-
ners out of the holders of Group X Common Stock and losers out of the
holders of Group Y Common Stock. Thus, tracking stock stockholders
generally are at the complete mercy of a board and an executive man-
agement team that have divided loyalties. With the incredible latitude
afforded by the business judgment rule, a tracking stock board and ex-
ecutive management team can act virtually unchecked.
By contrast, a decision by the board of C Corp. to run Business 2
"into the ground" is, as it should be, completely the board's preroga-
214. Those needs can include, for example, the need for financial and human capi-
tal. See supra section I.B.I.
215. Indeed, one can argue that conventional corporations forfeit their ability to
run businesses into the ground when they adopt tracking stock equity structures. If the
board of a tracking stock corporation desires to ignore the industrial development of a
particular business group, then it should either (a) sell that business group and distribute
the proceeds to the holders of shares linked to that group or (b) first unwind the track-
ing stock equity structure and then ignore the industrial development of that former bus-
iness group.
216. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (where mi-
nority stockholders of subsidiary challenged policy of parent company-majority stock-
holder of forcing subsidiary to pay large amounts of dividends, and thus inhibiting sub-
sidiary's industrial development, court rejected challenge on, among other grounds, that
minority stockholders received their proportionate share of dividends).
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tive. If the board makes an informed decision to do so, that decision
will prove either to be a "winner" for all involved or a "loser" for all
involved. If that decision turns out to be ill-advised, a stockholder chal-
lenge could be brought that alleges, most likely unsuccessfully, that the
directors breached their duty of care by making an uninformed or unin-
telligent decision. Such a challenge, however, would not be based on
the unfairness of running Business 2 into the ground, because no shares
of C Corp. are specifically linked to Business 2; rather, they are linked
to the performance of the entire corporation.
B. The Duty of Loyalty
1. Current Interpretation Under Delaware Law
While the duty of care ensures that directors meet minimal stan-
dards of attentiveness and prudence, the duty of loyalty ensures that
corporate fiduciaries demonstrate an "undivided and unqualified loyalty
to the corporation which they serve. ' 217 Under Delaware law, these fi-
duciaries may not misuse their "power over corporate property or
processes ' 218 in order to serve their own interests at the expense of the
corporation. 219 Delaware courts use the duty of loyalty to evaluate,
based on stringent fairness grounds,220 diversionary or self-serving ac-
tivities by corporate fiduciaries. These activities, of course, come in
many shapes and forms.Y A stockholder challenging such an activity
217. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI. supra note 33, § 3:01, at 1.
218. See Steiner v. Meyerson, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,857, at 93,146 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995).
219. See Enstar Group, Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (M.D. Ala.
1993) ("One risk which the investor should not assume, however, is that the officers
and directors who have accepted the responsibility of using that investor's money might
put their personal interests ahead of that of the corporation."). When a director's inter-
est as a stockholder conflicts with the interests of the corporation, the director must ig-
nore her personal interests as a stockholder and attend to the corporation's interests. See
Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., (1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,617, at 97,888 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990).
220. See SOLOMON & PALMrrER, supra note 7, at 314.
221. The following is a list of categories into which diversionary or self-serving
activities generally fall:
a. Flagrant diversions of corporate assets;
b. Self-dealing transactions;
c. Excessive executive compensation;
d. Usurpation of corporate opportunities;
e. Trading on inside information;
f. Accepting bribes in return for corporate favors; and
g. Using corporate assets and governance mechanisms for entrenqhment
purposes.
See id. at 315-16.
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must allege facts that, if true, would constitute a material conflict of in-
terest between the corporation and one or more of its directors. If those
facts are not alleged, then the business judgment rule attaches to the ac-
tions of the directors and a challenger has the heavy burden of over-
coming that rule's presumptions.222
If a challenger alleges those facts, however, two things occur. First,
the implicated directors are precluded from invoking the business judg-
ment rule to protect their actions.22 Second, the burden of proof shifts
to them. As a result, they will have to meet the "rigorous standards '224
associated with proving the "entire fairness" of the transaction.3 This
222. See supra section IV.A.1; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Corporate
Governance and Institutional Activism, N.Y. L.I., Jan. 18, 1996, at 5.
223. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
One of the most important decisions a court can make in this context is whether to ap-
ply the business judgment rule or the entire fairness test. In fact, the Delaware Supreme
Court has stated that "[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business judg-
ment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determina-
tion of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the out-
come of derivative litigation." Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) (quoting AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224. Kumar v. Racing Corp. of Am., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) [ 95,896, at 99,422 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1991).
225. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-16 (Del.
1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Steiner v. Meyerson,
[1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 98,857, at 93,146 (Del. Ch. July 19,
1995); Kumar, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,422.
Under Delaware law, the concept of "fairness" in a loyalty context has two basic
components - fair dealing and fair price. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1376 (Del. 1993); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Kumar, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,422-23; Pinson v. Campbell Taggart, Inc., No.
CIV.A.7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989). These components en-
compass both procedural burdens and substantive duties. See Pinson, 1989 WL 17438,
at *5. Fair dealing, on the one hand, has a procedural focus that looks at "when a trans-
action was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors,
and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders [if applicable] were ob-
tained." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. Fair price, on the other hand, has a substantive
focus that looks into the economic and financial considerations of the proposed transac-
tion, including "all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock." 457
A.2d at 711. Depending on the factual context of a particular duty of loyalty challenge,
only "fair dealing" may be implicated because the action or transaction at issue did not
involve a pricing component. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376 (in challenge alleging breach
of fiduciary duty as a result of allegedly discriminatory policy that unfairly favored
Class A employee stockholders over Class B nonemployee stockholders, Delaware Su-
preme Court stated that "[t]he case before us involves only the issue of fair dealing").
As the Delaware Supreme Court noted in Kahn, however, if the self-dealing trans-
action has been approved by either an informed and truly independent committee of di-
rectors or an informed majority of minority stockholders, then the burden of proof on
the issue of fairness shifts to the challenging stockholder. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117.
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burden shifting acts as a compensating procedural safeguard in situa-
tions where the interests of stockholders are not being protected due to
director self-interest. 6
The directorial loyalty concerns arising in a tracking stock context
mirror most closely self-dealing transactions currently addressed by the
duty of loyalty. In a traditional self-dealing transaction, a director's loy-
alty is tested because she winds up on both sides of a transaction with
her corporation. 227 This occurs when a director either approves or autho-
rizes a corporate transaction in which she has a direct or indirect per-
sonal or financial interest.m
Most states have adopted statutory provisions that seek to promote
fairness in self-dealing transactions, 229 and Delaware is no exception.230
Commonly referred to as interested director statutes ("IDS"), these
statutes will uphold an interested director transaction if some neutral
decisionmaking body - a committee of independent directors, the
stockholders, or a court - has ratified it, or if the transaction is other-
wise fair to the corporation.21 Fairness - either substantive, procedu-
ral, or both - lies at the heart of all those statutes. Delaware's IDS, for
example, provides that a contract or transaction232 "shall not be voida-
However, the court noted that if such approval is given by a special committee of direc-
tors, a court must give "careful judicial scrutiny of a special committee's real bargain-
ing power before shifting the burden of proof on the issue of entire fairness." 638 A.2d
at 1117.
226. See Pinson, 1989 WL 17438, at *5. If the directors meet their burden of
proving the entire fairness of a transaction, then that transaction is protected from a
stockholder challenge. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991). If, how-
ever, the directors fall to meet this burden and the transaction is found to be unfair to
the corporation, two remedies may flow. First, stockholders may demand rescission of
the transaction itself. Second, if rescission proves impractical, stockholders may demand
the payment of rescissory damages. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
227. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988) ("It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that... di-
rectors cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any personal benefit
through self-dealing."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 ("When directors ... are on both
sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.").
228. See SOLOMON & PALMrrER, supra note 7, at 343.
229. See BRODSKY & ADAMsIu, supra note 33, § 3:02, at 3. Forty-seven out of fifty
states have statutes controlling conflict of interest transactions. See id. § 3:02, at 18 n.1
(providing citations to the statute of each of the forty-seven states).
230. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1991).
231. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DuKE LU. 425, 439-40 & n.47 (1993).
232. Although it is unclear if the existence of a transaction or a contract is a sine
qua non to the application of the statute, precedent exists for its application when direc-
tors interested in one proposed transaction refuse to approve another competing pro-
posed transaction in which they have no interest, as such refusal implicates the same
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ble" solely for the reason that a director has a direct or indirect interest
therein if (1) the material facts of her interest are disclosed and a major-
ity of disinterested directors authorizes the transaction in good faith, (2)
the material facts of her interest are disclosed and the stockholders of
the corporation vote in good faith to approve the transaction, or (3) a
court determines that the contract or transaction is fair to the
corporation.233
2. Failure To Address Tracking Stock Concerns
The duty of loyalty, as currently interpreted under Delaware law,
and Delaware's IDS both fail to address the unique loyalty concerns
arising in a tracking stock context. Once again, these concerns stem
from the ability of tracking stock directors with Disproportionate Equity
self-serving concerns as when directors approve interested transactions. See Freedman v.
Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,617 at 97,888 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990).
In Freedman, stockholders challenged a decision of the corporation's board to re-
ject the sale of a stock option to a third party in connection with that third party's offer
to acquire the corporation. At the time of the rejection, the board was dominated by in-
side directors who had made a competing management buyout offer. Although the
board's rejection did not involve a transaction between the interested directors and the
corporation, the rejection paved the way for the board to accept management's compet-
ing buyout offer. Noting this, the Delaware Chancery Court stated that "only a wooden
understanding of the law of self-dealing would deny that the concerns underlying that
law are present here." [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,888.
The court then went on to analyze the interested directors' rejection of the stock option
under Section 144(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. While making such an
analysis, the court noted that the stock option was not rejected "by the disinterested di-
rectors or by the shareholders. Thus, the board's decision will be upheld only if it was
fair. Further, the defendants bear the burden of proving fairness." [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) at 97,888 (citations omitted).
233. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1991). The enactment of this statute lim-
ited stockholders' power under the common law in two ways. First, the statute allows
for a committee of disinterested directors to approve a transaction and bring it within
the scope of the business judgment rule. Second, if an independent committee is not
available, stockholders may either ratify the transaction or challenge its fairness in
court, but they no longer have the power to automatically nullify it. See Oberly, 592
A.2d at 466.
The first two prongs of Delaware's IDS are procedural in nature because they fo-
cus on what was disclosed about a particular transaction and who authorized it. The
third prong, by contrast, is substantive in nature, as it calls for a court determination
that the transaction itself is "fair" to the corporation. While Delaware's statutory provi-
sion appears to be disjunctive in nature, it has not been interpreted that way. The
Delaware Supreme Court has held that the approval of a conflict of interest transaction
by disinterested directors or stockholders does not displace the court's role to assure the
fairness of the transaction. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (apply-
ing a two-tiered analysis: application of Section 144 coupled with an intrinsic fairness
test); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (citing Fliegler favorably).
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Positions in their corporations - such directors hereinafter are referred
to as "TS Interested Directors" - to manipulate corporate decisions
and policies in such a way as to favor one business group over another
business group thereby securing personal financial gain. In other words,
these directors will play favorites in their decisionmaking based on their
own personal financial interests.
In the context of a tracking stock equity structure, the duty of loy-
alty and Delaware's IDS are problematic in two respects. First, they
simply do not address a number of situations that raise loyalty concerns
solely in a tracking stock context. Second, questions of interpretation
arise with respect to how they will treat, in a tracking stock context,
certain traditional situations that raise loyalty concerns in both conven-
tional and tracking stock equity structures. These two problems are'ex-
plored below.
a. Loyalty Concerns Where None Existed Before. Certain unique
situations arise in a tracking stock context that create loyalty concerns
that are not addressed by the duty of loyalty or Delaware's IDS. As
seen in the examples that follow, these situations all involve TS Inter-
ested Directors who profit through the promotion of the business group
in which they have a Disproportionate Equity Position.234 Thus, these
directors can profit by ensuring that that business group is successful,
and they have the means at their disposal to make this happen.
The duty of loyalty and Delaware's IDS do not address these situa-
tions because of their holistic approach toward the corporation. The
duty of loyalty, on the one hand, speaks to directors placing their inter-
ests ahead of those of the corporation, rather than before those of partic-
ular businesses operated by a corporation. Delaware's IDS, on the other
hand, focuses on transactions and contracts involving both the corpora-
tion and a particular director or an entity in which that director has a di-
rect or indirect interest.35 Thus, the statute focuses on dealings in which
the corporation itself is an active participant2a
6
This holistic approach is entirely appropriate from the "all for one,
one for all" perspective of a conventional corporation. Indeed, due to
234. Favoritism of this kind also can occur through the neglect of one business
group in an effort to promote the interests of another business group.
235. That interest may be directly or indirectly financial in nature or result from
the fact that the director is also a director of that other corporation and thus would be
referred to as a "common director."
236. Examples of these types of transactions include sales of property or other as-
sets to or by the corporation, loans to or by the corporation, and, in cases involving
outside directors, the furnishing of services (such as legal or accounting services) to the




the substantial unity of financial interest that exists between different
classes of common stock of a conventional corporation,237 the interests
of the corporation itself are generally synonymous with those of its
stockholders. Hence, there is no "loyalty" pull to favor one of the busi-
nesses or divisions operated by a conventional corporation over an-
other.238 The focus, rather, is on how well the corporation as a whole
performs. The duty of loyalty and Delaware's IDS simply reinforce this.
This holistic approach, however, simply does not address the
unique tracking stock vice of profiting through favoritism. Indeed, in
order for this vice to be possible, a corporation first must be subdivided
into two or more business groups and have securities linked to the per-
formances of those business groups. Once this is done, TS Interested
Directors have the ability to enhance their own financial interests
through the promotion of one business group over another.
Particularly troubling in this regard is the ability of TS Interested
Directors to point out that their self-serving efforts benefit other stock-
holders as well as themselves. When a particular business group is fa-
vored over another through directorial decisionmaking, not only is that
business group benefited but the holders of shares linked to that group
also are benefited. At the same time, of course, the TS Interested
Directors reap financial rewards. Such favoritism, therefore, is particu-
larly insidious because a particular group of stockholders in addition to
the TS Interested Directors also benefit from acts of favoritism.
An example will highlight the problems that the holistic approach
towards the corporation has in addressing tracking stock loyalty con-
cerns. Assume that a majority of the directors of TS Corp. have Dispro-
portionate Equity Positions in Group Y, and thus are TS Interested
Directors. Also assume that, when making capital allocations (a com-
mon intergroup conflict situation), the board decides to fund all of
Group Y's capital projects but few of Group X's. Further assume that
the TS Interested Directors voted this way in an effort to increase the
value of their shares of Group Y Common Stock.
In this example, the duty of loyalty, as currently interpreted under
Delaware law, is of no use in policing this act of favoritism designed
for personal profit. Since that duty focuses on the corporation as a
237. See supra text accompanying note 73.
238. This is true even when some directors of a conventional corporation own
stock in that corporation while others do not. In such a case, none of the directors has
any financial incentive to favor one business operated by the corporation over the other,
because no director will benefit thereby. Those directors with an equity interest, how-
ever, certainly have an interest in not making ill-advised corporate decisions in general
because the value of their shares will decline if poor decisions are made.
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whole, attention currently is not paid to how resources are divided be-
tween business groups. Nor does Delaware's IDS address this situation.
This shortcoming stems from the fact that a TS Interested Director is
not even considered "interested" by that statute. To be "interested"
under that statute, the director herself must be a party to a transaction
with the corporation or have a direct or indirect financial interest in an
entity that is. Instead, directors are considered "interested" in a track-
ing stock context if they have Disproportionate Equity Positions - an
impossibility with a conventional corporation.239
A related problem with the duty of loyalty and Delaware's IDS is
their failure to address situations in which TS Interested Directors can
profit through transactions with third parties in which no such director
has any interest whatsoever. An example will highlight this point. As-
sume again that a majority of the directors of TS Corp. have a Dispro-
portionate Equity Position in Group Y. Also assume that either Group X
or Group Y is equally capable of consummating the transaction in ques-
tion with a third party corporation in which no TS Corp. director has
any interest. The TS Interested Directors, however, decide to have
Group Y enter into the transaction in an effort to enhance the value of
their Group Y Common Stock.
Once again, the duty of loyalty, as currently interpreted under
Delaware law, falls short in addressing this act of favoritism. Indeed,
dealings between a corporation and a third party in which no director is
interested implicate not the duty of loyalty but rather the duty of care.
Accordingly, the board's decision almost always will receive the protec-
tions of the business judgment rule.240 In this instance, the fact that a di-
rector qua stockholder benefits as the corporation benefits is irrelevant,
because the duty of loyalty has been interpreted only in terms of a con-
ventional corporation. In a conventional corporate context, "[d]irectors
who are also shareholders usually have interests as shareholders that co-
incide with the best interests of the company. '"241
Delaware's IDS fares no better in this regard. It too suffers because
it applies solely to transactions between the corporation and a third-
party entity in which a director has a direct or indirect interest. In the
example above, TS Corp. is dealing with a third party corporation in
239. Directors of a conventional corporation with multiple classes of common
stock could also own a disparate number of shares of each such class; however, no eco-
nomic loyalty concerns should arise because the performance of the shares of each such
class of stock is linked to the corporation as a whole.
240. See supra section IV.A.1.
241. Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,617, at 97,888 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990).
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which no TS Corp. director has an interest. The statute, therefore, is not
applicable, as the TS Interested Directors are not considered "inter-
ested" thereunder.
The unusual nature of intergroup transactions that arise in a track-
ing stock context also throw a curveball to the duty of loyalty and
Delaware's IDS.242 Unlike the typical interested director transaction
where the corporation is one of at least two parties to the transaction, an
intergroup transaction occurs solely between business groups of a track-
ing stock corporation. The corporation is, in essence, on both sides of
the transaction. Because of this, it is hard to say that the well-being of
the corporation as a whole has been injured when a lopsided intergroup
transaction occurs, even though one business group could be viewed as
a winner and the other a loser. But a TS Interested Director clearly
could promote her own financial well-being by ensuring that the winner
is the business group in which she has a DE.
b. Interpretational Problems. Because a tracking stock corporation
legally is a single corporate entity, it remains just as susceptible as a
conventional corporation to the perpetration of traditional diversionary
or self-serving activities243 by its directors. As discussed earlier, in a
conventional corporate context interested directors must show the entire
fairness of dealings between themselves and their corporation unless, in
accordance with an interested director statute, those dealings have been
approved or ratified by an informed majority of disinterested directors
or stockholders. Directors of tracking stock corporations who have deal-
ings with their corporations should also be required to show the entire
fairness of those dealings unless those dealings have been so approved
or ratified.
Questions of interpretation, however, arise in situations in which
the actions of tracking stock directors would cause them to be consid-
ered "interested" within the meaning of the duty of loyalty and
Delaware's IDS. With respect to an interested director transaction cov-
ered by Delaware's IDS, assume that it is not possible to secure the ap-
proval of a majority of disinterested directors.244 In order to protect that
transaction under the statute, therefore, the transaction is put to a vote
of the stockholders.245 The question arises, however, as to which
242. For a discussion of intergroup transactions and dealings among the business
groups of a tracking stock corporation, see supra section II.B.4.
243. See supra note 221.
244. This could happen if either there were no disinterested directors to approve
the transaction or the transaction were put to a vote of stockholders after a previous de-
cision was reached by the directors to adopt a neutral stance towards the transaction.
245. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (1991).
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"stockholders" should be entitled to approve the interested transaction.
Should all tracking stock stockholders, regardless of class, vote on the
matter? Or should only those stockholders whose shares are linked eco-
nomically to the business group implicated in the transaction control the
outcome?246
Similarly, assuming no disinterested body has approved the inter-
ested director transaction in question, the burden of proof shifts to the
directors to prove the entire fairness of the transaction "to the corpora-
tion." 247 But as discussed earlier in the context of the duty of care,248 in
a tracking stock context does fairness to the corporation mean fairness
to the corporation as a whole or fairness to a particular business group?
This issue also plagues the duty of loyalty because "fairness to the cor-
poration" is paramount to that duty as well. Interpretive questions like
those discussed above ultimately must await judicial resolution.
246. Certificates or articles of incorporation of tracking stock corporations gener-
ally provide that, unless state law otherwise requires, all tracking stock stockholders
vote together as one class on all issues coming before common stockholders. State law
generally requires a separate class vote on matters that could adversely affect the rights
of holders of a particular class of stock and on any other matter specifically set forth in
a corporation's certificate or articles of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 102(b)(4), 242(b)(2) (1991). Therefore, the likely outcome of this issue is that all
tracking stock stockholders would vote together as one class.
While this is not troubling from a fiduciary duty point of view, it has significant
drawbacks from a stockholder perspective. Using the above example, assume that the
matter upon which the stockholders of TS Corp. will vote is a sale of assets of Group X
to a corporation in which all the directors of TS Corp. have a financial interest. Assume
also that each share of Group X Common Stock has one vote and that holders of Group
X Common Stock have 40% of the corporation's voting power. One share of Group Y
Common Stock also has one vote and holders of Group Y Common Stock have the re-
maining 60% of the corporation's voting power. Assuming TS Corp. is a Delaware cor-
poration and that its charter does not provide for lower quorum and approval percent-
ages, a majority of shares entitled to vote must be represented at the stockholders'
meeting in person or by proxy to constitute a quorum. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 216(1) (1991). Assuming a quorum is present, the sale of assets can only be approved
by the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares so represented. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 216(2) (1991).
Two problems thus arise. First, assuming all of the shares of Group X Common
Stock are represented at the stockholders' meeting, at least approximately 17% of the
shares of Group Y Common Stock must also be represented before a quorum can even
be achieved. Since the issue at hand is a sale of assets of Group X, however, the quo-
rum requirements could be defeated through sheer apathy on the part of holders of
Group Y Common Stock. Second, assuming for whatever reason holders of Group Y
Common Stock disliked the proposed sale, those holders if they exercise their superior
voting power could effectively veto it even if all the holders of Group X Common
Stock were in favor of it.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 223-26.
248. See supra text accompanying note 206.
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V. THE DuTy OF FAsNEss
This author does not advocate altering or reinterpreting traditional
corporate fiduciary duties to enable them to address the unique concerns
arising in a tracking stock equity structure. The reason for this is sim-
ple: these duties continue to perform the same important functions in
the corporate governance of a tracking stock corporation as they do in
the corporate governance of a conventional corporation. A tracking
stock corporation, despite its artificial bifurcation into distinct business
groups, remains legally intact as a single corporate entity. As such, it is
governed by only one board of directors that, like the board of a con-
ventional corporation, must guard against the conventional vices of di-
rectorial negligence and disloyalty. Accordingly, the traditional fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty should be used by the courts to address
these vices regardless of whether they occur in a conventional corporate
context or a tracking stock context.
The fact that a tracking stock corporation has only one board of di-
rectors while having holders of shares of multiple classes of stock with
substantially divergent financial interests, however, gives rise to new
challenges involving issues of fairness and favoritism. As seen in Part
IV, the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty fail to address
these issues. The duty of care, on the one hand, promotes the undertak-
ing of risky business activities within a framework of minimal directo-
rial prudence, and issues of fairness are never reached unless the formi-
dable presumptions of the business judgment rule are overcome. The
duty of loyalty, on the other hand, suffers from its focus on the corpora-
tion as a whole rather than on distinct business groups operated by that
corporation. The notion of profiting by favoring one part of a corpora-
tion over another is simply alien to duty of loyalty jurisprudence.
A. Why Tracking Stock Concerns Need To Be Addressed
In light of the foregoing, a logical question arises: Should the law
concern itself with the unique concerns arising in a tracking stock eq-
uity structure at all? Perhaps stockholders of tracking stock corporations
should simply close their eyes to these concerns and cross their fingers?
This appears to be what the tracking stock corporations discussed in
this article are hoping for, as they assert that their stockholders have no
additional rights as a result of their implementation of tracking stock
equity structures. 249 In addition, these corporations can ease stockholder
249. See RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 21; RJR PRoxY STATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 23; SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 38; TCI PRoxY
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concerns by pointing out that they are among an elite group of
America's finest corporations and that their directors are all prominent
members of the business, academic, and/or political communities.
But what if, in the future, as tracking stock equity structures be-
come more widespread, control of a tracking stock corporation falls into
less able hands? Will directors of less stature and scruples be able to
handle the reins of corporate law's equivalent of a bucking bronco? In-
deed, it is already troubling that, as shown earlier,250 certain members of
the boards of at least two tracking stock corporations have held Dispro-
portionate Equity Positions in the past. While these directors may not
have chosen to use their DEPs to their personal financial advantage,
others in the future may not exercise such self-restraint.
Perhaps the most worrisome prospect of all, however, arises from
an intergroup conflict standpoint. The tracking stock corporations in ex-
istence today are all profitable ventures. Clearly this will not always-be
the case. One day a tracking stock corporation will move from the prof-
itable end of the success/failure continuum towards the end where fi-
nancial disaster lurks. One day a tracking stock corporation will file for
bankruptcy.
Because financial developments of each business group of a track-
ing stock corporation could affect the performance of the corporation as
a whole,251 a corporate disaster could result from a financial decline of
only one business group. Indeed, if one business group begins to act
more like an anchor than a sail, the voyage of the entire corporation
could be imperiled. Under these circumstances, and given the extensive
intergroup conflicts that naturally arise in a tracking stock context, sig-
nificant stockholder litigation would appear inevitable. As the corporate
pie gets smaller, the friction between different stockholder groups will
grow. Embracing the "don't worry, be happy" position of tracking
stock corporations, therefore, seems ill-advised.
In this regard, one can only shudder over what would have hap-
pened to Kmart Corporation had it successfully issued five classes of
tracking stock back in 1994.252 In late 1995 and early 1996, Kmart's
flagship discount store business suffered from a number of serious fi-
STATEMENT. supra note 2, at 30; U S WEST PRoxy STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 29. For-
mulating this assertion in another way, Genzyme Corp. stated that a "Massachusetts
court would hold that a board of directors ... does not have separate or additional du-
ties to any group of stockholders." GENZYME PRoxy STATEENT, supra note 2, at 31-32.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 143-60.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
252. See supra notes 2, 49.
2163June 1996]
Michigan Law Review
nancial woes. 253 As a result, Kmart's common stock price plunged from
a 52-week high closing price of $161/4 to a closing price of $7 on
February 22, 1996. Assuming Kmart had issued five classes of tracking
stock in 1994, how, for example, would the four groups of stockholders
interested in Kmart business groups other than its flagship discount
store business group have responded when Kmart announced that its top
management priority was the turnaround of that ailing business group
rather than the development of the other four business groups? 254 In ad-
dition, given management's proposed multi-billion dollar make-over of
that ailing business group, would enough capital be available to further
the industrial development of the other four business groups? If not,
would the four groups of stockholders left out in the cold sit idly by on
the sidelines and watch this happen? This author submits that the result-
ing stockholder infighting would have rivaled the famed feuds between
the Hatfields and McCoys.
B. The Duty of Fairness
The special concerns arising in a tracking stock equity structure re-
quire an evolutionary development in corporate law in order to protect
tracking stock stockholders and guide tracking stock directors. By mov-
ing to a new level of principle and policy, corporate law can promote
corporate decisionmaking based on fairness and reasonableness rather
than favoritism and apathy in a tracking stock context. A new standard
is needed with which to evaluate directorial decisions that have dispa-
rate impacts on the different business groups and the holders of shares
linked to them. This standard, however, must carefully balance the
needs of the directors to manage the corporation with those of compet-
ing stockholder groups for fair and reasonable treatment. Importantly, it
also must avoid mandating simplistic solutions to intergroup conflicts,
such as requiring exactly "equal" treatment of each business group or
"splitting the baby" when scarce resources are allocated among busi-
ness groups. These solutions would likely guarantee the achievement of
corporate mediocrity.
253. See Robert Bemer, Kmart, in Letter, Seeks To Calm Vendors on Profits,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1996, at A3; Jennifer Steinhauer, Can Kmart Put Together a
Comeback, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1995, at D1; Can Kmart Pull Out of Its Spin? New
Chief Cuts Jobs, Closes Stores to Boost Financials, INveSTOR's Bus. DAILY, Oct. 18,
1995, at A4 [hereinafter Can Kmart Comeback?].
254. According to Robert Buchanan, an analyst at NatWest Securities, Inc., Kmart
"needs about $4 to $5 billion to rejuvenate its stores, many of which are old and need
remodeling." Robert Buchanan, quoted in Can Kmart Comeback?, supra note 253, at
A4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This author argues for the statutory or judicial enactment of a duty
of fairness that can address the special concerns arising in a tracking
stock equity structure. The goal of the duty of fairness would be to en-
sure that tracking stock boards do not exercise, while hiding behind the
business judgment rule, their broad discretionary powers in a way that
is unfair to, or fails to properly consider the needs of, a particular busi-
ness group and the holders of shares linked to it. Fairness is the proper
standard because the intergroup conflicts that arise in a tracking stock
context raise fairness issues.255A fairness standard would require track-
ing stock boards to affirmatively consider and address the industrial de-
velopment of all business groups, especially the declining or out-of-
favor business groups, when making decisions and policies that could
have disparate impacts. Neither blatant favoritism toward, nor benign or
purposeful neglect of, any particular business group would be tolerated
under such a standard.
As seen below, the duty of fairness is not designed to bring the di-
rectorial decisionmaking process to a grinding halt. In fact, it creates a
presumption in favor of tracking stock directors that any decision made
by them that has disparate impacts was both fair and reasonable to all
involved. Stockholders challenging a decision would have to plead par-
ticular facts to rebut this presumption. Those facts would have to
demonstrate that one or more of the three operative provisions of
Section (a) of the duty were not met. If the presumption is overcome,
then the directors would have the burden of demonstrating that they sat-
isfied all of those provisions when they made the challenged decision,
unless one of the two remedial provisions of Section (b) of the duty
were met. Failure on the part of directors to do so would result in the
granting of either equitable relief, such as enjoining or unwinding the
decision itself, or, if such relief were not feasible, compensatory dam-
ages paid by either the favored business group or the directors them-
selves, depending on the facts.
The duty of fairness provides:
(a) With respect to any corporation having outstanding shares of two
or more classes of capital stock, or series of capital stock, the rights of
which are defined by reference to specified Business Groups, any
Approved Action that has materially disparate impacts on the Business
Groups of such corporation and/or the trading value of shares of the clas-
255. Judicial precedent for requiring fairness in similar contexts already exists. See
In re FLS Holdings, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.12623, 1993 WL 104562 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 2, 1993) (holding that division of merger consideration between preferred
stockholders and common stockholders must be "fair" though not necessarily equal);
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 596-97 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same).
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ses or series of capital stock linked to such Business Groups will be pre-
sumed to be fair and reasonable to such Business Groups and the holders
of such shares unless, at the time approval was granted, one or more of
the following provisions were not satisfied:
1. The Approved Action was approved by a majority of Disinter-
ested Directors of the board of directors or a committee of such
board;
2. Prior to granting its approval, the board or such committee shall
have received and considered such Information as is necessary to
make an informed business judgment with respect to the Approved
Action; and
3. At the time it granted its approval, the board or such committee
reasonably believed, based upon such Information, that the
Approved Action was fair and reasonable to each Business Group
and the holders of shares of the class or series of capital stock
linked thereto.
(b) In the event that Section (a) shall not be satisfied, an Approved
Action covered thereby shall nevertheless be deemed fair and reasonable
if either of the following provisions is -satisfied:
1. The holders of a majority of shares of each class or series of
capital stock, voting as a separate class or series, shall have ratified
in good faith the Approved Action after having received such
Information as is necessary to make an informed decision with re-
spect to such Approved Action; or
2. At the time it was approved, the Approved Action was fair and
reasonable to each Business Group and the holders of shares of the
class or series of capital stock linked thereto. Directors of the cor-
poration shall bear the burden of proving the fairness and reasona-
bleness of such Approved Action under this Section (b)2.
(c) For purposes of the foregoing:
"Action" shall mean any action, activity, decision, policy,
transaction, contract, negotiation, or dealing of any kind
whatsoever.
"Approved Action" shall mean any Action affirmatively ap-
proved by the board or such committee. For purposes of this defi-
nition, an Approved Action shall include, without limitation, an af-
firmative decision by the board or such committee to cease or
terminate a current on-going Approved Action. In addition, in the
event alternative Actions are under consideration by the board or
such committee, the approval of one such Action shall be deemed
the simultaneous disapproval of all other Actions that the board or
such committee believed to be viable alternatives to the Approved
Action.
"Beneficial Effects" shall mean all material beneficial conse-
quences of an Action that are reasonably foreseeable at the time
such Action is considered by the board or such committee.
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"Business Group" shall mean any business group, division,
subsidiary, assets, or set of operations of the corporation with re-
spect to which the rights of a particular class or series of capital
stock are defined.
"Detrimental Effects" shall mean all material adverse conse-
quences of an Action that are reasonably foreseeable at the time
such Action is considered by the board or such committee. For pur-
poses of this definition, "Detrimental Effects" shall include, with-
out limitation, all material opportunity costs associated with a dis-
approved Action.
"Disinterested Director" shall mean, at the time the board or
such committee approves any Action, either (A) any Outside
Director or (B) any Inside Director whose responsibilities run to all
Business Groups, in each case who beneficially owns, on a fully
diluted basis, either (1) shares of all classes or series of capital
stock with an aggregate trading value of less than $100,000 or (2) a
number of shares of each class or series of capital stock that, in
proportional terms, reasonably reflects the same proportion that
outstanding shares of all classes or series of capital stock have to
each other.
"Information" shall mean, with respect to any Approved
Action, all materially relevant information relating to such Action.
For purposes of this definition, "materially relevant information"
shall include, without limitation: (A) all Beneficial Effects and Det-
rimental Effects of (1) the Approved Action, (2) any disapproved
Action that the board or such committee reasonably believed to be
a viable alternative to the Approved Action, and (3) all previously
approved and disapproved Actions that are materially relevant to
the Approved Action; (B) with respect to any Approved Action ef-
fected solely between or among two or more Business Groups, the
board's or such committee's reasonable judgment as to how a
wholly independent board or committee of a stand-alone corpora-
tion with characteristics substantially similar to each Business
Group affected thereby would assess such Action; and (C) for pur-
poses of Section (b)l, the nature and extent of the interest of any
Interested Director.
"Inside Director" shall mean a director of the corporation
who is also either an officer or other employee of or a consultant to
the corporation.
"Interested Director" shall mean any director of the corpora-
tion who is not a Disinterested Director.
"Outside Director" shall mean a director of the corporation




C. Elements of the Duty of Fairness Explained
As seen from above, the duty of fairness has three sections.
Section (a) contains the central provisions of the duty. Section (b) sets
forth two remedial provisions that are available to directors in the event
Section (a) is not satisfied. Section (c) contains a set of ten defined
terms. The way in which each of these three sections helps to address
the concerns raised by a tracking stock equity structure is described be-
low. Because the set of defined terms is used throughout the duty's first
two sections, it is not independently discussed.
1. Central Nature of Section (a)
Section (a) is the heart of the duty of fairness. Through its provi-
sions, this section restricts the applicability of the duty of fairness, sets
forth a presumption in favor of tracking stock directors, addresses direc-
torial loyalty concerns, and provides for a subjective measure of fair-
ness. Moreover, it provides valuable guidance to tracking stock direc-
tors as to the process they should be following when making decisions
that could have materially disparate impacts on a corporation's business
groups and related stockholders.
The purpose of the introductory paragraph is to limit the applica-
bility of the duty of fairness solely to situations in which the tracking
stock concerns discussed in this article arise. The first clause of this
paragraph limits the duty's applicability solely to tracking stock corpo-
rations. Use of the broadly defined term "Business Group," however, is
designed to help capture all forms of tracking stock corporations regard-
less of whether their capital stock is linked to the traditional business
group or some other aspect of the corporation. The introductory para-
graph further limits the scope of the duty by requiring an "Approved
Action" that has had materially disparate impacts on the Business
Groups of the corporation, the trading values of shares of the capital
stock linked to such Groups, or both. Most importantly, the introductory
paragraph establishes the presumption that an Approved Action is fair
and reasonable to all involved unless one or more of the three operative
provisions of Section (a) have not been satisfied.
The defined terms "Action" and "Approved Action" are particu-
larly important to Section (a). "Action," which plays a role in several
defined terms including "Approved Action," is broadly defined so as to
avoid the arguably narrow focus of interested director statutes on only
transactions and contracts. An Action, therefore, includes any and all
actions in which a corporation may engage. "Approved Action" in-
cludes not only any Action approved by the board or a committee, but
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also a board or committee decision to cease a previously approved, on-
going Action, such as the termination of a project or the cessation of
negotiations. Finally, the concept of materiality is not specifically men-
tioned with respect to either an Action or an Approved Action, because
boards and committees rarely spend time considering matters that are
not material to the corporation. Accordingly, the scope of the duty of
fairness is further limited to Actions considered by the board or a com-
mittee. As a result, ordinary day-to-day operational decisions made by
the management team would not be subject to judicial scrutiny.
Section (a) of the duty of fairness also contains three operative
provisions that must be satisfied by the board or a committee with re-
spect to any Approved Action. The first provision tackles head-on the
directorial loyalty concerns that arise when tracking stock directors hold
Disproportionate Equity Positions in their corporations. An Approved
Action must have received approval by a majority of "Disinterested
Directors" of the board or a committee. This requirement, while mirror-
ing one of the approval provisions available under Delaware's interested
director statute, 2 6 covers only the loyalty concerns arising in a tracking
stock context.
The first provision targets tracking stock loyalty concerns through
its use of the carefully formulated definition of "Disinterested
Director." The key to that definition is its focus on disproportionate
stock ownership rather than on the corporation as a whole. Because of
this focus, the particular parties involved in any Approved Action are
not relevant to the analysis. Thus, this loyalty provision would have to
be met even when an Approved Action involved either an intergroup
transaction or a transaction between a Business Group and a third-party
entity in which no director had any interest. To the extent an Approved
Action also implicated the traditional duty of loyalty - because, for ex-
ample, a director who is a direct participant in a transaction with her
corporation also happens to have a Disproportionate Equity Position at
the time - compliance with both the duty of fairness and any applica-
ble interested director statute would be required. This would ensure that
any such Approved Action was fair to both the corporation as a whole
and the various Business Groups of that corporation.
Under the duty of fairness, whether a particular director is "disin-
terested" is measured at the time the board or a committee approved
the Action in question. Leaving aside the stock ownership requirements
for the moment, either an Outside Director (defined in the usual sense
of the term) or an Inside Director (also defined in the usual sense of the
256. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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term) can be "disinterested." However, an Inside Director's duties must
run to all Business Groups or she will be disqualified regardless of her
stock holdings.257 With respect to the stock ownership requirements, a
de minimis threshold of $100,000258 ensures that, except as just indi-
cated, those directors who own shares worth less than $100,000 in the
aggregate will always be deemed "disinterested." If, however, a direc-
tor owns shares worth $100,000 or more in the aggregate, then that di-
rector's proportional ownership must "reasonably reflect" 59 the same
proportion that outstanding shares of all classes of tracking stock have
to each other. A director's stock ownership is calculated on a fully di-
luted basis so that her stock options and related derivatives are always
considered when determining whether she is disinterested.260
The second operative provision of Section (a) requires tracking
stock directors to exercise a heightened degree of procedural due care
when deciding whether to approve a particular Action. Before granting
its approval, the board or a committee must have both received and,
considered such "Information" as is necessary to make an informed
business judgment. Importantly, this is an objective test that allows a
court to make an independent and impartial determination of whether
the board or a committee took action prematurely based on inadequate
information. Information considered by a board or a committee after an
Action has been approved will not cure an uninformed business
judgment.26'
The amount of information that a tracking stock board or commit-
tee must receive and consider is designed to be materially greater than
the amount of information normally received and considered by the
board of a conventional corporation. This reflects the fact that, as a re-
257. Thus, an Inside Director whose duties run only to one Business Group be-
cause, for example, she is an officer of that Business Group rather than an executive of-
ficer of the entire corporation will always be deemed interested regardless of her stock
holdings.
258. The $100,000 figure, while arbitrary, is designed to ensure that those direc-
tors with limited stock ownership interests in the corporation are always assured a
"Disinterested Director" designation. Cf. Gaimmalvo v. Sunshine Mining, No.
CIV.A.12842, 1994 WL 30547 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1994) (holding that mere ownership
by directors of common stock did not create conflict that gave rise to fiduciary concerns
in context of a transaction that had potential to benefit common stockholders at expense
of preferred stockholders, at least in absence of allegation that directors' common stock
ownership was substantial in relation to number of outstanding shares).
259. The term reasonably reflect is used to provide necessary wiggle room. It is
designed to be a lower standard than reasonably approximate.
260. See supra note 144.
261. Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985) (ruling that consid-
eration by board of pertinent information after a decision had been made did not con-
vert an uninformed judgment into an informed one).
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sult of any given decision, certain stockholder groups may come out as
winners while others may come out as losers. This potential for diver-
gent consequences underscores the need for tracking stock boards and
committees to pay very close attention to the prospective impact that
any Action will have on all interested parties.
"Information" is defined to mean all "materially relevant informa-
tion" relating to any Approved Action. The definition of
"Information," therefore, is purposely general in order to ensure flexi-
bility in its application. However, the phrase "materially relevant infor-
mation" is itself set forth in more specific terms. This was done so that
a board or committee is forced to weigh at least the three significant
pieces of information specified in clause (A) when considering any
Action.
The first of these three pieces of information consists of all
Beneficial and Detrimental Effects of the Approved Action. "Beneficial
Effects," on the one hand, are the material positive consequences, or
"pros," flowing from the approval of a given Action. "Detrimental
Effects," on the other hand, are the material negative consequences, or
"cons," flowing from the approval of a given Action. In either case, a
board or committee must only consider those Effects that are reasonably
foreseeable from an objective standpoint.
The second piece of information is all Beneficial and Detrimental
Effects of any disapproved Action that the board or a committee reason-
ably believed to be a viable alternative to the Approved Action. Thus,
the board or committee must affirmatively consider what it is giving up
when it approves a given Action rather than any other viable alternative
Action. Indeed, the definition of "Detrimental Effect" specifically in-
cludes all material opportunity costs associated with a disapproved
Action, and, under the definition of "Approved Action," any viable al-
ternative Action not approved by the board or committee is deemed to
be disapproved. Importantly, only the effects of alternative Actions
viewed as "viable" in the eyes of the board or committee at the time an
Action is approved must be considered. This limitation purposely cuts
off judicial second-guessing as to why a board or committee failed to
consider an alternative Action revealed to be "viable" only with the
benefit of hindsight.
The third piece of information is all Beneficial and Detrimental
Effects of all previously approved and disapproved Actions that are ma-
terially relevant to the Approved Action. The goal behind requiring
board or committee consideration of this information is to ensure that
past Actions, whether approved or disapproved, are considered when
deciding whether or not to approve an Action currently under consider-
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ation. By considering their past Actions, boards and committees will
have the opportunity to discern patterns of favoritism and neglect and to
take any appropriate corrective measures. Importantly, this is an objec-
tive test that allows the courts to address patterns of favoritism and neg-
lect if a board or committee fails to do so. Courts, however, would re-
view only previously approved and disapproved Actions that had a
"material relevance" to the Approved Action at issue.262
One final point on "Information" must be made. Clause (B) of
"materially relevant information" specifically requires the board or a
committee to consider one highly relevant piece of information when
deciding whether to approve an intergroup transaction. That piece of in-
formation is, with respect to each Business Group involved in such
transaction, the board's or committee's reasonable judgment as to how a
wholly independent board or committee of a stand-alone corporation
with characteristics substantially similar to such Business Group would
assess the transaction. In other words, the board or committee must
"stand in the shoes" of a theoretical, wholly independent board or com-
mittee and make a reasonable judgment as to how that board or com-
mittee would assess the transaction under consideration.263 If, standing
in those shoes, the board or committee decides that the theoretical board
or committee would vote against the transaction, then the actual board
or committee must have a compelling reason to go ahead with it. Other-
wise, the transaction would be highly suspect on fairness grounds.264
The purpose of the third operative provision of Section (a) is to
provide a substantive review of the board's or committee's Approved
Action. Unlike in a substantive due care review, mere "rationality" is
not the standard against which a court will evaluate that Action.265
Rather, concepts of fairness and reasonableness form the backdrop for
this type of substantive review.266 When evaluating a particular decision,
262. It is assumed that the relevance of any particular approved or disapproved
Action diminishes as time passes.
263. Cf. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.
1994) ("[F]aimess ... can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent,
board of directors."(quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709-10 n.7)).
264. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
266. As Lawrence E. Mitchell wrote in his analysis of the "horizontal" conflicts
arising between competing participants in a corporate capital structure, "fairness, prop-
erly applied, is supremely well-suited to a situation in which there exist competing
claimants to the same property." Mitchell, supra note 15, at 475. Professor Mitchell has
added that "[flaimess, as defined by and as used throughout our legal system, is a con-
cept of balance, of proportionality among the parties to a transaction or proceeding."
Mitchell, supra note 231, at 426. For a listing of the academic literature on fairness as
used in the corporate context, see id. at 428 n.13.
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however, a court will use a subjective test. That is, it will judge the fair-
ness and reasonableness of the Approved Action through the eyes of the
board or committee. If, after receiving and considering the requisite
amount of Information in advance, a board or committee of Disinter-
ested Directors "reasonably believed" the Approved Action was fair
and reasonable to all involved, a court's inquiry will end. However, the
reasonableness of the board's or committee's belief is inextricably tied
to the Information considered by it. Therefore, if a court finds, based on
such Information, that the board's or committee's belief is unreasonable,
a plaintiff's challenge should prevail, unless one of the remedial provi-
sions of Section (b) of the duty of fairness is satisfied.267
The third operative provision thus requires boards and committees
to follow a balanced approach to decisionmaking that weighs both- the
benefits and detriments of Approved Actions, viable alternative Actions
and previously approved or disapproved related Actions. Decisions
made by a disinterested board or committee based on such a balanced
approach will be deemed to be fair and reasonable, even if hindsight ul-
timately indicates otherwise. Importantly, "fair and reasonable" does
not necessarily mean absolutely "equal, ' 268 as "equality" is just one
shade of fairness and reasonableness.2 69 As stated earlier, requiring ex-
actly equal treatment of the various Business Groups is a simplistic, im-
267. An interesting parallel in this regard can be found by looking at how the
courts evaluate challenges brought against corporations that have adopted defensive
measures in a corporate takeover context. In this regard, the initial burden is on the di-
rectors to show that "they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness existed" and that any defensive action taken by them was
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955, 958 (Del. 1985); see also Moran v. Household Intl. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356 (Del. 1985); BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4.6 (Supp. 1996).
268. Delaware law, in fact, has long recognized that different groups of stockhold-
ers need not always be treated equally for all purposes. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1376-77 (Del. 1993) (holding that establishment of employee stock owner-
ship plan and key man life insurance programs that provided liquidity to employee
stockholders but not nonemployee stockholders was valid); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957
(holding discriminatory exchange offer was valid); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-
56 (Del. 1964) (holding stock buyback of leading holder's shares at above-market price
to be valid).
269. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have written:
Many scholars, though few courts, conclude that one aspect of fiduciary duty is
the equal treatment of investors. Their argument takes the following form: fiduci-
ary principles require fair conduct; hence, fiduciary principles require equal treat-
ment. The conclusion does not follow. The argument depends on an equivalence
between equal and fair treatment.




practical solution that would likely lead all Business Groups down the
path of mediocrity.
2. Remedial Nature of Section (b)
Section (b) of the duty of fairness contains fall back provisions to
Section (a). In other words, it allows an Approved Action that has
failed to meet the requirements of Section (a) nevertheless to be
deemed fair and reasonable to all parties. Under Section (b), an imper-
iled Approved Action can be remediated, and thus directors can avoid
liability, in one of two ways.
First, an imperiled Approved Action can be remediated through its
subsequent ratification by the holders of a majority of shares of each
class or series of capital stock, voting as a separate class or series.
Thus, if an Approved Action fails to meet the requirements of Section
(a) because, for example, directors did not consider the requisite amount
of Information, subsequent stockholder ratification of the Approved
Action will save it. For ratification to be effective, however, two things
must occur. First, the holders of each class or series of capital stock,
voting as a separate class or series, must ratify it. This means, among
other things, that the group of stockholders most disadvantaged by the
Approved Action must affirmatively ratify it. Second, the corporation
must have provided its stockholders with such "Information" as is nec-
essary for them to make an informed decision. In addition to the kinds
of information previously discussed, clause (C) of "materially relevant
information" requires that the corporation inform its stockholders of the
nature and extent of the interest of any Interested Director.
Second, an imperiled Approved Action can be remediated through
a judicial determination that it is fair and reasonable to all involved.
This ensures the rightful remediation of an Approved Action that is oth-
erwise fair and reasonable but which did not meet the requirements of
Section (a) because, for example, a majority of Disinterested Directors
failed to approve it. Unlike Section (a), which looks at fairness subjec-
tively through the eyes of directors, Section (b) looks at fairness objec-
tively through the eyes of a court. Thus, Section (b) provides a tougher
standard of fairness than Section (a). This enhancement, coupled with
the fact that the burden of proof is on directors, is designed to en-
courage directors to comply fully with the provisions of Section (a)
when making decisions that can have materially disparate impacts on
the various Business Groups and their stockholders.
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D. Practical Advice for Boards of Tracking Stock Corporations
Tracking stock directors are not to be envied. As seen above, the
corporate decisions and policies they make can have disparate impacts
on the various business groups of their corporations and the trading
value of the shares of stock linked to those groups. Sooner or later, the
plaintiff securities bar will wake up to this fact and start bringing chal-
lenges that focus on those disparate impacts. When this happens, the
courts will have to decide whether, as advocated in this article, tracking
stock directors owe additional fairness-based duties to the stockholders
of their corporations or whether the business judgement rule will pre-
vail. Accordingly, it is naive - and risky - for tracking stock direc-
tors to make decisions and policies under the belief that the status .quo
will rule the day.
What, therefore, should a tracking stock corporation and its direc-
tors be doing to ensure victory in the coming showdown with the plain-
tiff securities bar? Several things come to mind. First and foremost, the
corporation's board and committees should voluntarily satisfy the provi-
sions of Section (a) of the duty of fairness described above. This means
that board decisions must be made by "disinterested directors" as such
term is defined by the duty of fairness. Tracking stock directors holding
Disproportionate Equity Positions should modify their holdings so that
their ownership ratios reasonably reflect the outstanding share ratio of
the corporation. In addition, if any officer of that corporation is a mem-
ber of the board, that officer should have duties running to the entire
corporation. If she does not, then she should resign from the board
immediately.
With respect to its decisionmaking process, a tracking stock board
must take a proactive, balanced approach to evaluating alternative
courses of action that can have disparate impacts. This means that a
board should not only consider the pros and cons of all viable alterna-
tive courses of action,. but that it should also view those alternatives in
light of historical courses of action it previously considered and either
took or rejected. Based on this information, the board should make de-
cisions that it considers fair and reasonable to all involved.
In order to ensure that each stockholder group is adequately repre-
sented in the boardroom, a tracking stock corporation should consider
allowing each group to nominate and elect at least one director at each
annual meeting.270 For example, if a given tracking stock corporation
270. Ample precedent for this type of arrangement exists with respect to both
common and preferred stockholders. See Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800 (Del. 1966);
BALoTr & FMNKEsTE, supra note 7, § 4.4 (Supp. 1996). See generally FRANKLIN A.
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has a board consisting of ten directors and the holders of its two classes
of tracking stock hold 70% and 30% of the voting power, respectively,
then a charter provision could be adopted that allows the 70% group to
elect seven directors and the 30% group to elect the remaining three di-
rectors. 271 Just as most tracking stock corporations alter the voting
power of their various stockholder groups at predetermined intervals
based on changes in the relative market values of their different classes
of tracking stock, so too could the number of directors that the various
stockholder groups are entitled to elect be altered. In this way, every
stockholder group will have elected at least one director to the board
who will voice that group's concerns.
Clearly, this article contemplates that tracking stock directors will
spend a greater amount of time and energy in overseeing tracking stock
corporations than their counterparts will spend overseeing conventional
corporations. 272 For this added burden no apology is forthcoming. In-
deed, given the substantial concerns that arise in a tracking stock con-
text, a lesser effort by tracking stock directors would be a true disser-
vice to the stockholders who have placed their trust in them. Tracking
stock directors are the proper parties to be charged with ensuring that
the novel equity structures of their corporations work for all of their
stockholders regardless of the business group to which their shares are
linked.
CONCLUSION
This article has described a novel equity structure that employs
tracking or targeted stocks. Through this structure shares of different
classes of common stock are economically linked to the performance of
distinct business groups operated by a tracking stock corporation. While
the goal of implementing this equity structure is the enhancement of
GavuRT4z BusuIms PLANNING 424-25 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the issuance of two or
more classes of stock with differing voting rights). Indeed, Delaware law specifically
provides for this: "The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any
class or series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such
term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation."
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1991).
271. The best time to implement this type of charter provision is, of course, at the
time a corporation implements a tracking stock equity structure.
272. At a minimum, tracking stock directors will have to become much more fa-
miliar with the financial statements of the various business groups of their corporations
in order to make informed decisions that impact those groups. In addition, they must
expect additional pressure from various stockholder groups whenever their corporations
experience serious financial difficulties of the type that Kmart Corp. previously faced
and most likely is still facing today. See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
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stockholder value, this structure carries with it the heavy baggage of in-
tergroup conflicts. These conflicts raise substantial issues involving fair-
ness and favoritism in directorial decisionmaking. In addition, new di-
rectorial loyalty concerns arise when directors hold Disproportionate
Equity Positions.
The traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty were not de-
signed to, nor do they, address these concerns. The duty of care and the
business judgment rule only require directors to adhere to a minimal
standard of care and prudence. The duty of loyalty, with its focus on the
corporation as a whole, is ill-equipped to handle the disproportionate
ownership problems of a tracking stock corporation that play out in un-
orthodox ways. While the traditional duties of care and loyalty can and
should continue to play a role in the corporate governance of tracking
stock corporations, a new duty is needed to ensure that directorial deci-
sions and policies are made in a way that promotes fairness and reason-
ableness rather than favoritism and neglect.
This author advocates that a duty of fairness be adopted either stat-
utorily or judicially. Until it is, tracking stock corporations should vol-
untarily comply with this duty. Compliance would be required when-
ever a tracking stock corporate board makes a decision or formulates a"
policy that will have a materially disparate impact on that corporation's
business groups and related stockholders. Decisions and policies of this
nature must be approved by directors who are "disinterested" in a
tracking stock context. They should be based on a balanced approach to
decisionmaking that requires a careful evaluation of the benefits and
drawbacks of alternative courses of action. They should be made in the
context of historical courses of action previously considered and either
taken or rejected by the board in order to prevent patterns of favoritism
and neglect from developing. Finally, they should be fair and reasona-
ble to all parties in light of all the information before the board.
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